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XIXXXEinleitung
Problemstellung
Die Besteuerung von Zinsen, Dividenden und Kursgewinnen privater Anleger hat
einen erheblichen Ein￿uss auf deren Anlageentscheidungen.
Durch die Besteuerung des Wertzuwachses von angelegten Mitteln sinkt der An-
reiz, den heutigen Konsum zu Gunsten des zuk￿nftigen Konsums zu reduzieren, da
die Pr￿mie f￿r den heutigen Konsumverzicht in Form der Rendite auf die angeleg-
ten Mittel geringer ausf￿llt. Dar￿ber hinaus hat die Besteuerung einen Ein￿uss auf
die optimale Portfoliozusammensetzung privater Anleger, wenn sich die steuerliche
Behandlung verschiedener Wertpapiere unterscheidet.
Sowohl in Deutschland als auch in den USA ￿ndet eine unterschiedliche steu-
erliche Behandlung von Ertr￿gen aus Zinsen und Dividenden auf der einen Seite
und Ertr￿gen aus Kursgewinnen auf der anderen Seite statt. Insbesondere werden
Kursgewinne unter bestimmten Voraussetzungen nach aktuellem Rechtsstand mit
einem geringeren Steuersatz belegt als Ertr￿ge aus Zinsen und Dividenden. Da ver-
schiedene Anlageklassen, wie etwa festverzinsliche Wertpapiere oder Aktien, zu sehr
unterschiedlichen Teilen ihre Ertr￿ge aus diesen beiden Quellen beziehen, werden
somit auch diese Anlageklassen steuerlich ungleich behandelt.
Die zentralen Kernergebnisse dieser Arbeit werden auf Basis eines Steuersystems
erarbeitet, welches in Grundz￿gen dem US-amerikanischen nachempfunden wurde.
Da sich die US-amerikanischen Regelungen und die Regelungen des deutschen Steu-
errechts bez￿glich der steuerlichen Behandlung von Anlageerfolgen in ihren Grund-
z￿gen stark ￿hneln, lassen sich viele zentrale Kernaussagen auf Deutschland ￿bertra-
gen. Zu der Bedeutung etwaiger Unterschiede wird in den Anh￿ngen zu den Kapiteln
2 und 3 kurz eingegangen.
1Nimmt man an, dass die gemeinsame Verteilung der einzelnen Ertragsbestandtei-
le der verschiedenen Wertpapiere bekannt ist und f￿r die beiden Ertragsbestandteile
konstante Steuers￿tze gelten, so l￿sst sich unter Umst￿nden die optimale Anlageent-
scheidung unter Ber￿cksichtigung von Steuern in einem Modell ohne Steuern berech-
nen, indem die gemeinsame Verteilung entsprechend angepasst wird. Jedoch kennt
sowohl das deutsche als auch das US-amerikanische Steuerrecht einige besondere
Regelungen, die eine R￿ckf￿hrung des Problems mit Steuern auf ein Problem ohne
Steuern unm￿glich machen und damit eine explizite Modellierung der steuerlichen
Regelungen erfordern. Im Rahmen dieser Arbeit wird neben der Ber￿cksichtigung
von Steuers￿tzen unterschiedlicher H￿he f￿r Kursgewinne und Zinsen/Dividenden
der Ein￿uss der folgenden f￿r Privatanleger besonders bedeutenden Regelungen un-
tersucht:
• Kursgewinne werden im Vergleich zu Ertr￿gen aus Dividenden und Zinsen
nicht bei Entstehen, sondern erst bei ihrer Realisation versteuert. Dies bietet
dem Anleger die M￿glichkeit, den Zeitpunkt der Besteuerung durch Wahl des
Ver￿u￿erungszeitpunktes selbst zu w￿hlen (so genannte tax-timing Option)
und bei Nichtver￿u￿erung unter Ausnutzung des Zins- und Zinseszinse￿ektes
noch Ertr￿ge auf die noch nicht geleisteten Steuerzahlungen zu erwirtschaften.
• Mittel, die in speziellen Altersvorsorgekonten oder -vertr￿gen, wie etwa den
deutschen Riestervertr￿gen oder den US-amerikanischen Individual Retire-
ment Accounts bespart werden, genie￿en eine steuerliche Sonderbehandlung.
In der Regel kommt es im Rahmen von Altersvorsorgekonten oder -vertr￿gen
zu einer so genannten nachgelagerten Besteuerung, die im Wesentlichen darin
besteht, dass die Einzahlung aus unversteuertem Einkommen erfolgt, die Ent-
nahme hingegen der Einkommensteuer unterliegt. Weiterhin sind Einzahlun-
gen in solche Konten begrenzt, w￿hrend Entnahmen nach bestimmten Rege-
lungen erfolgen m￿ssen, vor Eintritt des Rentenalters grunds￿tzlich steuerlich
sanktioniert werden und Ertr￿ge, die auf einem solchen Konto erwirtschaftet
werden, steuerfrei sind.1 Durch die Steuerfreiheit der Ertr￿ge hat also nicht
nur die Wahl des Anlegers, welche Wertpapiere er besparen m￿chte (asset
1F￿r eine detaillierte Unterscheidung der unterschiedlichen Typen von Altersvorsorgekonten und
weitere Einzelheiten der steuerlichen Behandlung von Mitteln in diesen Konten sei auf Kapitel 1
verwiesen.
2allocation), sondern auch die Frage, in welchem Kontentyp er welche Wert-
papiere besparen m￿chte (asset location), Ein￿uss auf die Entwicklung seines
Verm￿gens.
• Realisierte Kursgewinne und Kursverluste werden steuerlich unterschiedlich
behandelt. W￿hrend in einem Jahr realisierte Kursgewinne grunds￿tzlich voll
steuerp￿ichtig sind und den Anlageerfolg mindern, werden realisierte Kursver-
luste nicht unbegrenzt steuerp￿ichtig. Es ￿ndet also keine oder nur eine be-
schr￿nkte Steuererstattung f￿r erlittene Kursverluste statt. 2 Stattdessen wird
ein Verlustvortrag einger￿umt, der in zuk￿nftigen Perioden mit etwaigen rea-
lisierten Kursgewinnen verrechnet werden kann und die zuk￿nftige Steuerbe-
lastung mindert.
Im Gegensatz zu Steuererstattungen weist ein Verlustvortrag zwei wesentliche
Nachteile f￿r den Anleger auf. Zum einen bleibt ein solcher Verlustvortrag im
Gegensatz zu Steuererstattungen, die wieder angelegt werden k￿nnen, unver-
zinst. Zum anderen hat ein Verlustvortrag nur dann f￿r den Anleger einen
Wert, wenn er diesen Verlustvortrag einsetzen und zu Geld machen kann, also
in zuk￿nftigen Perioden mit realisierten Kursgewinnen verrechnen kann oder
in Steuersystemen, die Steuererstattungen f￿r erlittene Kursverluste gew￿hren,
in zuk￿nftigen Perioden als erlittenen Kursverlust deklarieren kann, um Steu-
err￿ckerstattungen zu erhalten. W￿hrend im deutschen Steuersystem grund-
s￿tzlich f￿r Privatpersonen keine Steuererstattungen f￿r erlittene Kursverluste
vorgesehen sind, gew￿hrt das US-amerikanische Steuerrecht f￿r Kursverluste,
die den Betrag von $ 3.000 im Jahr nicht ￿bersteigen, die M￿glichkeit, diese
mit anderem Einkommen zu verrechnen.
W￿hrend die Bedeutung des tax-timing 3 und die Bedeutung von Altersvorsorge-
konten und -vertr￿gen4 bereits in verschiedenen Arbeiten untersucht worden sind, 5
wurde der Bedeutung der asymmetrischen Behandlung von realisierten Kursgewin-
2Durch eine solche Regelung soll sichergestellt werden, dass das Steueraufkommen in Zeiten schlech-
ter B￿rsenentwicklung nicht zu stark sinkt.
3Siehe etwa Constantinides (1983, 1984), Dammon et al. (1989), Dammon und Spatt (1996), Dam-
mon et al. (2001, 2004), Chay et al. (2006) und Gallmeyer et al. (2006).
4Siehe etwa Shoven und Sialm (1998, 2003), Dammon et al. (2004), Poterba et al. (2004), Huang
(2007), Garlappi und Huang (2006), Gomes et al. (2006) und Zaman (2007).
5Die Arbeit von Dammon et al. (2004) vereint sogar beide Ans￿tze und untersucht simultan den
Ein￿uss von tax-timing und Altersvorsorgekonten.
3nen und -verlusten noch keine gro￿e Beachtung geschenkt. Deren Untersuchung stellt
einen Schwerpunkt der vorliegenden Arbeit dar.
Die vorliegende Dissertationsschrift besteht aus in drei englischsprachigen Auf-
s￿tzen. Das Kapitel 1 enth￿lt die Ergebnisse des gemeinsam mit Prof. Dr. Raimond
Maurer durchgef￿hrten Forschungsprojekts ￿How Unobservable Bond Positions in
Retirement Accounts A￿ect Asset Allocation￿. Der Artikel ￿Optimal Tax-Timing
and Asset Allocation when Tax Rebates on Capital Losses are Limited￿ bildet das
Kapitel 2. Das Kapitel 3 enth￿lt den Aufsatz ￿Are Bonds Desirable in Tax-Deferred
Accounts?￿. Im nachfolgenden Abschnitt wird auf die wichtigsten Ergebnisse der
einzelnen Beitr￿ge eingegangen.
Einordnung der Ergebnisse
Ziel des Artikels ￿How unobservable Bond Positions in Retirement Accounts a￿ect
Asset Allocation￿, welches das Kapitel 1 der vorliegenden Arbeit bildet, ist es, die
Bedeutung der M￿glichkeit in ein steuerbefreites Altersvorsorgekonto anlegen zu
k￿nnen, f￿r die asset allocation eines privaten Anlegers zu analysieren. Im Abschnitt
￿Tax-E￿ects in Retirement Accounts￿, der das Herzst￿ck darstellt, wird gezeigt, dass
sich die Entwicklung des zu einem bestimmten Zeitpunkt in einem gew￿hnlichen und
einem Altersvorsorgekonto angelegten Verm￿gens in zwei Summanden zerlegen l￿sst.
Der erste Summand beschreibt die Entwicklung des Verm￿gens, das der Anleger
ohne ein steuerbefreites Altersvorsorgekontos erzielt h￿tte. Der zweite Summand
beschreibt den Teil des Endverm￿gens, der auf die Steuerfreiheit der Ertr￿ge im
Altersvorsorgekonto zur￿ckzuf￿hren ist.
Der E￿ekt, der aus der Steuerfreiheit der Ertr￿ge resultiert, l￿sst sich weiter
zerlegen in einen direkten und einen indirekten Steuere￿ekt. W￿hrend der direkte
Steuere￿ekt den E￿ekt der Erh￿hung des Gesamtverm￿gens aus einer Anlageent-
scheidung misst, der aus der Steuerfreiheit der Ertr￿ge in der Entscheidungsperiode
resultiert, misst der indirekte Steuere￿ekt den Ein￿uss, der durch die Ver￿nderung
des Altersvorsorgeverm￿gens entsteht, welches in zuk￿nftigen Perioden die Gene-
rierung steuerbefreiter Ertr￿ge erlaubt. Insbesondere die Bedeutung des indirekten
Steuere￿ekts nimmt mit zunehmender L￿nge des verbleibenden Anlagehorizonts auf-
grund des Zinseszinse￿ekts stark zu.
4Unter den in der Literatur ￿blichen Annahmen an das Steuersystem zeigt Huang
(2007) mit Hilfe eines Replikationsarguments, dass im Altersvorsorgekonto bevor-
zugt risikofreie Wertpapiere gehalten werden sollten. Halten private Anleger in ihrem
Altersvorsorgekonto bevorzugt risikolose Wertpapiere, so werfen diese aufgrund der
Steuerfreiheit der Ertr￿ge im Altersvorsorgekonto h￿here Ertr￿ge ab als sie dies im
konventionellen Depot tun w￿rden. Ein risikoloses Wertpapier im Altersvorsorge-
konto hat also einen h￿heren Ein￿uss auf das zuk￿nftige Verm￿gen als ein risiko-
loses Wertpapier im konventionellen Depot. Der Anleger h￿lt also gewisserma￿en
￿unobservable bonds￿ in Form gegenw￿rtiger und zuk￿nftiger ￿berrenditen aus der
Steuerfreiheit seiner Ertr￿ge der festverzinslichen Wertpapiere im Altersvorsorge-
konto. Da der Ein￿uss der Steuerfreiheit der Ertr￿ge auf das Gesamtverm￿gen mit
sinkendem Anlagehorizont abnimmt, muss der Anleger seinen Anteil des risikofreien
Wertpapiers im Laufe des Lebenszyklus sukzessive erh￿hen und folglich seinen Ak-
tienanteil sukzessive senken, wenn er sein Endverm￿gen nicht mit steigendem Alter
h￿heren Risiken aussetzen m￿chte.
Der Artikel ￿Optimal Tax-Timing and Asset Allocation when Tax Rebates on Ca-
pital Losses are Limited￿ bildet das Kapitel 2 dieser Dissertationsschrift. Im Mittel-
punkt der Betrachtung steht hier die Untersuchung optimaler tax-timing Strategien
f￿r Anleger, die in Steuersystemen handeln, welche Steuererstattungen f￿r realisier-
te Kursverluste begrenzen. Eine solche Begrenzung gibt es sowohl im deutschen als
auch im US-amerikanischen Steuersystem.
Im analytischen Teil wird in Erweiterung von Constantinides (1983) gezeigt, dass
es auch in solchen Steuersystemen optimal bleibt, erlittene Kursverluste sofort zu
realisieren, obwohl die Kompensation f￿r die erlittenen Verluste in Form eines sich
nicht verzinsenden Verlustvortrags deutlich unattraktiver ausf￿llt als eine Steuer-
erstattung in einem Steuersystem mit symmetrischer Behandlung von realisierten
Kursgewinnen und -verlusten wie bei Constantinides.
Im numerischen Teil wird in Erweiterung der Arbeit von Dammon et al. (2001)
gezeigt, dass die asymmetrische Behandlung von Kursgewinnen und -verlusten grund-
s￿tzlich zu einer deutlich geringeren Aktienquote f￿hrt. Dies liegt daran, dass das
Rendite-Risiko-Pro￿l von Aktien deutlich unattraktiver wird, da ein Verlustvortrag
einen deutlich geringeren Nutzen mit sich bringt als eine Steuererstattung. Verf￿gt
ein Anleger hingegen bereits ￿ber einen Verlustvortrag, so f￿hrt dies in Steuer-
5systemen ohne Steuerstattungen f￿r realisierte Kursverluste dazu, dass der Anle-
ger seine Aktienquote wieder geringf￿gig erh￿ht, da der Verlustvortrag dem Anle-
ger erlaubt, zuk￿nftige Kursgewinne teilweise steuerfrei zu vereinnahmen, was sein
Rendite-Risiko-Pro￿l wiederum verbessert.
Kapitel 3 ist der mit Abstand j￿ngste Aufsatz der vorliegenden Arbeit und unter-
sucht die Bedeutung der asymmetrischen Behandlung von realisierten Kursgewinnen
und -verlusten f￿r die asset location Entscheidung privater Anleger. W￿hrend die
existierende Literatur fast ￿bereinstimmend feststellt, dass risikofreie festverzinsliche
Wertpapiere in Altersvorsorgekonten bespart werden sollten, 6 halten private Anle-
ger in der Realit￿t nicht unerhebliche Aktienquoten in ihren Altersvorsorgekonten.
Diese Diskrepanz zwischen den empirisch beobachtbaren Anlagestrategien privater
Anleger und den theoretischen Ergebnissen der Literatur wird von Amromin (2003)
auch als Asset Location Puzzle bezeichnet.
Kapitel 3 zeigt, dass dieses Puzzle durch die Einf￿hrung einer asymmetrischen
Behandlung von Kursgewinnen und -verlusten erkl￿rt werden kann. Dies liegt im
Wesentlichen daran, dass das Replikationsargument von Huang (2007), auf dem die
Dominanz des risikofreien Wertpapiers basiert, aufgrund der asymmetrischen Be-
handlung von Kursgewinnen und -verlusten nicht mehr anwendbar ist. Wenn man
auf positive oder negative Kursgewinne bedingt, also annimmt, dass bekannt ist,
ob in der betrachteten Periode Kursgewinne oder -verluste erzielt werden, bleiben
risikofreie festverzinsliche Wertpapiere das bevorzugte Wertpapier im Altersvorsor-
gekonto. Ist das Vorzeichen der Kursgewinne der Periode jedoch nicht zu Beginn
dieser Periode messbar, so bleibt dieses Ergebnis nicht g￿ltig, da sich die Replika-
tionsportfolios f￿r positive und negative Kursgewinne voneinander unterscheiden.
Somit bleibt ein Replikationsrisiko. Um die Auswirkungen dieses Risikos gering zu
halten, kann es sinnvoll sein, Aktien sowohl im konventionellen als auch im Alters-
6Arbeiten, die dieser verbreiteten Ansicht nicht folgen, sind die von Shoven (1999), Garlappi und
Huang (2006) und Zhou (2007). Die Arbeit von Shoven (1999) basiert auf historischen Renditen
und zeigt, dass es historisch f￿r eine Einmalanlage g￿nstiger war, Aktien im Altersvorsorgekon-
to zu besparen. Allerdings vernachl￿ssigt Shoven in seiner Analyse das h￿here Risiko, welches
mit einem Aktieninvestment im Altersvorsorgekonto verbunden ist. Garlappi und Huang (2006)
zeigen in einem Zweiperiodenmodell mit binomialverteilten Renditen f￿r einen Anleger mit Leer-
verkaufsrestriktionen und logarithmischer Nutzenfunktion, dass es optimal sein kann, auch im
Altersvorsorgekonto einen Aktienanteil zu halten. Zhou (2007) argumentiert, die optimale Allo-
kation von Aktien h￿nge davon ab, wie oft Gewinne im konventionellen Konto realisiert werden.
In ihrer Studie ignoriert sie dabei jedoch Diversi￿kationsgesichtspunkte, welche, wie etwa Dam-
mon et al. (2001) und die Ergebnisse von Kapitel 2 zeigen, von enormer Bedeutung sind. Zhou
betrachtet den Anteil der realisieren Kursgewinne als exogen.
6vorsorgekonto zu besparen.
W￿hrend f￿r positive Kursgewinne die Rendite von Aktien im Altersvorsorgekon-
to h￿her ist und bei entsprechender H￿he den Steuervorteil von risikofreien festver-
zinslichen Wertpapieren ￿berkompensieren kann, sind Aktien bei negativen Kurs-
gewinnen im konventionellen Konto aufgrund des dort gew￿hrten Verlustvortrags
besser aufgehoben. Unter Diversi￿kationsgesichtspunkten bietet es sich deshalb an,
Aktien sowohl im konventionellen als auch im Altersvorsorgekonto zu besparen.
Dieses Ergebnis steht im direkten Gegensatz zur bisherigen asset location Li-
teratur, die in Steuersystemen mit symmetrischer Behandlung von Kursgewinnen
und -verlusten arbeitet und grunds￿tzlich risikofreie festverzinsliche Wertpapiere im
Altersvorsorgekonto emp￿ehlt. Insbesondere l￿sst sich also mit Hilfe einer unter-
schiedlichen steuerlichen Behandlung von Kursgewinnen und -verlusten das Asset
Location Puzzle erkl￿ren.
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9Abstract
Many tax-codes around the world allow for special taxable treatment of savings in
retirement accounts. In particular, pro￿ts in retirement accounts are usually tax
exempt which allow investors to increase an asset’s return by holding it in such
a retirement account. While the existing literature on asset location shows that
risk-free bonds are usually the preferred asset to hold in a retirement account, we
explain how the tax exemption of pro￿ts in retirement accounts a￿ects private in-
vestors’ asset allocation. We show that total ￿nal wealth can be decomposed into
what the investor would have earned in a taxable account and what is due to the
tax exemption of pro￿ts in the retirement account. The tax exemption of pro￿ts
can thus be considered a tax-gift which is similar to an implicit bond holding. As
this tax-gift’s impact on total ￿nal wealth decreases over time, so does the investor’s
equity exposure.
JEL Classi￿cation Codes: G11, H24
Key Words: asset location, asset allocation, tax-deferred accounts, tax exempt
accounts
101.1 Introduction
Pro￿ts from dividends, interest and capital gains are usually subject to taxation.
In tax-sheltered retirement accounts, however, pro￿ts remain untaxed which allows
the return of an asset to increase from its after-tax to its pre-tax return by holding
it in such a tax-sheltered retirement account. This paper explains optimal asset
allocation (i.e. which assets to hold) and asset location (i.e. in which account to
hold these assets) for investors having the opportunity to invest in both taxable
and retirement accounts. In particular, it explains why the equity exposure in both
taxable as well as retirement wealth decreases with a decreasing investment horizon.
It is most closely related to the recent literature on optimal asset location deci-
sions including Shoven and Sialm (1998), Shoven and Sialm (2003), Dammon et al.
(2004), Poterba et al. (2004), Huang (2007) and Garlappi and Huang (2006). These
papers conclude that assets facing a high tax-burden should generally be located
in retirement accounts, while assets facing a low tax-burden are better located in
conventional taxable accounts. Garlappi and Huang (2006), however, show that this
￿nding does not hold in general.
While, in general, the existing literature shows that risk-free bonds are the pre-
ferred asset to hold in the retirement account, we explain how the investor’s equity
exposure in both the taxable and the retirement account depends on the length of
the remaining investment horizon and the fraction of total wealth in the retirement
account. Due to the tax exemption of pro￿ts in the retirement account, total wealth
contains a tax-gift which becomes bigger as the remaining investment horizon in-
creases. As bonds are usually the preferred asset to hold in a retirement account the
tax-gift can be considered an implicit bond holding that is not directly observable in
security accounts. As this tax-gift decreases with decreasing length of the remain-
ing investment horizon, so does the unobservable bond holding and the observable
equity exposure.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 reviews the related literature. Sec-
tion 1.3 introduces the model and discusses the tax-e￿ects of investments into tax-
sheltered retirement accounts. Section 1.4 provides numerical evidence. Section 1.5
concludes.
11Taxation of TA TEA TDA
Contribution X X
Pro￿ts X
Withdrawal X
Table 1.1: Taxable treatment in di￿erent accounts
1.2 Prior Studies
Dilnot (1995) categorizes retirement accounts according to the taxable treatment of
contributions, pro￿ts and withdrawals. Even though theoretically, there are many
combinations of taxable treatments, in practice there are only three main types of
retirement accounts to be found. The so-called taxable accounts (TAs) are accounts
in which contributions can only be made from after-income-tax dollars, and where
pro￿ts are taxable and withdrawals are tax exempt. Tax-deferred accounts (TDAs)
such as IRAs are characterized by the opportunity to contribute to them from pre-
income-tax dollars, and withdrawals are taxable while pro￿ts are tax exempt. In tax
exempt accounts (TEAs) like Roth-IRAs, contributions are made from after income
tax dollars, pro￿ts are tax exempt, and withdrawals are usually tax-exempt. In
many countries, di￿erent kinds of accounts coexist with di￿erent taxable treatment.
Whereas TAs can be used for other investment objectives besides saving for retire-
ment, TEAs and TDAs are pure retirement accounts. Early withdrawals from them
are subject to a penalty tax and contributions to them are limited by law. As only
TAs are ￿exible enough to be used as saving accounts for other investment objectives
as well, only TEAs and TDAs are referred to as retirement accounts (RAs) in this
article. Due to the di￿ering taxable treatment of the funds in the various accounts,
investing a pre-tax dollar in each of the separate types of accounts usually results
in varying risk-return pro￿les of that dollar and di￿erent changes in the investor’s
wealth. Table 1.1 summarizes the taxable treatment of the three di￿erent types of
accounts.
Although optimal asset allocation is a topic that has been intensively discussed
in economic literature, research on optimal asset location is quite a recent ￿eld
of research. It goes back to studies of Tepper and A￿eck (1974), Black (1980)
and Tepper (1981). They analyze optimal investment strategies of companies that
run de￿ned-bene￿t pension plans. If these companies do not face any short-selling
12restrictions and their gains are fully taxable at the moment of occurrence (i.e. there
is no deferral option), they should hold bonds only in their de￿ned-bene￿t pension
plan, where the taxable treatment is similar to that of TEAs. Auerbach and King
(1983) point out that this result also applies to investors having the opportunity to
invest into a retirement account and a TA.
Shoven and Sialm (1998) and Shoven (1999) introduce the problem of asset
location to household investment decisions and point out that each choice of an
investment strategy for retirement saving does not only contain a choice about the
assets to invest in (the so-called asset allocation problem), but also a choice about
which of these assets to locate in a retirement account and which to locate in a
taxable account (the so-called asset location problem). In their studies, they analyze
asset location and asset allocation decisions for simulated distributions of wealth.
They arrive at the conclusion that due to tax-ine￿ciency of many actively managed
mutual funds, these funds have their preferred location in a retirement account,
while tax exempt bonds should be held in a taxable account.
Bodie and Crane (1997), Poterba and Samwick (2001) and Barber and Odean
(2003) analyze asset location strategies used by private investors in practice. They
report that investors do not realize the opportunities that TDAs o￿er to them. In
particular, they often choose suboptimal asset location strategies. Contribution rates
have been found to have an especially substantial impact on utility losses (Gomes
et al. (2006)). Amromin (2002) and Bergstresser and Poterba (2004) report similar
￿ndings and further point out that many investors have considerable amounts of
money in both accounts and hold signi￿cantly more stocks in their TDAs than in
their TAs. Benartzi and Thaler (2001) point out that investors tend to follow naive
1
n-diversi￿cation strategies in their retirement accounts and pension plans and thus
the more stock funds o￿ered to them by these plans the more stocks investors tend
to hold.
According to Gale and Scholz (1994), the majority of investors in the US that
contribute to an individual retirement account are either older than 59 or have
substantial funds in a TA in addition to the funds in the IRA. Either of these cases
makes the need for an early withdrawal - which is accompanied by a penalty tax -
quite unlikely. This is why we put the focus of our analysis on the asset location and
asset allocation decisions induced by the tax-e￿ects and ignore early withdrawals.
13A dollar invested into a risk-free asset in an RA results in a higher after-tax yield
than a dollar invested into the same risk-free asset in a TA. Hence, the dollar in the
RA is worth more than the dollar in the TA, a fact which has been pointed out by
Dammon et al. (2004) and Poterba (2004). Dammon et al. (2004) call the di￿erence
between the value of the dollar in the TEA and the value of the dollar in the TA the
￿shadow price￿ of that dollar. This ￿shadow price￿ depends on the relative dividend
of the assets, the relative capital gains of the assets, the level of tax-rates on these
dividends and gains, and the length of the remaining investment horizon. Due to
the penalty tax for early withdrawal and the maximum contribution limits for TEAs
and TDAs, TAs are often used for retirement saving as well. Hence, private investors
saving for retirement usually only locate some part of their retirement savings in a
retirement account. Due to the di￿erence in taxable treatment of assets between
a taxable account and a retirement account, it is important to make an informed
decision as to which asset to locate in the retirement account and which to locate
in the taxable account.
The impact of tax-timing strategies on optimal asset location decisions is an-
alyzed in Dammon et al. (2004) and Zaman (2007). In Zaman’s numerical study,
stocks tend to have their preferred location in the taxable account to use potential
bene￿ts from tax-timing and exploit the higher tax-burden of bonds. This result
does not di￿er from that in Dammon et al. (2004), whose analysis contains only one
risky asset. This ￿nding suggests that it su￿ces to consider one risky asset in our
numerical analysis.
Furthermore, (long-term) capital gains are often subject to a lower tax-rate than
dividends and interest. This is why the returns on stocks that mainly consist of
capital gains tend to be taxed at a lower rate than the returns on bonds mainly
consisting of interest payments. For this reason, Shoven and Sialm (2003) argue
that bonds should have their preferred location in a retirement account and stocks
shall only be held there if no bonds are held in the taxable account at all. This
argument seems to be very convincing at ￿rst sight and has been shown to be
correct for investors that are not facing short-selling restrictions (see e.g. Dammon
et al. (2004), Shoven and Sialm (2003) or the theoretical paper of Huang (2007)).
However, Garlappi and Huang (2006) show that this does not necessarily hold if the
investor is short-selling constrained.
14If investors are facing high labor income risk and have limited liquid ￿nancial
resources, some papers, among them Amromin (2003), Dammon et al. (2004) and
Amromin (2005), argue that holding stocks in the retirement account and bonds
in the taxable account can also be an e￿cient investment strategy when taking la-
bor income shocks into account. They base their argument on the fact that due
to the lower volatility of bonds, holding them in the taxable account reduces the
probability of having to withdraw funds from the retirement account and to pay
the penalty tax. The higher the probability and the order of magnitude of income
shocks and the lower the liquid ￿nancial resources, the better the strategy to hold
su￿cient TA-wealth in bonds. Besides, under current law there seem to be tax arbi-
trage opportunities between savings in retirement accounts and mortgage payments
(Amromin et al. (2007)). The literature on taxation and optimal portfolio choice is
surveyed in Poterba (2002b) and Campbell (2006).
While the focus of the existing literature is on the asset location decision, we
concentrate on the impact of the tax-e￿ects in retirement accounts for the investor’s
asset allocation decision.
1.3 Tax-E￿ects in Retirement Accounts
1.3.1 E￿ects of Tax Deferral
In this article it is assumed that dividends, interest, and capital gains in the TA are
taxable at occurrence. That is, no matter if realized or not, capital gains are fully
taxable, i.e. there is no tax-timing option. Equivalently one could also assume the
corresponding tax-rate to be the ￿e￿ective tax-rate￿ as described in Constantinides
(1983), which re￿ects the unmodeled optimal tax realization strategy in the risky
asset. It is further assumed that the investor cannot go short and there is no need for
an early withdrawal from a retirement account. This in particular implies that the
investor does not have to pay the penalty tax for early withdrawal at any point in
time. A market with n assets is considered. Assets can be traded without incurring
any transaction costs.
Let αl,i,t denote the proportion of asset i in period t with location l ∈ {R,T},
in which R denotes the location in a retirement account (TDA or TEA) and T de-
15notes a location in the taxable account. Let αl,t ≡ (αl,1,t,...,αl,n,t)> be the vector
of proportions of the n assets in period t with location l. 0 ≤ τd < 1 denotes the
constant tax-rate on dividends and interest, and 0 ≤ τg < 1 the constant tax-rate
on capital gains. In particular, it is assumed that short-term and long-term capital
gains are subject to the same tax-rate. 0 ≤ dR,i,t and −1 ≤ gR,i,t are the dividend
or interest rate (dividend rate in this article) and the capital gains rate, respec-
tively, for asset i in period t in the retirement account (and thus on a pre-tax basis).
dT,i,t ≡ (1 − τd)dR,i,t and gT,i,t ≡ (1 − τg)gR,i,t denote the dividend rate and the cap-
ital gains rate of asset i in period t in the TA (and thus on an after-tax basis).
dl,t ≡ (dl,1,t,...,dl,n,t)> denotes the vector of dividend rates in period t with loca-
tion l and gl,t ≡ (gl,1,t,...,gl,n,t)> denotes the vector of capital gains rates in period t
with location l. 0 ≤ τp,t < 1 denotes an exogenously given personal income tax-rate
of the investor in period t. 1 denotes a column vector of n ones. The vector of gross
returns Rl,t in period t for assets with location l is given by Rl,t ≡ 1+dl,t+gl,t. WT,t
denotes the wealth of some investor in a TA and WR,t the wealth of that investor in
a RA at the end of period t.
Tax-deferred accounts allow deferring income taxation until withdrawal. That
means contributions to such tax-deferred accounts are made from pretax-income.
This is in contrast to taxable accounts and tax exempt accounts, where contributions
can only be made from after-tax dollars. Investors facing a high marginal income
tax rate at the time of contribution, but expecting a lower personal income tax-rate
at the time of withdrawal can lower their expected relative income tax burden by
an investment in a TDA.
Assume the investor is initially endowed with WT,0 dollars in a TA and WR,0
dollars in a TEA. For simplicity, she is not allowed to shift funds between the two
accounts and maximizes utility over a T-period investment horizon from total ￿nal
wealth WT ≡ WT,T + WR,T.
The investment decision of the investor can be decomposed into two parts. On
the one hand, the investor has to decide which assets to hold. This problem is known
as the asset allocation problem. On the other hand, she has to decide which of the
assets to hold in the retirement account and which in the taxable account. This prob-
lem is known as the asset location problem. In the remainder of this paper an asset
allocation for a T-period investment horizon is de￿ned to be a tuple (α1,...,αT) of
16vectors αt (t ∈ NT ≡ {n ∈ N|n ≤ T}), which contain the proportions of the assets
relative to total wealth Wt. An asset location for a T-period investment horizon with
investment opportunities in a retirement account and a TA is a tuple (L1,...,LT) of
tuples Lt = (αR,t,αT,t) (t ∈ NT), such that αt =
WT,t−1
Wt−1 αT,t +
WR,t−1
Wt−1 αR,t (t ∈ NT).
When returns are stochastic, WT,t, WR,t, and Wt are not known before the end of
period t, which is why αT,t+1,αR,t+1, and αt+1 also cannot be determined before
the end of period t, that is at the beginning of period t + 1. The tuple (I1,...,IT)
of tuples It = (αt,αR,t,αT,t) (t ∈ NT) is called an investment strategy. While the
asset allocation (α1,...,αT) provides information about proportions of the asset
relative to total wealth, the asset location (L1,...,LT) provides information about
the accounts in which these assets are held and with which proportions.
If one pre-income-tax dollar at the end of period 0 is invested in a TDA for a
T-period investment horizon and x · y denotes the Euclidian scalar product of two
n-dimensional vectors x and y, total ￿nal wealth after income tax is given by
T Y
t=1

αR,t · (1 + gR,t + dR,t)

(1 − τp,T) =
T Y
t=1
(αR,t · RT,t)(1 − τp,T). (1.1)
If one invests one such dollar for a T-period investment horizon in a TEA, income
taxation is already due at the time of contribution and one ends up with a ￿nal
wealth after income tax of
(1 − τp,0)
T Y
t=1

αR,t · (1 + gR,t + dR,t)

= (1 − τp,0)
T Y
t=1
(αR,t · RT,t). (1.2)
The only di￿erence in total ￿nal after income tax wealth of an investment in a TDA
and a TEA is the point in time at which the investor has to pay the income tax.
As τp,0 might di￿er from τp,T, an investment in a TDA might result in di￿erent ￿nal
wealth than an investment in a TEA. An investment in a TDA o￿ers the opportunity
to face an income tax-rate at withdrawal τp,T that is lower than the income tax-rate
at contribution τp,0, but bears the risk that τp,T is higher than τp,0. If contributions
to a TEA are made from income that has already been subject to income taxation,
the factor 1 − τp,0 is to be omitted.
If one invests one pre-income-tax dollar in a TA for a T-period investment hori-
17zon, total ￿nal after income tax wealth is given by
(1 − τp,0)
T Y
t=1

αT,t ·
 
1 + (1 − τg)gR,t + (1 − τd)dR,t

= (1 − τp,0)
T Y
t=1
(αT,t · RT,t).
(1.3)
Total ￿nal wealth after income tax of an investment in a TA and a TEA with the
same proportions of the assets αR,t = αT,t ∀t ∈ NT only di￿ers in the rates of return.
In the TA, dividend rates and capital gains rates shrink towards zero by the factor
1 − τd and 1 − τg, respectively. If one invests in assets whose dividend rates and
capital gains rates cannot become negative, an investment in a TEA is at least as
good as an investment into a TA. If τp,0 ≥ τp,T, this also holds for a comparison
between an investment in a TA and a TDA. If however τp,T > τp,0, an investment in
a TA does not necessarily dominate an investment in a TDA, because for investment
horizons of su￿cient length, the tax exemption of pro￿ts in the TDA can outweigh
the tax-burden of the higher income tax-rate.
1.3.2 E￿ects of Tax Exemption of Pro￿ts in Retirement Ac-
counts
Saving for retirement is usually a process lasting several decades, where the e￿ect
of tax exemption on pro￿ts in TDAs and TEAs becomes of increasing importance
due to the compounding of interest and the length of the investment horizon. When
combined with the e￿ect of shrinking returns on total ￿nal wealth, the tax exemption
of pro￿ts in retirement accounts can be considered a public contribution to private
retirement saving. This contribution does not come directly in the form of a payment
to the retirement account, but indirectly as what can be called a tax-gift. For an
investor who can invest in a TA and a TEA total ￿nal wealth is given by
WT = WT,0
T Y
t=1
(αT,t · RT,t) + WR,0
T Y
t=1
(αR,t · RR,t). (1.4)
For positive returns and αT,t = αR,t (t ∈ NT), growth of wealth in the TEA is higher
than in the TA due to the tax exemption of pro￿ts. Thus, the longer the investment
horizon the stronger the impact of wealth in the TEA on total ￿nal wealth. The tax
18advantage that results from the tax exemption of pro￿ts in the TEA in period t is
given by
Tt ≡ αR,t · (RR,t − RT,t) = αR,t · (τddR,t + τggR,t). (1.5)
Tt can be interpreted as a relative tax-gift in period t that is paid for each dollar
invested into a TEA. Besides the vector of pre-tax and after-tax returns on the assets
and the tax-rates on gains and dividends, the relative tax-gift depends in particular
on the choice of the proportions of the assets αR,t in the TEA in period t. Equation
(1.4) can be rewritten as
WT =(WT,0 + WR,0)
T Y
t=1
(αt · RT,t) +
T X
t=1
WR,0
t−1 Y
j=1
(αR,j · RR,j)Tt
T Y
j=t+1
(αj · RT,j).
(1.6)
Total ￿nal wealth after income tax WT at the end of period T, thus consists of
two components. The ￿rst summmand is total ￿nal wealth an investor would have
attained without having had the opportunity to invest in a TEA and is thus driven
to invest her entire initial wealth WT,0 + WR,0 in a TA. The second
GT ≡
T X
t=1
WR,0
t−1 Y
j=1
(αR,j · RR,j)Tt
T Y
j=t+1
(αj · RT,j) (1.7)
is the amount of total ￿nal wealth WT that results from the tax exemption of pro￿ts
as well as interest and compound interest on the pro￿ts in the TEA. It can be
interpreted as a public tax-gift for private retirement saving in terms of non-levied
taxes on gains and dividends as well as interest and compound interest and will be
referred to as total tax-gift.
Especially for long investment horizons this tax-gift can be a substantial fraction
of the investor’s total ￿nal wealth. To demonstrate the power of this tax-gift con-
sider an investor who is initially endowed with $ 5,000 in both her taxable and her
retirement account and can only invest into one risk-free asset with a pre-tax return
of 6%. If the investor’s investment horizon is 40 years and the tax-rate applicable
to the return of the asset is 36%, i.e. her after-tax return is 3.84%, her total ￿nal
wealth is $ 74,000 and her tax-gift is $ 28,857, which is about 39% of total ￿nal
19wealth. The tax-gift thus has a tremendous impact on total ￿nal wealth.
Equation (1.7) can be further decomposed into
GT =
T X
t=1
t6=k
WR,0
t−1 Y
j=1
j6=k
(αR,j · RR,j)Tt
T Y
j=t+1
(αj · RT,j)
+ WR,0
k−1 Y
j=1
(αR,j · RR,j)Tk
T Y
j=k+1
(αj · RT,j)
+
T X
t=k+1
WR,0
t−1 Y
j=1
j6=k
(αR,j · RR,j)(αR,k · RR,k − 1)Tt
T Y
j=t+1
(αj · RT,j).
(1.8)
According to Equation (1.8), the total tax-gift contained in total ￿nal wealth WT
can be decomposed into three summands. The part of GT that is independent from
the investment decision in period k and only depends on the tax-e￿ects of the other
periods is given by the ￿rst summand. The absolute change in total ￿nal wealth
that results from the second summand
WR,0
k−1 Y
j=1
(αR,j · RR,j)Tk
T Y
j=k+1
(αj · RT,j) (1.9)
describes the change in total ￿nal wealth that results from the relative tax-gift in
period k and is called the direct tax-e￿ect of the investment decision in period k,
or just the direct tax-e￿ect in this article. It depends on growth of TEA-wealth
until the end of period k − 1 and therefore also on the proportions of the assets
in the TEA αR,j (j ∈ Nk−1) until period k − 1, the relative tax-gift Tk, and the
after-tax growth rate
QT
j=k+1 (αj · RT,j) until the end of the investment horizon.
WR,0
Qk−1
j=1 (αR,j · RR,j)Tk describes the tax-gift in period k which then grows by
the after-tax growth rate
Qt
j=k+1 (αj · RT,j) until the end of the investment horizon.
The absolute change in total ￿nal wealth that results from the third summand
T X
t=k+1
WR,0
t−1 Y
j=1
j6=k
(αR,j · RR,j)(αR,k · RR,k − 1)Tt
T Y
j=t+1
(αj · RT,j) (1.10)
is the change in total ￿nal wealth that results from the change of period k retirement
wealth and is called the indirect tax-e￿ect of the investment decision in period k
or just the indirect tax-e￿ect in the preceding. Each summand in (1.10) can be
20interpreted as follows: WR,0
Qt−1
j=1
j6=k
(αR,j · RR,j)(αR,k · RR,k − 1)Tt is the e￿ect on
period t total wealth, which results from the choice of αR,k in period k and the
increase of the tax exempt basis in that period. It then grows with after-tax return
QT
j=t+1 (αj · RT,j) until the end of period T to the indirect tax-e￿ect.
The direct tax-e￿ect from Equation (1.9) has a singular e￿ect, as it only has an
impact on total wealth in one single period and then grows with an after income
tax return until the end of the investment horizon. The expression for the indirect
tax-e￿ect in Equation (1.10), however, has more than one summand for k ≤ T − 2.
Due to the change in the tax exempt basis, it has an impact on all future periods.
This is why the impact on total ￿nal wealth from the indirect tax-e￿ect in period k
can be quanti￿ed by the direct tax-e￿ects of all future periods on that part of TEA
wealth that results from the investment decision in period k.
Both the direct and the indirect tax-e￿ect are not necessarily an advantage to
the investor. If the total return on TEA-wealth in period t is negative, the relative
tax-gift Tt can become negative. This is because contrary to an investment in a
TA, the treasury does not participate in these losses via the taxation of dividends
and gains. If Tt becomes negative, so does the direct tax-e￿ect. As with the direct
tax-e￿ect, negative gains that outweigh potential interest or dividends can lead to a
negative return on TEA wealth, which causes a relative reduction in the tax exempt
basis of forthcoming periods by (αR,t · RR,t − 1) < 0, and shows a negative indirect
tax-e￿ect.
1.3.3 Generalization to TDAs
The argument for the case of an investment opportunity set with a TEA and a TA
can be generalized to the case of an investment opportunity set with a TDA and a
TA as follows: Initial wealth WR,0 which has been invested into a TEA at the end of
period 0 must have been made from after income tax dollars. As an investment into
a TDA is made from pre income-tax dollars, instead of investing WR,0 after income
tax dollars into a TEA, one can invest
WR,0
1−τp,0 pre income-tax dollars in a TDA. As
wealth in a TDA is still subject to income taxation at the end of the investment
horizon at rate τp,T, the investor can only consider W 0
R,t ≡ WR,t
1−τp,T
1−τp,0 her e￿ective
wealth, as the remainder falls to the treasury at the end of period t. If τp,T < τp,0,
then W 0
R,t > WR,t and an investment in a TDA results in a higher ￿nal wealth than
21an investment into a TEA due to the lower burdening with income tax. As W 0
R,t and
WR,t only di￿er by the constant factor
1−τp,T
1−τp,0 , the problem of ￿nding the optimal
investment strategy with an investment opportunity set with both a TEA and a
TA, is equivalent to the problem of with a TDA and a TA. Hence, it su￿ces to
consider an investor with the opportunity to invest into both a TA and a TEA. As
before, WR,t denotes the wealth in the RA if the retirement account is a TEA and
the e￿ective wealth in the RA if the retirement account is a TDA.
1.3.4 Optimal Asset Location Decisions
According to the seminal work of Huang (2007), investors that do not face short-
selling constraints should invest their entire retirement-wealth into the asset a with
the highest e￿ective tax-rate
τa ≡
(1 + (1 − τd)dB)(xa − 1)
(1 + (1 − τd)dB)xa − 1
(1.11)
in which xa ≡ 1
1−τg +
da(τd−τg)−τg
(1−τg)(1+(1−τd)dB) is the replication cost in the TA of one dollar
of asset a in the RA. Furtermore, in this case, the asset location and asset allocation
problem are independent from each other, as each dollar in asset a in the RA can
be replicated by 1
1−τg dollars of that asset and
da(τd−τg)−τg
(1−τg)(1+(1−τd)dB) dollars of the risk-
free asset in the TA. In particular, in such a setting the asset allocation and asset
location decision are independent from each other.
If, however, the investor is not allowed to go short, it is no longer necessarily
optimal for him to hold the asset with the highest e￿ective tax-rate in the RA as
shown in Garlappi and Huang (2006). This is due to the fact that the investor
cannot replicate the tax-deferred portfolio in the taxable account if this required
to go short. Garlappi and Huang (2006) have also pointed out that holding stocks
in the RA can help smooth the ratio of the relative tax-gift Tt times WR,t to total
wealth Wt. They call this ratio the tax-subsidy. This tax-subsidy can be interpreted
as that part of growth in total wealth that results from the relative tax-gift in period
t. This growth in total wealth can be smoothed by constructing portfolios in the
RA and the TA that have similar weights in the two assets.
Smoothing these extra growth-rates results in less volatile distributions of ￿nal
wealth, which is desirable for risk-averse investors. However, Garlappi and Huang
22(2006) assume the return of the risky asset to be binomially distributed. In this case,
it is possible to smooth the tax-subsidy in such a way that it takes the same value,
independent from the realization of the return from the risky asset. If, however,
the return on the risky asset S has a more complex distribution and can take more
than two realizations, it is no longer possible to keep the tax-subsidy at the same
level independent from the realization of the return. Nevertheless, in such a case,
it is still possible to dampen the impact of the total tax-gift, which, according to
Equation (1.7), is ceteris paribus best attained when only holding bonds in the RA.
As one can see from Equation (1.6), in addition to the risks due to the volatility of
growth of total wealth after-tax, the volatility of the total tax-gift is a second source
of risk to which total ￿nal wealth is exposed when holding stocks in a retirement
account.
For a given asset allocation αt (t ∈ NT\{k}), the decision to locate stocks instead
of bonds in the retirement account in period k has three e￿ects on the risk-return
pro￿le of total ￿nal wealth given everything else as equal. First, it has an impact on
the direct tax-e￿ect whose sign is depending on the absolute tax-burden of stocks
and bonds. Second, due to the higher expected pre-tax return on stocks the ex-
pected indirect tax-e￿ect increases. Third, if the pre- and the after-tax returns of
S and B are not negatively correlated, the volatility of total ￿nal wealth increases
as both the direct and the indirect tax-e￿ect are subject to higher volatility. While
according to the ￿rst and third e￿ect, bonds should be preferably located in the
retirement account, the second e￿ect suggests that stocks could be preferably held
in the retirement account as well.
However, the changes of the risk-return pro￿les of stocks and bonds when shifting
them from the TA to the RA suggest that bonds should still be the preferred asset
to hold in the RA. Shifting bonds from the TA to the RA increases their return.
However, shifting stocks from the TA to the RA does not only increase their expected
return, but also its volatility. Moreover, bonds usually come with a higher e￿ective
tax-rate than stocks.
According to Equation (1.6) total ￿nal wealth consists of two components: total
￿nal wealth the investor would have attained without the opportunity of investing
into a retirement account and a tax-gift that results from the tax exemption of
pro￿ts in these accounts. As the impact of the tax-gift decreases with a decreas-
23ing investment horizon, its impact is stronger, the longer the remaining investment
horizon. Due to the fact that investors usually prefer bonds in their retirement ac-
count, the properties of the tax-gift are more similar to those of bonds than to those
of stocks. The tax-gift can thus be regarded an implicit bond position that is not
directly observable in the investor’s security accounts. The higher the unobservable
implicit bond position, the higher the observable equity position. This is why for
longer remaining investment horizons investors will have a higher observable bond
position than for shorter remaining investment horizons. Hence, besides decreasing
future labor income, decreasing unobservable bond holding in retirement accounts
are another reason for decreasing equity exposure over the life cycle.
Due to the risks associated with the indirect tax-e￿ect, the preference for bonds
in the retirement account, and the shadow price of one dollar in the retirement
account, an investor with a high fraction of her wealth in a retirement account will
hold a lower total fraction of stocks than an investor with a high fraction of her
wealth in a taxable account.
1.4 Numerical Evidence
For the numerical analysis, a short-selling constrained investor who can invest in a
market with a risky asset S and a risk-free asset B is considered. The characteristics
of S and B are similar to those of stocks and bonds, respectively. The capital
gains rate of S is lognormally distributed with an expected gain of µg,S = 0.09
and a standard deviation of σg,S = 0.20. Asset S has a constant dividend rate of
dS = 0.02. Asset B has a certain interest-rate of dB = 0.06 and no capital gains.
An investment horizon of T = 40 years is considered which is a realistic investment
horizon for retirement saving. The tax-rates on dividends and gains are assumed to
be τd = 0.36 and τg = 0.2, respectively.1 This parameter choice follows Dammon
et al. (2004). For these parameter values, the e￿ective tax-rates for stocks and bonds
are τS = 0.16 and τB = 0.36, respectively. Thus, investors that are not short-selling
constrained in their taxable accounts should hold their entire retirement wealth
in bonds. Even though we consider short-selling constraint investors, this result
1Since capital gains that are realized short-term are taxable at the investor’s personal income tax-
rate which corresponds to the tax-rate on dividends, choosing τg to be smaller than τd implies
the assumption that the long-term capital gains rate applies to the investor’s capital gains.
24remains valid.
The investor is assumed to maximize her utility of total ￿nal wealth WT from a
CRRA-utility function with a parameter of risk aversion of γ ∈ [0,∞)
U(WT) ≡

 
 
W
1−γ
T
1−γ for γ 6= 1
ln(WT) for γ = 1.
(1.12)
Her optimization problem is
max
αT,αR
E[U [WT]] (1.13)
s.t.
Wt = WR,t + WT,t (1.14)
WR,t+1 = WR,t (αR,t+1 · RR,t+1) (1.15)
WT,t+1 = WT,t (αT,t+1 · RT,t+1) (1.16)
0 ≤ αR,t,αT,t ≤ 1 (1.17)
in which αT ≡ (αT,1,...,αT,T) and αR ≡ (αR,1,...,αR,T). Normalizing by Wt and
taking into account that U is homogeneous in wealth implies that the optimization
problem is equivalent to the solution of
max
αT,αR
E

U

WT
Wt

(1.18)
s.t.
1 =
WR,t
Wt
+
WT,t
Wt
(1.19)
WR,t+1
Wt
=
WR,t
Wt
(αR,t+1 · RR,t+1) (1.20)
WT,t+1
Wt
=
WT,t
Wt
(αT,t+1 · RT,t+1) (1.21)
0 ≤ αR,t,αT,t ≤ 1. (1.22)
If Vt(Xt) denotes the investor’s utility as a function of her states variables Xt at
25time t, it holds for an investor with risk-aversion of γ 6= 1 that
Vt (Xt) ≡ max
αT,αR
E

U

WR,t
Wt

(1.23)
= max
αT,αR
E
"
Vt+1 (Xt+1) ·
 
WR,t
Wt
(αR,t+1 · RR,t+1)
+

1 −
WR,t
Wt

(αT,t+1 · RT,t+1)
!1−γ#
. (1.24)
The solution of this problem can thus be computed numerically using backward
induction. For the optimization procedure one state-variable (the percentage of
wealth in the RA relative to total wealth Xt =
WR,t
Wt at the end of period t) is
su￿cient. The grid is spanned with 101 grid points that are equally distributed on
[0,1]. The integral of the expectation in Equation (1.24) is computed using Gaussian
quadrature.
If the investor would only have the opportunity to invest into one account, she
would hold the same fraction of stocks in all periods according to the classical result
of Merton (1969) and Samuelson (1969). All derivations from a constant fraction of
stocks thus have to be driven by the di￿erent taxable treatment of the assets in the
two accounts.
Figure 1.1 shows the optimal equity proportion for an investor with risk-aversion
of γ = 3 as a function of time passed since the initial investment and her fraction
of retirement wealth to total wealth. The upper left and the upper right graphs
show her optimal fraction of stocks in the TA and the RA, respectively. If her
fraction of wealth in the retirement account is zero or one, the investor is in the
one-account world, there is no asset location decision, and in line with Merton
(1969) and Samuelson (1969) she holds the same fraction of stocks independent
from the remaining investment horizon. If, however, the investor is endowed with
both taxable and retirement wealth, she has to decide, which assets to hold in the
retirement account and which in the taxable account. Con￿rming the ￿ndings of
the recent literature on optimal asset location, we ￿nd the investor to prefer bonds
in the retirement account and stocks in the taxable account.
The lower right graph, which depicts the sum of the investor’s optimal fraction
of stocks in the TA and the RA, shows that the investor only holds stocks in the
retirement account if her taxable wealth is entirely invested in stocks. With an
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Figure 1.1: This Figure shows the optimal asset location and asset allocation strat-
egy as a function of the investor’s fraction of retirement wealth to total wealth
(retirement wealth) and her remaining investment horizon. The upper left graph
shows her optimal fraction of stocks in the TA, the upper right graph depicts her
optimal fraction of stocks in the RA. The lower left graph shows the optimal overall
equity exposure, the lower right graph shows the sum of the optimal relative equity
exposure in the TA and the RA.
increasing fraction of wealth in the retirement account, the investor ￿rst increases
her fraction of stocks in the TA until it has attained 100% as can be seen from
the upper left graph. However, increasing her fraction of retirement wealth further,
does not cause the investor to immediately increase her fraction of stocks in the
retirement account - as can be seen from the lower right graph. For small increases
in retirement wealth, she keeps her fraction of stocks in the retirement account at
0% (plateau e￿ect), which re￿ects the fact that bonds are preferred in the RA as
they come with a more advantageous risk-return pro￿le in the retirement account.
Furthermore, if only risk-free bonds are held in the RA, there is no additional source
of risk from the tax-e￿ect. The size of the plateau e￿ect increases with a short-term
investment horizon. This is due to the fact that for short investment horizons the
probability of facing a negative tax-e￿ect when being invested into equities in the
27retirement account is signi￿cantly higher than for long investment horizons.
If the fraction of retirement wealth increases even further, the investor increases
the fraction of stocks in the retirement account. This re￿ects her desire not to get
too heavily invested into bonds. However, the increase in the fraction of stocks in
the retirement account is slower than in the taxable account. If the investor does
not have any retirement wealth, her optimal equity exposure is about 70%, if she
does not have any taxable wealth her optimal equity exposure is only about 50%.
This is due to the fact that bonds have a more advantageous risk-return pro￿le in
the retirement account.
The investor’s fraction of stocks in both the taxable account and the retirement
account decreases with decreasing length of the remaining investment horizon. This
is due to the fact that with decreasing investment horizon, the expected tax-gift
decreases. As the investor prefers bonds in the retirement account for lower levels
of retirement wealth, the tax-gift can be considered a certain income stream which
is similar to a risk-free bond. If the investor has a higher retirement wealth, the
tax-gift is still more similar to a risk-free bond than to a stock as the investor’s
fraction of stocks in the RA remains below 50%, despite the associated risk. This
does not necessarily hold for investors with even lower risk-aversion which is why in
that case the tax-gift can become more similar to an implicit stock-holding. Due to
the absence of this implicit bond holding, the investor increases her explicit bond
holding and thus decreases her equity exposure for short investment horizons.
The lower left graph depicts the fraction of stocks relative to total wealth. For low
levels of retirement wealth, the stock fraction is more prevalent. This is due to sharp
increases in equity exposure in the taxable account. This is explained by the fact
that one dollar of bonds in the retirement account has a higher impact on total ￿nal
wealth than one dollar in the taxable account due to the tax-e￿ect. In particular,
the indirect tax-e￿ect has a tremendous impact for long investment horizons. As the
tax-e￿ect diminishes with decreasing investment horizon, the increase in the total
fraction of stocks decreases with increasing time passed since the initial investment.
For higher levels of retirement wealth, the total fraction of stocks ￿rst rapidly
decreases due to the plateau e￿ect and the investor’s aversion against holding stocks
in the retirement account. For even higher levels of retirement wealth, the total
fraction of stocks decreases even further, a ￿nding noted by Dammon et al. (2004).
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Figure 1.2: This Figure shows the increase in taxable wealth an investor who does
not have retirement wealth needs to be compensated with to attain the same level
of expected utility as an investor who is endowed with the same total wealth of
which some is invested in a retirement account (utility costs) as a function of this
investor’s fraction of total wealth in the retirement account (retirement wealth) and
the remaining investment horizon.
Consequently, one dollar of stocks in the retirement account has a higher impact on
total ￿nal wealth than one dollar of stocks in the taxable account. However, the
slope of the decrease is somewhat lower as the investor starts holding stocks in her
retirement account. Nevertheless, as bonds come with a more advantageous risk-
pro￿le in the retirement account, this increase is not strong enough to prevent the
total fraction of stocks from decreasing as retirement wealth increases. Our obtained
results remain valid when varying the investor’s risk-aversion parameter γ.
Since retirement accounts allow for earning pre-tax returns while taxable ac-
counts only allow for earning after-tax returns, one dollar in a retirement account is
worth more than one dollar of taxable wealth. We analyze the value of retirement
wealth by computing the increase in taxable wealth an investor with some given to-
tal wealth which is entirely held in a taxable accounts needs to be compensated with
to attain the same level of expected utility as an investor who is holding the same
amount of total wealth of which some part of is invested in a retirement account.
Figure 1.2 shows the increase in taxable wealth an investor who is initially en-
dowed with only taxable wealth needs to be compensated with to attain the same
level of expected utility as an investor who is endowed with the same total wealth
of which some part is held in a retirement account (utility costs). The investor’s
utility costs are increasing both in her retirement wealth and her remaining invest-
ment horizon. Each dollar in the retirement account provides the investor with
29some tax-gift, which is why the investor’s utility costs increase in her retirement
wealth. With increasing length of the investment horizon the impact of the tax-gift
increases. Consequently, the investor’s utility costs increase in the length of her
remaining investment horizon.
However, the investor’s utility costs are concave in her retirement wealth. This
is due to the fact that with increasing retirement wealth the investor increases her
fraction of stocks in the retirement account for not getting too heavily invested into
bonds. Since bonds are the preferred asset to hold in the retirement account, each
dollar of bonds that is held in the retirement account provides the investor with a
higher advantage than a dollar of stocks that is held in the retirement account. Con-
sequently, her marginal utility gains decrease when she holds stocks in her retirement
account.
1.5 Conclusion
In this paper, the ￿eld of asset location decisions for retirement savers having the
opportunity to invest into both a retirement account and a taxable account is out-
lined.
Con￿rming recent ￿ndings in economic literature that bonds are the preferred
asset to hold in the retirement account, we show that the investor only holds stocks
in the retirement account if her taxable wealth is entirely invested into equity. We
further show that the investor does not increase her equity exposure in the retire-
ment account immediately with increasing retirement wealth, but prefers to hold
only bonds in her retirement account for small increases in retirement wealth which
is another indication for her preference for bonds in the retirement account. If,
however, the investor’s retirement wealth is substantial, she also holds some stocks
in her retirement account in order to prevent from investing too heavily in bonds.
While the literature on optimal asset location concludes in (almost) one voice
that bonds are the preferred asset to hold in retirement accounts, this paper focuses
on the relation of asset location and asset allocation and shows that besides the
locational preference of bonds in retirement accounts, the opportunity to invest
in a retirement account also has an impact on asset allocation. It is argued that
the di￿erent taxable treatment of capital gains and dividends in taxable as well
30as tax-sheltered retirement accounts has an impact on asset allocation. Compared
to the benchmark of a constant equity proportion in a one-account problem, the
investor’s equity proportion depends on both her fraction of total wealth in the
retirement account and the length of the remaining investment horizon. The longer
the remaining investment horizon, the higher the investor’s equity exposure in both
taxable and retirement account. This ￿nding is due to the fact that total ￿nal wealth
can be decomposed into what the investor would have attained in the absence of a
tax-deferred investment vehicle and a tax-gift resulting from the tax exemption of
pro￿ts in retirement accounts. As the properties of the tax-gift are more similar to
those of risk-free bonds than to those of stocks and its impact is decreasing with
decreasing remaining investment horizon, the investor is endowed with some implicit
bond holding that is unobservable in her security account. As the impact of the tax-
gift on total ￿nal wealth is stronger the longer the remaining investment horizon, the
investor’s equity exposure is higher the longer the remaining investment horizon.
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33Abstract
Since Constantinides (1983), it is well known that it is optimal to realize losses
immediately if capital losses qualify for inde￿nite tax rebates. However, many tax-
codes around the world restrict tax rebates on capital losses. This paper shows that
Constantinides’ result generalizes to markets in which capital loss deduction is lim-
ited and that realizing losses immediately remains an optimal tax-timing strategy
even though the compensation for the loss comes as a loss carryforward, which is less
attractive than compensation in cash. Nevertheless, in such markets, an investor
without an initial loss carryforward will hold substantially less risky assets than in
markets with unlimited tax rebates, due to the less attractive taxable treatment of
capital losses. An investor with a signi￿cant loss carryforward, however, increases
her equity exposure due to the opportunity of earning capital gains tax-free. The
less capital losses qualify for tax rebates, the lower the equity exposure is.
JEL Classi￿cation Codes: G11, H24
Key Words: tax-timing, asset allocation, capital losses, loss carryforward, limits
on tax rebates
342.1 Introduction
The tax rules private investors are confronted with are an important factor in￿u-
encing household portfolio structure. Even though pre-tax returns are reported in
newspapers, on television, or on the internet, only after-tax returns should have an
impact on investment decisions of rational private investors, as only these returns
have an impact on potential consumption and bequest. 1
Many assets generate pro￿ts from both capital gains and dividends. The taxable
treatment of these two types of pro￿ts di￿ers in two ways. First, dividends are
taxable the year they are obtained, while capital gains are taxable the year when
the asset is sold and the gains are realized. Second, dividends are subject to a higher
tax-rate than capital gains that qualify for long-term treatment.
The taxation of capital gains has several impacts on asset allocation decisions
of private investors. First, it reduces the expected after-tax return, which might
lead some investors to increase their present consumption and decrease their future
consumption by investing less. Second, the deferral of capital gains taxation until
realization of the capital gains results in compound returns on the postponed taxes
and thus decreases the e￿ective capital gains tax-rate (Chay et al. (2006)). Third,
investors having high unrealized capital gains in some assets might not want to sell
them in order to avoid paying the capital gains tax, and thus get ￿locked in￿. 2 The
decision whether or not to sell an asset with embedded unrealized capital gains is
in￿uenced by two opposing e￿ects. On the one hand, the investor should sell some
part of the asset to rebalance the portfolio. On the other hand, the investor should
not sell any part of the asset at all to defer paying the capital gains tax and exploit
the e￿ect of compound returns.
A capital gains tax an investor has to pay when selling an asset with unrealized
capital gains is similar to a transaction cost. However, while the transaction cost
in future periods are usually independent from present transaction costs, future
unrealized capital gains depend on present trading behavior. Especially for aged
1However, when the investor bequests assets with unrealized capital gains, these gains are not
taxable for the bene￿ciary under current US tax-law. Hence, at the end of the investor’s life
cycle, pre-tax capital gains might matter more than after-tax capital gains.
2An investor is said to be ￿locked in￿ when she has unrealized capital gains in some asset and a
higher fraction of total wealth is invested in that asset to avoid the capital gains tax-payment
than she would hold when not facing unrealized capital gains.
35investors, the disadvantages of unbalanced portfolios might be outweighed by the
forgiveness of capital gains under current US tax-law when bequeathed. Fourth, if
tax rebates on realized capital losses are limited, the risk-return pro￿le of the assets
becomes worse than they would be if tax-rebates were unlimited. This results in
a lower exposure to the risky asset. Under current US tax-law, there is an annual
upper bound of $ 3,000 of unrealized capital losses that can be o￿set against other
income and thus quali￿es for tax rebates. 3 According to Poterba (1987), this loss-
o￿set constraint applies to about twenty percent of US taxpayers.
On the assumption that the returns of each asset are subject to the same tax-rate,
Auerbach and King (1983) show that an optimal portfolio is a weighted average of
a market portfolio and a portfolio that is chosen on the basis of tax considerations
ignoring risk. Thus, expected changes in the capital gains tax-rate result in vast
realizations of capital gains (Auerbach (1988)).
Auerbach et al. (2000) and Ivkovich et al. (2005) show that a large part of the
investor public does not engage in tax-minimizing transactions. According to Shefrin
and Statman (1985), Odean (1998), Barber and Odean (2000, 2001, 2003), investors
tend to hold assets incurring losses too long and tend to sell assets with unrealized
capital gains too early which clearly violates e￿cient tax-planning. The study by Jin
(2006), however, ￿nds selling decisions by institutions serving tax-sensitive clients
to be sensitive to cumulative capital gains. Con￿rming this ￿nding, Barclay et al.
(1998) show that fund managers manage tax liabilities to attract new investors.
Bergstresser and Poterba (2002) ￿nd fund ￿ows to be sensitive to tax burdens.
This ￿nding suggests that private investors might be more subject to the dis-
position e￿ect than institutional investors. Ivkovich et al. (2005) compare the re-
alizations of capital gains in taxable and tax-deferred accounts and ￿nd a strong
￿lock in￿ e￿ect for capital gains in the former type of accounts. This ￿nding in turn
suggests that private investors might ride e￿cient tax-timing strategies. The empir-
ical evidence in Seyhun and Skinner (1994), however suggests that the $ 3,000 limit
on capital losses qualifying for tax rebates under current US-tax code represents an
important constraint on tax-reduction strategies, and investors tend to follow very
simple tax-timing strategies like realizing losses early and postponing gains. How-
3This rule assures that public ￿nances are not a￿ected too strongly when capital markets perform
poorly.
36ever, in their study, about 90% of the investors seem to follow simple buy-and-hold
strategies. Other studies on the relation between taxation and investment behav-
ior include Blouin et al. (2003) and the surveys in Poterba (2002a) and Campbell
(2006).
According to the seminal work of Constantinides (1983), it is optimal to realize
losses immediately if capital loss deduction is unlimited and if wash sale rules do
not apply.4 Under current US tax law wash sales are permitted and it is not allowed
to short a security in which one has a long position to avoid realizing capital gains.
Investors realizing such a ￿shorting-the-box-strategy￿ are treated as if they had sold
the long position and hence their capital gains are taxed. Gallmeyer et al. (2006)
address this issue and propose tax-management strategies to circumvent the capital
gains tax. Their so-called trading ￿exibility strategy minimizes future tax-induced
trading costs by shorting one of several stocks, even if none of these stocks has an
unrealized gain. This strategy is in particular useful if the bene￿ts from holding a
well-diversi￿ed portfolio are outweighed by the expected future rebalancing costs.
This is in particular the case if two assets are highly correlated. Constantinides and
Scholes (1980) argue that even when an investor sells an asset with an unrealized
capital gain, the realization of that gain can be deferred by hedging. To circum-
vent the ￿shorting-the-box-strategy￿ Stiglitz (1983) suggests selling (or shorting, if
necessary) highly correlated assets instead of realizing capital gains. Nevertheless,
this shorting-strategy can be subject to signi￿cant transaction costs and is subject
to the risk that correlations might change in time.
Dammon et al. (2001), on the other hand, show that selling an asset with an
unrealized capital gain can be an optimal tax-timing strategy. According to their
study, the diversi￿cation bene￿t of reducing a volatile position can signi￿cantly
outweigh the tax cost of selling the asset with an unrealized capital gain. The results
of Dammon et al. (1989) suggest that the value of the option to realize long-term
gains in order to regain the opportunity of realizing short-term losses is negatively
related to the stocks price volatility.
If short-term capital gains are taxed at a higher tax-rate than long-term capital
gains, Constantinides (1984) shows that it can be optimal to sell assets with an
4A transaction is termed a wash sale if a stock is sold to realize a capital loss and repurchased
immediately. Under current US tax-rules wash sales do not qualify for the capital loss deduction
if the same stock is repurchased within thirty days before or after the sale.
37unrealized capital gain as soon as they qualify for long-term treatment in order to
regain the opportunity of producing short-term losses. Cadenillas and Pliska (1999)
show that in a single-security market, even with only one tax-rate, it can be optimal
to cut unrealized capital gains short. This surprising result is most likely due to the
reduction in volatility.
Dammon and Spatt (1996) extend the approach of Constantinides (1984) by al-
lowing the number of trading periods before a short term position becomes a long
term position to be greater than one. In particular, they show that contrary to
intuition, it can be optimal to defer small short-term losses even in the absence of
transaction costs. This ￿nding is due to the fact that realizing these losses and
repurchasing the asset restarts the short-term holding period and thus the time the
investor has to wait until potential future gains qualify for long-term treatment.
Under plausible parameter values, they ￿nd that it can be optimal for private in-
vestors to defer realizing short-term capital losses of about 10% in the absence of
transaction costs.
The articles closest to ours are Constantinides (1983) and Dammon et al. (2001).
Our paper di￿ers from the existing literature on optimal asset allocation by allowing
for limitations on tax rebates for capital losses. According to the seminal work of
Constantinides (1983), it is optimal to realize losses immediately if capital loss de-
duction is unlimited and if wash sale rules do not apply. This paper generalizes his
result to tax-systems in which capital loss deduction is limited and the remaining
losses can be carried over inde￿nitely as a loss carryforward. It shows that in such
tax-systems, Constantinides’ result of realizing losses immediately remains an opti-
mal tax-timing strategy even though the investor’s compensation for incurred losses
does not come in cash as a tax rebate, but as a less desirable loss carryforward that
does not pay any interest and potentially remains unused.
It further extends the approach of Dammon et al. (2001) by allowing for limits
on tax rebates and shows that such limits decrease the optimal equity exposure of
investors that do not have an initial loss carryforward. This is due to the fact that
in tax-systems with unlimited tax rebates, the investor e￿ectively receives some tax-
refund in cash which can be reinvested to earn some returns on the tax rebate. In
contrast, the loss carryforward does not earn any interest. Furthermore, in a tax-
system with limited tax rebates, the investor bears the risk that the loss carryforward
38potentially remains unused if the investor does not live long enough to make use of
it.
Limits on tax rebates thus worsen the risk-return-pro￿le of risky assets. This is
why in tax-systems with limited tax rebates, investors with no initial loss carryfor-
ward tend to hold less risky assets than in tax-systems with unlimited tax rebates.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 introduces the
model and generalizes the ￿nding of Constantinides (1983) that it is optimal to
realize capital losses immediately to tax-systems with limits on tax rebates. Section
2.3 discusses the impact of the tax-timing option and limited tax rebates on asset
allocation. Section 2.4 presents our numerical results extending the approach of
Dammon et al. (2001) to tax-systems with limited tax rebates. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Optimal Tax-Timing with Unrealized Capital
Losses
The model in this section builds on Constantinides (1983). Following his approach, a
market is considered in which investors are price takers and only trade at equilibrium
prices. There are no transaction costs and the tax-system allows for wash sales. 5
There is only one capital gains tax-rate, i.e. the tax-system does not distinguish
between long-term and short-term capital gains. The investment opportunity set
consists of a risk-free asset that pays an after-tax return of r > 0 and a risky asset
which is in￿nitely divisible.
The di￿erence between a realized capital gain and a realized capital loss plus
an initial loss carryforward Lt−1 ≤ 0 in period t is called a net capital gain Gt,
if Gt ≥ 0, or a net capital loss, if Gt < 0. A net capital gain is taxable at tax-
rate τ > 0 when being realized. Unrealized capital gains or losses are not subject
to taxation. In line with Constantinides, we assume the same tax-rate τ to apply
for capital gains and losses.6 In contrast to Constantinides, we allow for limits on
tax rebates for capital losses, i.e. net capital losses only qualify for tax rebates for
5This assumption assures that unrealized capital losses can be realized without having to decrease
the exposure in the asset bearing the unrealized capital loss.
6Under current tax-law realized capital losses up to $ 3,000 can be o￿set from other income such
that the tax-rate which applies to such losses is the investor’s personal tax-rate, which can di￿er
from the tax-rate on capital gains.
39that part of the absolute value of the net capital loss Gt not exceeding a maximum
amount of Mt ≥ 0 dollars in period t. This tax rebate of τ dollars per dollar of net
capital loss is paid when the loss is realized or the investor has a loss carryforward
remaining from the previous period. This modeling follows the taxable treatment
of net capital losses under current US tax-law. The net capital gain (or loss) Tt in
period t that is subject to the capital gains tax-rate is given by
Tt ≡ max(Gt + Lt−1;−Mt). (2.1)
Realized net capital losses that do not qualify for tax rebates can be inde￿nitely
carried forward to the following periods. Thus, the loss Lt < 0 that can be carried
forward from period t to period t + 1 is given by
Lt ≡ Gt − Tt + Lt−1. (2.2)
In a one-period model, the evolution of an investor’s wealth in a tax-system with
limited tax rebates is equal to that of an investor in a tax-system with unlimited
tax rebates who has sold a put-option at time zero without receiving a premium for
that put-option. However, in a tax-system with limited tax rebates, the investor
receives the loss carryforward according to Equation (2.2) as a compensation when
the put-option is in the money, i.e. if T1 < −M1 at time of maturity.
2.2.1 Wealth, Unrealized Gains and Loss Carryforward
In tax-systems with limited tax rebates, optimal asset allocation depends on total
wealth Wt before trading including unrealized capital gains, the initial loss carry-
forward Lt−1, unrealized capital gain Ut before trading at time t, and the length of
the remaining investment horizon. The key to understanding optimal tax-timing in
such a tax-system is understanding the relation between Wt, Ut and Lt−1.
A loss carryforward Lt−1 of one dollar in period t can be used in two ways.
First, it can be subtracted from a realized capital gain to reduce capital gains taxes.
Second, in the absence of a realized capital gain, the loss carryforward can be claimed
a net capital loss that quali￿es for tax rebates if Mt > 0. Thus, one dollar of loss
carryforward can be shifted to τ dollars of wealth if Mt ≥ τ. Shifting the loss
40carryforward to wealth is a dominating strategy, since one dollar of loss carryforward
can reduce future tax burden by not more than τ dollars. Furthermore, in contrast
with the loss carryforward, the τ dollars of tax rebate can be reinvested and earn
pro￿ts. By investing them in the risk-free asset, their value is always at least as high
as the future tax burden of the unrealized capital gain.
Thus, if two investment strategies result in the same unrealized capital gains
at some point in time t before trading, but one of them results in a higher pre-
tax wealth Wt before trading and the other in a higher loss carryforward Lt−1 (in
absolute value), the strategy with the higher pre-tax wealth is at least as good as
the strategy with the higher loss carryforward, if for every τ extra dollars of wealth
Wt of the ￿rst strategy, the second strategy does not have more than one dollar of
extra loss carryforward Lt−1. If A  B denotes ￿A is at least as good as B￿, than
this ￿nding can also be expressed as

 Wt = τ
Lt−1 = 0

 

 Wt = 0
Lt−1 = −1

 (2.3)
An investor endowed with one dollar of unrealized capital gains Ut = 1 at the
beginning of period t before trading and one dollar of loss carryforward Lt−1 = −1
can use the loss carryforward in two ways. It can either be used to realize the capital
gain without having to pay the capital gains tax or it can be used to generate a net
capital loss at time t and thus to earn a tax rebate of τ dollars if Mt ≥ τ. As
argued above, the value of the tax rebate is at least as high as the future tax burden
due to the unrealized capital gain when invested in the risk-free asset. Accordingly,
realizing the net capital loss to increase Wt but not to realize the capital gains is a
dominating tax-timing strategy.
An investor who is neither endowed with that dollar of unrealized capital gain
nor that dollar of loss carryforward can be considered an investor who has realized
that capital gain and used the loss carryforward to avoid the capital gains tax.
The investor then lacks the dominating opportunity of realizing the net capital loss.
Hence:

 Ut = 1
Lt−1 = −1

 

 Ut = 0
Lt−1 = 0

 (2.4)
41The unrealized capital gain Ut is the product of the number of units St of the risky
asset and the unrealized capital gain Pt − P ∗
t−1 per unit of the risky asset where Pt
denotes the price of the risky asset at time t and P ∗
t is the investor’s purchase price
of that asset at the end of period t after trading. That is, P ∗
t−1 is the purchase price
of that asset at the beginning of period t before trading. Then Ut is given by
Ut = St ·
 
Pt − P
∗
t−1

(2.5)
Equation (2.4) only depends on Ut. In particular, it is independent from the compo-
sition of Ut, i.e. whether a given capital gain Ut results from a high equity exposure
with a small capital gain or a small equity exposure with a high capital gain.
The relation between wealth and unrealized capital gains is a consequence of the
relation between wealth and losses and the relation between unrealized gains and
losses. If two investment strategies result in a loss carryforward of zero at some point
in time t before trading, but the ￿rst of them results in a higher pre-tax wealth and
in higher capital gains than the other, the ￿rst strategy is at least as good as the
second strategy, if for every τ extra dollars of pre-tax wealth, the unrealized capital
gains of the ￿rst strategy does not exceed one dollar. This is due to the fact that
according to Equations (2.3) and (2.4) it holds that

  

Wt = 0
Ut = 1
Lt−1 = −1

  

+

  

Wt = τ
Ut = 0
Lt−1 = 0

  



  

Wt = 0
Ut = 0
Lt−1 = 0

  

+

  

Wt = 0
Ut = 0
Lt−1 = −1

  

⇔

 


Wt = τ
Ut = 1
Lt−1 = −1

 




 


Wt = 0
Ut = 0
Lt−1 = −1

 


⇔

Wt = τ
Ut = 1

 

Wt = 0
Ut = 0


(2.6)
The economic reason for this result is that each dollar of unrealized capital gains
results in a tax burden of τ dollars. Whereas when Ut = 1 and Wt = τ, the τ dollars
of wealth allow for earning pro￿ts on these τ dollars, the investor with Wt = 0 and
Ut = 0 cannot earn these pro￿ts. By investing the τ dollars in the risk-free asset,
its value is always at least as high as the present unrealized capital gain.
422.2.2 The Optimal Tax-Timing Strategy
In the following, the investment decision at time t of an investor endowed with an
initial loss carryforward of Lt−1 is considered. We assume that the return of the
risky asset consists only of capital gains, i.e. the asset does not to pay any dividend
or interest.7 If the investor does not trade the risky asset at time t, the purchase
price of the risky asset does not change and P ∗
t = P ∗
t−1. If the investor purchases
the asset in period t at price Pt, the purchase price is given by P ∗
t = Pt.
Let Pt0 ∈ [infi∈[t,t+1) Pi,supi∈[t,t+1) Pi] be some price of the risky asset at time
t0 ∈ [t,t+1). In the case that Pt0 < P ∗
t−1 the investor could realize a net capital loss
in period t by trading at price Pt0. If that loss does not exceed Mt in absolute value,
that is, if −
 
Pt0 − P ∗
t−1

≤ Mt, the classical result of Constantinides (1983) applies
and the investor should sell the asset to realize that loss and earn the tax rebate on
it.
If, however, the net capital loss exceeds Mt, i.e. Pt0 −P ∗
t−1 < −Mt, the precondi-
tions under which the result of Constantinides (1983) holds are no longer full-￿lled. 8
In the following it is shown that it remains optimal to sell the asset even though the
tax rebate is potentially lower than in the tax-system with unlimited tax rebate, a
potential loss carryforward is a less attractive compensation than a tax refund, and
the purchase price P ∗
t is increased from P ∗
t−1 to Pt0, thereby increasing the risk of
getting ￿locked in￿ in forthcoming periods.
2.2.3 The Case with One Risky Asset
To prove that the optimal tax-timing strategy is to realize losses immediately, we
consider three strategies of an investor who is initially endowed with one unit of the
risky asset at time t acquired at price P ∗
t−1 and who wants to hold one unit of the
risky asset from time t to t + 1.9 Since all other strategies are linear combinations
7We will show later in this section that the optimal tax-timing strategy is not a￿ected by this
assumption and does not di￿er from the optimal tax-timing strategy with an asset that pays
dividend or interest.
8For t0 > t, it is also possible that the investor has already realized capital losses during time [t,t0)
summing up to a value of G. In this case Constantinides’ result does not apply any longer if
Pt0 − P∗
t−1 < min(0,−Mt − G).
9It su￿ces to consider an investor who does not change the number of risky assets in her portfolio.
An investor who wants to increase the number of risky assets in her portfolio faces the same tax-
timing decision (with potentially di￿erent purchase prices after trading in period t) as an investor
who does not change the number of risky assets in her portfolio. An investor who decreases the
43of these three strategies, it su￿ces to show that one of these strategies is at least
as good as the two other strategies. 10 First, the investor can sell the risky asset
to realize the unrealized net capital loss, and immediately repurchase it (strategy
one). Second, the investor can hold the asset and do no transactions (strategy two).
Third, the investor can sell just enough of the risky asset to realize the maximum
loss that can be o￿set in period t, and repurchase the sold amount of the risky asset
immediately (strategy three). In case the loss carryforward Lt−1 exceeds the upper
limit qualifying for tax rebates, the investor does not even have to sell any assets to
realize the desired capital loss and strategies two and three coincide.
All other tax-timing strategies are linear combinations of these three strategies.
Any strategy selling a fraction of the risky asset which is greater than that in strategy
three, but less than that in strategy one results in a portfolio and a loss carryforward
that is a linear combination of those of strategy one and three. Accordingly, any
strategy selling some fraction of the risky asset which is less that that of strategy
three, but more that that of strategy two results in a portfolio and a loss carryforward
that is a linear combination of those of strategies two and three. To prove that
strategy one is an optimal tax-timing strategy, it thus su￿ces to show that strategy
one performs at least as good as strategies two and three.
The three strategies at time t only di￿er in their purchase price of the risky
asset P ∗
t , the initial loss carryforward Lt, the unrealized capital gain Ut+1, and the
investor’s wealth Wt+1 at the beginning of period t + 1 before trading.
When the investor follows strategy one and sells the risky asset, a net capital
loss of Pt0 − P ∗
t−1 is realized and the purchase price decreases to P ∗
t = Pt0. As
Pt0 − P ∗
t−1 < −Mt ⇒ Pt0 − P ∗
t−1 + Lt−1 < −Mt, the taxable net capital loss is
T
(1)
t = max
 
Pt0 − P
∗
t−1 + Lt−1;−Mt

= −Mt. (2.7)
Thus, the tax refund is Mtτ dollars. The remaining loss carryforward is given by
L
(1)
t = Pt0 − P
∗
t−1 + Mt + Lt−1. (2.8)
number of risky assets in her portfolio faces a given minimum realized net capital loss which is
equivalent to a higher given initial loss carryforward from a technical perspective.
10To derive the optimal tax-timing strategy of an investor who additionally holds some risk-free
bonds from time t to t + 1, it su￿ces to analyze the case of an investor who holds only one
unit of the risky asset since the return on the risk-free bonds do not have an impact on optimal
tax-timing.
44If the investor follows strategy two and does not do any transactions in period t, the
purchase price remains at P ∗
t = P ∗
t−1, the net capital loss is
T
(2)
t = max(Lt−1;−Mt). (2.9)
Thus, the tax refund is max(Lt−1;−Mt)τ and the remaining loss carryforward is
L
(2)
t = Lt−1 − max(Lt−1;−Mt). (2.10)
If the investor follows strategy three, an investment strategy is chosen such that the
net capital loss is given by
T
(3)
t = −Mt (2.11)
and accordingly, the tax refund under strategy three is Mtτ. The remaining loss
carryforward is
L
(3)
t = 0, (2.12)
Let W
(i)
t denote the pre-tax wealth in period t of strategy i (i ∈ N3 ≡ {n ∈ N|n ≤ 3})
before trading. Then
W
(1)
t+1 =Pt+1 + Mtτ exp

r(t + 1 − t
0)

(2.13)
W
(2)
t+1 =Pt+1 − max(Lt−1;−Mt)τ exp

r(t + 1 − t
0)

(2.14)
W
(3)
t+1 =Pt+1 + Mtτ exp

r(t + 1 − t
0)

. (2.15)
If the investor follows tax-timing strategy three, two cases have to be distinguished
concerning the amount of the risky asset to be sold. First, if max(Lt−1;−Mt) =
−Mt, then the loss carryforward Lt−1 from period t−1 su￿ces to realize the desired
net capital loss in period t. In this case, the investor does not have to do any
transactions, and strategies two and three coincide. For case three, it thus su￿ces to
consider the case that Lt−1 > −Mt in which the investor still has to sell some fraction
of the risky assets. The amount of the risky assets the investor has to sell is then
equivalent to a fraction f of the risky asset, such that −Mt = f
 
Pt0 − P ∗
t−1

+Lt−1 ⇔
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strategy one strategy two strategy three
P∗
t Pt0 P∗
t−1 mixed
Wt+1 Pt+1 + Mtτ exp

r(t + 1 − t0)

Pt+1 − max

Lt−1;−Mt

Pt+1 + Mtτ exp

r(t + 1 − t0)

·τ exp

r(t + 1 − t0)

Ut+1 Pt+1 − Pt0 Pt+1 − P∗
t−1 Pt+1 − P∗
t−1 + Mt + Lt−1
Lt Pt0 − P∗
t−1 + Mt + Lt−1 Lt−1 − max(Lt−1;−Mt) 0
Table 2.1: This table shows the investor’s purchase price P ∗
t , her total wealth Wt+1,
her unrealized capital gains Ut+1 and her loss carryforward Lt when following strat-
egy one, two or three.
f =
−Mt−Lt−1
Pt0−P∗
t−1 .
Let U
(i)
t denote the unrealized capital gains (or losses) in period t of strategy i
(i ∈ N3) before trading. Then
U
(1)
t+1 =Pt+1 − Pt0 (2.16)
U
(2)
t+1 =Pt+1 − P
∗
t−1 (2.17)
U
(3)
t+1 =Pt+1 −
 
fPt0 + (1 − f)P
∗
t−1

=Pt+1 −

−Lt−1 − Mt
Pt0 − P ∗
t−1
Pt0 +

1 −
−Lt−1 − Mt
Pt0 − P ∗
t−1

P
∗
t−1

=Pt+1 −

−Lt−1 − Mt
Pt0 − P ∗
t−1
 
Pt0 − P
∗
t−1

+ P
∗
t−1

=Pt+1 − P
∗
t−1 + Lt−1 + Mt.
(2.18)
Table 2.1 summarizes the properties of the three tax-timing strategies.
With Equation (2.4), it holds in case that max(Lt−1;−Mt) = Lt−1 for the rela-
tion between strategies one and three that

 


W
(1)
t+1
U
(1)
t+1
L
(1)
t

 


=

 


Pt+1 + Mtτ exp

r(t + 1 − t0)

Pt+1 − Pt0
Pt0 − P ∗
t−1 + Mt + Lt−1

 




  

Pt+1 + Mtτ exp

r(t + 1 − t0)

Pt+1 − P ∗
t−1 + Mt + Lt−1
0

  

=

  

W
(3)
t+1
U
(3)
t+1
L
(3)
t

  

.
(2.19)
Thus, strategy one is at least as good as strategy three if max(Lt−1;−Mt) = Lt−1.
The economic reason for this ￿nding is that the loss carryforward of strategy one
46can be more easily converted to wealth and earn pro￿ts than the lower unrealized
capital gain of strategy three. In case that max(Lt−1;−Mt) = −Mt strategies two
and three coincide. To show that strategy one is an optimal tax-timing strategy it
remains to show that strategy one is at least as good as strategy two.
For the relation between strategies one and two, we distinguish two cases. First,
if Mt + Lt+1 ≤ 0 ⇔ max(Lt−1;−Mt) = −Mt, it holds with Equation (2.3) that


 

W
(1)
t+1
U
(1)
t+1
L
(1)
t


 

=


 

Pt+1 + Mtτ exp

r(t + 1 − t0)

Pt+1 − Pt0
Pt0 − P ∗
t−1 + Mt + Lt−1


 




 

Pt+1 + Mtτ exp

r(t + 1 − t0)

Pt+1 − P ∗
t−1
Lt−1 + Mt


 

=

  

Pt+1 − max(Lt−1;−Mt)τ exp

r(t + 1 − t0)

Pt+1 − P ∗
t−1
Lt−1 − max(Lt−1;−Mt)

  

=

  

W
(2)
t+1
U
(2)
t+1
L
(2)
t

  

.
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Second, if Mt + Lt−1 > 0 ⇔ max(Lt−1;−Mt) = Lt−1, it holds that


 

W
(1)
t+1
U
(1)
t+1
L
(1)
t


 

=


 

Pt+1 + Mtτ exp

r(t + 1 − t0)

Pt+1 − Pt0
Pt0 − P ∗
t−1 + Mt + Lt−1


 

=

  

Pt+1 + (Mt + Lt−1 − Lt−1)τ exp

r(t + 1 − t0)

Pt+1 − Pt0
Pt0 − P ∗
t−1 + Mt + Lt−1

  



 


Pt+1 − Lt−1τ exp

r(t + 1 − t0)

Pt+1 − Pt0
Pt0 − P ∗
t−1 + Mt + Lt−1 − (Mt + Lt−1)


 




 

Pt+1 − Lt−1τ exp

r(t + 1 − t0)

Pt+1 − P ∗
t−1
Lt−1 − Lt−1


 

=

  

Pt+1 − max(Lt−1;−Mt)τ exp

r(t + 1 − t0)

Pt+1 − P ∗
t−1
Lt−1 − max(Lt−1;−Mt)

  

=

  

W
(2)
t+1
U
(2)
t+1
L
(2)
t

  

.
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Thus, strategy one is at least as good as strategy two, which shows that indepen-
dent from the realization of future prices Pt+1 of the stock and the relation of the
47maximum loss deduction Mt to the initial loss carryforward Lt−1, strategy one al-
ways does at least as good as strategies two and three. Furthermore, strategy one
sometimes results in higher wealth than strategy two by allowing to earn the risk-
free interest rate on the tax rebates. Hence, strategy one is an optimal tax-timing
strategy and unrealized capital losses should be realized immediately.
Furthermore, if Pt0 6= infi∈[t,t+1) Pi, the investor can still increase the realized loss
in period t by trading whenever the price of the asset is below the purchase price.
In this case the above results with Pt0 = infi∈[t,t+1) Pi apply.
It has thus far been assumed that the risky asset does not pay any dividend or
interest. If, however, the risky asset does pay some dividend or interest, all strategies
are a￿ected from these payments in the same way, since under all three strategies,
the investor holds one unit of the risky asset and thereby receives the same amount
of dividend or interest. Hence, the results derived above also hold for risky assets
whose returns consist of both capital gains and dividend or interest payments.
2.2.4 The Case with Multiple Risky Assets
If the investor only holds one risky asset, it is optimal for the investor to realize losses
at time t immediately in order to earn the interest on the tax rebate if Mt > 0. If
Mt = 0, there is no tax rebate and the investor can only use a loss carryforward
to reduce future realized capital gains. Consequently, for the one-asset case when
Mt = 0, both strategies one and three and any combination of them is an optimal
tax-timing strategy, as there are no tax rebates that allow for earning an extra
return.
In the one-asset case, the investor never faces the situation in which one of
the assets comes with an unrealized capital gain and another is endowed with an
unrealized capital loss. That being so, a net capital loss that exceeds the amount
of Mt can only be carried forward. If, however, the investor holds more than one
risky asset, a loss carryforward Lt−1 realized in some asset S1 in period t can be
used to reduce net capital gains from some other asset S2 realized in some period
k ≥ t if the investor wants to reallocate the portfolio. As, in contrast to strategy
one, strategy three does not allow for this transfer of realized losses of some asset S1
to some other asset S2, strategy one dominates strategy three in the multiple-asset
case.
482.2.5 Attainable Wealth
As shown in Constantinides (1983) and above, both in tax systems with limited
and unlimited tax rebates, it is optimal to realize losses immediately. Let W
(l)
t
denote the beginning of period t wealth before trading that an investor following
the optimal tax-timing strategy can attain in a tax-system with limited tax rebates,
i.e. W
(l)
t ≡ W
(1)
t . Furthermore, let W
(u)
t denote the corresponding wealth the
investor can attain in a tax-system with unlimited tax rebates following the optimal
tax-timing strategy to realize losses in the period they occur. As there are no loss
carryforwards in tax-systems with unlimited tax rebates, it is assumed that Lt−1 = 0
in the tax-system with limited tax rebates to make the two tax-systems comparable.
In case an investor realizes a capital loss in period t that does not exceed Mt, the
evolution of the wealth from t to t+1 is the same in both tax systems. If, however,
the capital loss exceeds Mt, i.e. Pt0 − P ∗
t−1 < −Mt, then
W
(l)
t+1 =Pt+1 + Mtτ exp

r(t + 1 − t
0)

(2.22)
U
(l)
t+1 =Pt+1 − Pt (2.23)
L
(l)
t =Pt0 − P
∗
t−1 + Mt (2.24)
and
W
(u)
t+1 =Pt+1 −
 
Pt0 − P
∗
t−1

τ exp

r(t + 1 − t
0)

(2.25)
U
(u)
t+1 =Pt+1 − Pt0 (2.26)
L
(u)
t =0. (2.27)
With Equation (2.3) it holds that


 

W
(u)
t+1
U
(u)
t+1
L
(u)
t


 

=


 

Pt+1 +
 
Mtτ −
 
Pt0 − P ∗
t−1 + Mt

τ

exp

r(t + 1 − t0)

Pt+1 − Pt0
0


 



  

Pt+1 + Mtτ exp

r(t + 1 − t0)

Pt+1 − Pt0
Pt0 − P ∗
t−1 + Mt

  

=

  

W
(l)
t+1
U
(l)
t+1
L
(l)
t

  

.
(2.28)
49Thus, not very surprisingly, an investment opportunity set with unlimited tax re-
bates is preferable to an investment opportunity set with limited tax rebates. The
advantage of the investment opportunity set with unlimited tax rebates is the op-
portunity to get an unlimited tax rebate on capital losses and earn the interest on
these losses, as in a tax-system with limited tax rebates, no interest is paid on the
loss carryforward. Furthermore, one dollar of cash at hand can be used much more
￿exibly than one dollar of loss carryforward ￿ especially when limits on maximum
losses qualifying for tax rebates M1,...,MT are small.
2.3 Capital Gains Taxation and Asset Allocation
Having derived the optimal tax-timing strategy for an investor endowed with an
initial loss carryforward, we now turn to the impact of the tax-timing option and
limits on tax rebates for asset allocation.
In the absence of a tax-timing option and tax rebates on capital losses, an in-
vestor maximizing utility from terminal wealth whose wealth does not face exogenous
increases or decreases, for instance through non-￿nancial income or consumption,
would hold the same fraction of stocks in each period, according to the classical
result of Merton (1969) and Samuelson (1969). Thus, in such a setting, each devia-
tion of the investor’s asset allocation from this benchmark is due to the tax-timing
option and the limits on tax rebates. This section discusses how taxation of capital
gains and in particular, how limits on capital loss deduction a￿ect the investor’s
asset allocation.
The taxation of capital gains di￿ers in four ways from the Merton-Samuelson
benchmark. First, capital gains are often taxed at lower tax-rates than dividends
and interest. Second, capital gains are only taxable when realized. That is, the
investor has a deferral option, which is exercised by not selling the asset. Third, net
capital losses only qualify for tax rebates up to a certain limit. Fourth, capital gains
are forgiven when being bequeathed.
It is true that the di￿erent tax-rates applied to capital gains and dividends and
interest can still be analyzed in a model without taxes by applying the after-tax
risk-return pro￿les of the two assets. However, the deferral option, limits on tax
rebates, and the forgiveness of capital gains when being bequeathed deserve explicit
50modeling.
The deferral option allows the investor to earn compound returns on the taxes
that have been postponed, which reduces the e￿ective capital gains rate (Chay et al.
(2006)). On the other hand, postponing the realization of capital gains can result in
unbalanced portfolios. In particular when unrealized capital gains are substantial,
rebalancing the portfolio can result in substantial capital gains tax payments, which
make it even less attractive to sell an asset with a substantial unrealized capital
gain. This is also referred to as the danger of getting ￿locked in.￿
In a tax-system with unlimited tax rebates, capital gains and capital losses are
treated symmetrically. That is, it does not matter if a net capital gain or a net
capital loss is realized; the investor is confronted with the same taxable treatment.
In tax-systems with limited tax rebates, however, there is an asymmetric taxation
of capital gains and losses. Although capital gains are taxed at the capital gains
tax-rate independent of their amount, capital losses qualify for tax rebates only up
to a certain limit. The investor thus keeps the fraction 1 − τ of realized capital
gains, but bears the entire risk for losses exceeding the maximum loss deduction if
there is no initial loss carryforward. The compensation for this risk comes as a loss
carryforward. However, in contrast to tax rebates, a loss carryforward does not pay
any interest.
Furthermore, a loss carryforward also bears the risk of never being used and thus
ending up worthless. This risk is especially important if the remaining investment
horizon of the investor is short. Therefore, in comparison with a tax-system with
unlimited tax rebates in the absence of an initial loss carryforward, an investment
into a risky asset o￿ers the same opportunities to the investor when returns are
positive, but bears higher risks when returns are negative. As a result, in a tax-
system with limited tax rebates, investors that are not endowed with an initial loss
carryforward will hold less risky assets than in a tax-system with unlimited tax
rebates. The higher the level of the initial loss carryforward, the lower the investor’s
advantage of an additional loss carryforward since the risk that this additional loss
carryforward remains unused is higher when with the investor already has some
loss carryforward. Furthermore, even if it is entirely used, the time passed until its
entire usage is longer, which means it will take longer until the investor receives the
interest payments on the tax rebates.
51The size of the advantage to an investor without a loss carryforward who has
the opportunity to invest in a tax-system with unlimited tax rebates instead of a
tax-system with limited tax rebates depends on seven factors. First, it depends
on M1,...,MT, the amounts up to which realized losses qualify for tax rebates.
The higher these values are, the lower the advantage is of the tax-system with
unlimited tax rebates. Second, it depends on the capital gains tax-rate τ. The
higher τ is, the higher the tax rebates are, and thus the more advantageous the
tax-system with unlimited tax rebates is. Third, it depends on the evolution of
the price of the risky asset, P1,...,PT. The earlier and the higher capital losses
are that exceed M1,...,MT, the bigger the advantage is in the tax-system with
unlimited tax rebates. As one can see, the more volatile the risky asset, the higher
the disadvantage of being in a tax-system with limited tax rebates. Hence, in tax-
systems with limited capital loss deduction, investors will decrease their holdings
in risky assets when those assets become more volatile. Fourth, the lower the risk-
aversion of an investor is, the higher the exposure to risky assets is, and consequently,
the higher the disadvantage is when being confronted with a tax-system with limited
tax rebates. Fifth, the higher the risk-free rate is, the higher the disadvantage is
of the loss carryforward not paying any interest, and thus the higher the advantage
is of the tax-system with unlimited tax rebates. Sixth, the higher the level of the
investor’s wealth is, the higher the probability is of exceeding the lower bound on
maximum losses qualifying for tax rebates for a given equity proportion. Seventh,
the investor’s advantage depends on the investor’s remaining investment horizon.
The longer the investment horizon is, the bigger the advantage is of the tax-system
with unlimited tax rebates due to the compounding of interest on tax rebates.
If, however, the investor has an initial loss carryforward, this has a positive im-
pact on the after-tax risk-return pro￿le of the risky asset, as it allows the investor
to earn an amount of capital gains not exceeding the loss carryforward tax-free. As
a result of this, if the investor has some loss carryforward, there is no longer a dom-
inating relationship between the two tax-systems from the investor’s point of view.
On the one hand, the investor bears the risk that the treasury does not participate
in high losses via tax rebates. On the other hand, the investor has the opportunity
of earning some capital gains tax-free due to the initial loss carryforward.
Given the parameters of the tax-system, the investor’s initial wealth, the length
52of the remaining investment horizon, and the distribution of future changes in the
price of the risky asset, having sold the assets with unrealized capital losses, the
investment decision depends on three factors: ￿rst, the loss carryforward, second, the
remaining unrealized capital gains, and third the remaining initial equity proportion.
Altogether, six di￿erent cases can be distinguished.
First, when the investor is endowed with an initial loss carryforward, unrealized
capital gains and an equity proportion below the optimal level, the investor can
increase her equity proportion to the optimal level. Compared to the case with
no initial loss carryforward, the optimal equity proportion will be higher, as the
loss carryforward allows earning future pro￿ts tax-free. In particular, when the
remaining investment horizon is short, this e￿ect is important, as otherwise the loss
carryforward does not have any value to the investor.
Second, when the investor has an initial loss carryforward, unrealized capital
gains and a high initial equity proportion, the investor can use the loss carryforward
to rebalance her portfolio without having to pay the capital gains tax for unrealized
gains not exceeding the loss carryforward.
Third, when the investor does not have an initial loss carryforward, but has
unrealized capital gains, and the initial equity proportion is above the optimal equity
exposure of an investor who is not endowed with unrealized capital gains, the desire
to rebalance the portfolio and the desire to defer the realization of capital gains
are opposing e￿ects. The higher the initial equity proportion is, and the lower the
unrealized capital gain is per unit of the risky asset, the higher the probability is
that the desire to rebalance the portfolio outweighs the desire to defer the realization
of capital gains and that the investor hence realizes at least part of the unrealized
capital gains.
Fourth, when the investor has no initial loss carryforward, but has unrealized
capital gains, and the initial equity proportion is low, the investor will increase the
equity proportion to the optimal level, as this transaction does not confront her with
capital gains taxes.
Fifth, when the investor has an initial loss carryforward, but no unrealized capital
gains, the initial equity proportion does not have an impact on the optimal equity
proportion, as the investor can trade without facing capital gains tax-payments.
Sixth, when the investor has neither an initial loss carryforward nor an unrealized
53capital gain, the investor holds a lower equity proportion than in the case with an
initial loss carryforward, as there is no opportunity of earning positive future capital
gains tax-free.
In total, a limitation of capital loss deduction should result in a lower equity
exposure than in a tax-system with unlimited tax rebates. The stricter the limita-
tion, the lower the equity exposure for an investor who does not have an initial loss
carryforward.
2.4 Optimal Tax-Timing over the Life Cycle
Having derived optimal tax-timing decisions for investors endowed with unrealized
capital losses and discussed the impact of the tax-timing option and limits on tax
rebates for the investor’s asset allocation, we now turn to optimal tax-timing strate-
gies over the life cycle. The model in this section builds on Dammon et al. (2001).
We consider an economy consisting of short-selling constrained investors living for
at most T years, who can only trade at time t = 0,1,...,T. F(t) denotes the
probability that the investor is still alive through period t (t ≤ T). We assume the
investor to derive utility from the consumption Ct of a single good at time t and
bequest, and have CRRA-utility with a parameter of risk-aversion of γ ∈ [0,∞), i.e.
U(Ct) ≡

 
 
C
1−γ
t
1−γ for γ 6= 1
ln(Ct) for γ = 1.
(2.29)
The parameter γ represents the investor’s willingness to substitute consumption
among di￿erent states in time. It also represents the elasticity of consumption,
which is given by 1
γ. The investor’s task is to optimize the discounted expected
utility of lifetime consumption and bequest, given an initial endowment, subject
to the intertemporal budget constraint. The parameter β represents the investor’s
utility discount factor, and i is a constant annual in￿ation rate. Following Dammon
et al. (2001), we assume that at the time of death, the investor’s remaining wealth
is used to purchase an H-period annuity payable to the investor’s bene￿ciary and
that the H-period annuity provides the bene￿ciary with nominal consumption of
AHWt (1 + i)
k−t at date k (t + 1 ≤ k ≤ t + H), in which AH ≡
r∗(1+r∗)H
(1+r∗)H−1 is the
54H-period annuity factor, r∗ =
(1−τd)r−i
1+i is the after-tax real bond return, Wt is the
investor’s total beginning-of-period-t-wealth, and i is a constant in￿ation rate. For
simplicity, the bene￿ciary is assumed to have the same preferences as the investor.
On this assumption, H can be interpreted as a measure for the investor’s bequest
motive. The higher H the stronger the bequest motive.
Following Dammon et al. (2001), we consider an investor who is not endowed
with non-￿nancial income11 and assume that the purchase price used to compute
capital gains is the average weighted historical purchase price. This assumption
assures that stochastic dynamic programming is an e￿cient method for solving the
investor’s optimization problem. 12 If P ∗
t denotes that purchase price after trading
at time t, and qt denotes the number of risky assets the investor holds in period t,
P ∗
t is given by
P
∗
t =

 
 
qt−1P∗
t−1+max(qt−qt−1,0)Pt
qt−1+max(qt−qt−1,0) if P ∗
t−1 < Pt
Pt if P ∗
t−1 ≥ Pt.
(2.30)
This speci￿cation takes into account that it is optimal to realize capital losses (i.e.
P ∗
t−1 ≥ Pt) immediately, which decreases the average purchase price from P ∗
t−1 to Pt.
If, however, the investor is endowed with an unrealized capital gain (i.e. P ∗
t−1 < Pt)
the change in the tax basis depends on the trading in period t. If the investor
sells some assets (i.e. qt < qt−1), the tax basis remains unchanged. If instead, the
investor purchases some assets (i.e. qt > qt−1) the tax basis is a weighted average of
the previous tax basis and the purchase price Pt of the new asset. As according to
the optimal tax-timing strategy losses shall be realized immediately, the investor’s
realized net capital gain in period t is given by
Gt =

χ{P∗
t−1>Pt}qt−1 + χ{Pt≥P∗
t−1} max(qt−1 − qt,0)

·
 
Pt − P
∗
t−1

(2.31)
where χ{P∗
t−1>Pt} denotes the characteristic function of Pt, which is one for P ∗
t−1 > Pt
11We relax this assumption in section 2.4.5.
12In an exact cost basis calculation, it is possible that the investor holds positions in the risky
asset with di￿erent purchase prices. In particular, the investor should prefer to sell the asset
with the highest purchase price ￿rst which could allow her to slightly decrease her tax payments.
However, DeMiguel and Uppal (2005) show that the certainty equivalent losses from using the
average tax basis instead of the exact tax basis is small. The average purchase-price method is
e.g. mandatory under current Canadian or Danish tax-law.
55and zero otherwise. By R we denote the gross after-tax return of the risk-free asset.
d is a constant after-tax dividend of equity, bt is the number of units of the risk-free
asset with purchase price one the investor holds during period t.
In a tax-system with unlimited tax rebates, the optimization problem is the
same as in Dammon et al. (2001). In a tax-system with limits on tax rebates, the
investor’s optimizing problem becomes
max
Ct,qt
E
"
T X
t=0
β
t

F(t)U

Ct
(1 + i)
t

+ (F(t − 1) − F(t))
t+H X
k=t+1
β
k−tU

AHWt
(1 + i)
t
#
(2.32)
s.t.
Wt = qt−1 · (1 + d)Pt + bt−1 · R, t = 0,...,T (2.33)
Wt = τTt + qt · Pt + bt + Ct t = 0,...,T − 1 (2.34)
qT = 0,bT = 0 (2.35)
qt ≥ 0,bt ≥ 0 t = 0,...,T − 1 (2.36)
given the initial holding of bonds b−1, stocks q−1, the initial tax-basis P ∗
−1, the
price of one unit of the stock P0, and the initial loss carryforward L−1. According
to Equation (2.32), the investor maximizes discounted expected utility of lifetime
consumption and bequest. Equation (2.33) de￿nes the investor’s beginning of period
t wealth as the sum of wealth in stocks and wealth in bonds before trading at time
t, including the after-tax interest and dividend income, but before any capital gains
taxes resulting from trading at time t. Equation (2.34) is the investor’s budget
constraint at time t. If the investor trades equity, the net capital gain Tt is subject
to the capital gains tax-rate.
By letting Xt denote the vector of the investor’s state variables, Vt(.) the in-
vestor’s value function at time t, f(t) the probability of surviving from period t to
t+1 given the investor is alive at the beginning of period t, and taking into account
that the sum in the last term of the objective function (2.32) can be simpli￿ed by
taking into account that
Pt+H
k=t+1 βk−t =
β(1−βH)
1−β , the Bellmann equation for the
56optimization problem can be written as
Vt(Xt) =max
Ct,qt
"
f(t)U

Ct
(1 + i)t

+ f(t)βEt [Vt+1 (Xt+1)]
+ (1 − f(t))
β
 
1 − βH
1 − β
U

AHWt
(1 + i)
t
# (2.37)
for t = 0,...,T − 1 subject to Equations (2.1), (2.2), (2.30), (2.31), and (2.33) to
(2.36) with terminal condition VT (XT) = U

AHWT
(1+i)T

. The state variables needed to
solve the problem at time t are the investor’s beginning-of-period-wealth Wt before
trading, the initial loss carryforward Lt−1, the price of the risky asset Pt, its tax
basis P ∗
t−1, and the number of stocks qt−1 the investor is holding at the beginning
of period t before trading. Thus, the vector of state variables Xt at time t can be
represented as
Xt = [Pt,Wt,Lt−1,P
∗
t−1,qt−1]. (2.38)
The US tax-code allows a constant amount of $ 3,000 as the maximum amount that
quali￿es for tax rebates. Due to this, the impact of this upper bound depends on
the investor’s level of beginning-of-period wealth. If M > 0, investors with higher
beginning-of-period-wealth should have a lower fraction invested in equity, since
they run a higher risk of facing net capital losses exceeding M than investors with
lower beginning-of-period-wealth. In order to reduce the number of state variables
and keep our optimization problem numerically tractable, we assume Mt to be a
non-positive multiple of Wt, i.e. m ≡ Mt
Wt (t ∈ NT) to be some ￿nite non-positive
real value.13
By the assumption that Mt is a constant multiple of Wt, the above optimization
problem can be simpli￿ed by normalizing with beginning-of-period-wealth Wt. Let
st ≡
qt−1Pt
Wt denote the fraction of the investor’s beginning-of-period-wealth before
trading invested into equity, αt ≡
qtPt
Wt the investor’s fraction of beginning-of-period-
wealth allocated to equity after trading, b0
t ≡ bt
Wt the fraction of the beginning-of-
period-wealth allocated to risk-free bonds after trading, ct ≡ Ct
Wt the consumption-
13Except for m = 0, this approach does not capture the impact of changes in beginning-of-period
wealth Wt on the relation between M and Wt. However, the impact of di￿erent wealth levels on
optimal asset allocation can be analyzed by varying m.
57wealth-ratio, p∗
t−1 ≡
P∗
t−1
Pt the investors basis-price-ratio, tt ≡ Tt
Wt the fraction of the
investor’s beginning-of-period-wealth that is taxable at the capital gains tax-rate,
lt−1 ≡
Lt−1
Wt the fraction of the investor’s loss carryforward to beginning-of-period-
wealth, gt ≡
Pt+1
Pt − 1 the capital gain on the stock in period t, and
Rt ≡
αt (1 + d)(1 + gt) + b0
tR
αt + b0
t
(2.39)
the gross nominal return on the investor’s portfolio after trading in period t and
payment of taxes on dividends and interest, but before payment of capital gains
taxes.
De￿ning vt(xt) ≡
Vt(Xt)
W
1−γ
t
to be the normalized value function, ρt ≡
Wt+1
Wt(1+i) to
be the investor’s real growth of wealth before capital gains taxes, the investor’s
optimization problem can be rewritten as
vt(xt) = max
ct,αt
"
f(t)U(ct) + f(t)βE

vt+1 (xt+1)ρ
1−γ
t

+ (1 − f(t))
β
 
1 − βH
1 − β
U (AH)
# (2.40)
s.t.
1 = τtt + αt + b
0
t + ct t = 0,...,T − 1 (2.41)
ρt = (1 − τtt)Rt t = 0,...,T − 1 (2.42)
αt,b
0
t ≥ 0 t = 0,...,T − 1 (2.43)
in which tt is given by
tt = max(δt + lt−1;−m) (2.44)
The fraction of realized gains to beginning-of-period-wealth needed to compute tt is
given by
δt ≡
Gt
Wt
=

χ{p∗
t−1>1}st + χ{p∗
t−1≤1} max(st − αt,0)

·
 
1 − p
∗
t−1

(2.45)
58and p∗
t is given by
p
∗
t =

 
 
stp∗
t−1+max(αt−st;0)
(st+max(αt−st;0))(gt+1) p∗
t−1 < 1
1
gt+1 otherwise
(2.46)
At time T, the investor’s value function takes the value
vT =
β
 
1 − βH
1 − β
U (AH) (2.47)
in all states. Our optimization problem can be solved numerically using backward
induction with state variables xt = [st,p∗
t−1,lt−1]. To do so, a 41×40×41 grid with
equally distributed grid points over [0,1], [0,1.5] and [-1,0] is spanned. For values of
[st,p∗
t−1,lt−1] between the grid, cubic spline interpolation is performed. To expedite
computation, the interpolation function for each of the two problems is computed
symbolically as a function of st, p∗
t−1, and lt−1 for each period t. The cubic spline
interpolation at time t can then be performed by plugging st, p∗
t−1, and lt−1 into
this interpolation function. The integral in the expectation in Equation (2.40) is
computed using Gaussian quadrature. The optimization problem with unlimited
tax rebates with state variables xt = [st,p∗
t−1] is solved accordingly for a 41 × 40
grid.
For the numerical analysis, it is assumed, that annual in￿ation is i = 3.5%,
and mandatory retirement age is J = 66, indicating that the investor still works
at age 65 and retires when attaining age 66. The pre-tax risk-free rate is 6%. The
return on equity is lognormally distributed, independent in time, comes with an
expected capital gain of µ = 7% (t ∈ NT), a standard deviation of σ = 20.7%
(which corresponds to a standard deviation of the real return of about 20%) and a
constant pre-tax dividend rate of 2% in each period.
The correct choice of the risk-premium for equity has been subject to numerous
theoretical and empirical research (see Siegel (2005) for a survey). While the histor-
ical risk-premium has been about 6% (Mehra and Prescott (1985)) in the US since
1872, economists doubt whether this will be true in future periods. We follow the
current consensus which is about 3% to 4% (see e.g. Dammon et al. (2001, 2004)
Cocco et al. (2005), and Gomes and Michaelides (2005)).
The tax-rate on interest, dividends and income is assumed to be τd = 36%. The
59Base-case Parameter Values
Description Parameter Value
Risk-aversion γ 3
Length of investment horizon T 80
Number of years annuity bene￿ciary H 60
Mandatory retirement age J 66
Discount factor β 0.96
Dividend rate d 2%
Expected capital gains rate stock µ 7%
Standard deviation stock σ 20.7%
Interest payment of bond r 6%
In￿ation rate i 3.5%
Tax-rate on dividends, interest and income τd 36%
Tax-rate on capital gains τg 20%
Table 2.2: This table reports the parameter values used in the base-case.
tax-rate on realized capital gains is assumed to be τg = 20%. Since short-term
capital gains are usually subject to the same tax-rate as dividends and interest, this
implies the assumption that the investor realizes capital gains long-term, which is
can be the case, for example, when the investor sells them after one year and one day.
We assume the investor makes decisions annually starting at age 20 ( t = 0). The
maximum age the investor can attain is set to 100 years (T = 80). It is also assumed
that the relative risk-aversion of the investor is γ = 3 and the annual subjective
utility discount factor is β = 0.96. We assume the investor ￿nances consumption
entirely from her investments and does not have any non-￿nancial income (we relax
this assumption in section 2.4.5). This choice of parameters follows Gallmeyer et al.
(2006) and is quite similar to that of Dammon et al. (2001). Initially, H is set
to H = 60 in the bequest function, indicating the investor wishes to provide the
bene￿ciary with an income stream for the next 60 years. The data for the survival
probabilities of our investor were set equal to the survival probabilities for female
investors according to the 2001 Commissioners Standard Ordinary Mortality Table.
Table 2.2 summarizes these parameters for the base-case.
w We ￿rst turn to the base-case scenario and analyze optimal consumption and
asset allocation in sections 2.4.1 and 2.4.2. In section 2.4.3, we quantify the value
of an initial loss carryforward. Section 2.4.4 compares optimal asset allocation in
tax-systems with limited capital loss deduction and unlimited capital loss deduction.
Section 2.4.5 explores the sensitivity of our results to non-￿nancial income and tax-
60systems that allow for tax rebates (i.e. m > 0).
2.4.1 Optimal Consumption Policy
We begin the discussion of our numerical results for the base-case in a life cycle
model by presenting the investor’s optimal consumption policy depending on her
age, her initial fraction of stocks, her unrealized capital gains and losses and her
initial loss carryforward. As a benchmark case, we consider an investor confronted
with a tax-system that does not pose any limits on tax rebates. The relation between
the optimal consumption-wealth-ration depends heavily on the investor’s bequest
motive. As the investor ages her mortality rate increases such that the impact of her
bequest motive on her consumption and investment decision increases. The bequest
motive used in the base-case is of such magnitude that the investor increases her
consumption slightly over the life cycle. For high initial levels of the equity exposure
and unrealized capital gains, the investor is ￿locked in,￿ and her optimal consumption
also depends on the capital gains tax she faces to ￿nance her consumption and
rebalance her portfolio.
Figure 2.1 shows the investor’s optimal consumption-wealth-ratio. The investor’s
basis-price-ratio indicates whether she faces unrealized gains or losses. For p∗ < 1,
the investor faces unrealized capital gains that become higher as p∗ becomes lower.
If p∗ = 1, the investor neither faces unrealized capital gains nor losses, whereas if
p∗ > 1, the investor is endowed with an unrealized capital loss.
The upper left graph depicts the consumption-wealth-ratio depending on age and
initial equity proportion in a tax-system that does not allow for any tax rebates on
realized capital losses (m = 0) for an investor who is has no initial loss carryforward
(l = 0), and whose basis-price-ratio is p∗ = 0.5, indicating that the investor faces
substantial unrealized capital gains in her equity. The upper right graph shows the
optimal consumption-wealth-ratio for an investor who is endowed with an initial loss
carryforward of 10% of her beginning-of-period-wealth ( l = −0.1).
The upper graphs in Figure 2.1 show that the investor’s optimal consumption-
wealth-ratio is slightly increasing with her age. This increase is due to the fact
that due to increasing mortality rates and the forgiveness of capital gains when
being bequeathed the value of the tax-timing option decreases as the investor ages.
The decreasing value of the tax-timing option tends to decrease the desire to hold
61Optimal Consumption Policy
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Figure 2.1: This Figure shows the investor’s optimal consumption-wealth-ratio (op-
timal consumption) in a tax-system with no tax rebates on capital losses ( m = 0).
The investor is either endowed with no initial loss carryforward ( l = 0, left graphs) or
an initial loss carryforward of 10% of her beginning-of-period wealth ( l = −0.1, right
graphs). The upper graphs depict the investor’s optimal consumption-wealth-ratio
depending on her age and her initial equity proportion when the investor is facing
substantial unrealized capital gains in her equity ( p∗ = 0.5), the lower graphs de-
pict her optimal consumption-wealth-ratio at age 20 depending on her initial equity
proportion and her basis-price-ratio.
equity thereby reducing the expected return on investments which increases present
consumption.14 The upper left graph further shows that the investor decreases her
consumption with increasing initial equity proportion. This decline is due to the fact
that her basis-price-ratio is smaller than one, and she thus faces unrealized capital
gains. If the investor’s initial equity proportion is of signi￿cant height, she is ￿locked
in￿. To ￿nance her consumption, she therefore either has to decrease her risk-free
bond position, which leaves her with a badly diversi￿ed portfolio, or she has to sell
some fraction of her equity, which confronts her with capital gains tax payments.
14However, due to the forgiveness of capital gains when being bequeathed there is an opposing
e￿ect on the investor’s equity exposure. This e￿ect will be discussed in more detail in section
2.4.2.
62In both cases, she decreases her consumption to either improve diversi￿cation or
decrease the amount of capital gains tax to pay.
If, however, the investor is endowed with an initial loss carryforward (upper right
graph), she uses that loss carryforward to realize capital gains and avoid the capital
gains tax. Due to her initial loss carryforward, she can thus avoid either ending
up with an unbalanced portfolio or paying the capital gains tax. Consequently, she
only decreases her consumption-wealth-ratio if her initial loss carryforward is not
su￿cient to rebalance her portfolio and withdraw funds to ￿nance her consumption.
The lower left graph in Figure 2.1 shows the optimal consumption-wealth-ratio
of an investor at age 20 who has no initial loss carryforward ( l = 0) in a tax-system
that does not allow for any tax rebates for realized capital losses ( m = 0) depending
on her initial equity proportion and her initial basis-price-ratio. The lower right
graph shows her optimal consumption-wealth-ratio when she is given an initial loss
carryforward of 10% of her beginning-of-period wealth (l = −0.1).
When a 20-year old investor is given an initial loss carryforward (left graph), she
decreases her consumption if she has to sell equity with unrealized capital gains to
lower her capital gains tax payments. The investor faces unrealized capital gains if
her basis-price-ratio is smaller than one. If, in addition, her initial equity proportion
exceeds the optimal equity proportion she would choose if she was not confronted
with the capital gains tax-rate, she is ￿locked in￿. To ￿nance her consumption, she ei-
ther has to decrease the fraction of risk-free bonds in her portfolio, which might leave
her with an unbalanced portfolio, or she has to sell equity with unrealized capital
gains and pay the capital gains tax-rate. Since both options are quite unattractive,
she reduces her consumption when being ￿locked in￿. The higher her initial eq-
uity proportion and the lower her basis-price-ratio, the higher her unrealized capital
gains. Since higher unrealized capital gains confront the investor with higher capital
gains tax payments when rebalancing her portfolio, her consumption wealth-ratio is
lower when facing a high initial equity proportion and a low basis-price-ratio.
If, however, the investor has an initial loss carryforward (lower right graph), she
can avoid the capital gains tax-payment on realized capital gains. Consequently,
her consumption is above the level of an investor has no initial loss carryforward.
However, her consumption is below the level of an investor who does not have
unrealized capital gains. This re￿ects the fact that the investor wishes to keep a
63certain loss carryforward for future periods and thus does not use her entire loss
carryforward at once.
2.4.2 Optimal Investment Policy
Having discussed the optimal consumption policy in the previous section, we now
turn to the optimal investment policy in the base-case scenario. This policy depends
on the investor’s basis-price-ratio, her initial equity exposure, her initial loss carry-
forward, and the length of her remaining investment horizon. The basis-price-ratio
indicates whether the investor faces an unrealized capital gain or loss, and thereby
in￿uences potential capital gains tax-payments when trading equity. The initial eq-
uity proportion indicates to which extend the investor is a￿ected by the unrealized
capital gains or losses. An initial loss carryforward provides the investor with the
opportunity of avoiding capital gains tax-payments when rebalancing her portfolio.
The length of the remaining investment horizon has an impact on the investor’s
optimal tax-timing and asset allocation due to the forgiveness of capital gains when
being bequeathed. Due to the uncertain death of the investor, the length of the
remaining investment horizon is not known in advance. However, its distribution
depends on the investor’s age since mortality rates are increasing as the investor
ages.
Figure 2.2 shows the investor’s optimal equity proportion after trading in our
base-case setting in which the tax-system does not provide any tax rebates. The
upper left graph depicts the investor’s optimal equity proportion as a function of age,
and the initial equity proportion for an investor who has no initial loss carryforward
(l = 0), and whose initial basis-price-ratio is p∗ = 0.5, such that the investor faces
substantial unrealized capital gains in her equity. The upper right graph shows the
optimal equity proportion for an investor who has an initial loss carryforward of
10% of her beginning-of-period-wealth (l = −0.1). Compared to the benchmark
case with no tax-timing option (not shown here), the investor’s equity exposure
increases signi￿cantly, which re￿ects the value of the tax-timing option.
The upper left graph in Figure 2.2 shows that the investor’s optimal equity
proportion depends on both her initial equity proportion and her age. As the investor
gets older, she sharply increases her optimal equity proportion due to the forgiveness
of capital gains when being bequeathed. This increase is of tremendous size if she
64Optimal Investment Policy
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Figure 2.2: This Figure shows the investor’s optimal equity exposure in a tax-system
with no tax rebates on capital losses (m = 0), for an investor who either has no
initial loss carryforward (l = 0, left graphs) or an initial loss carryforward of 10% of
her beginning-of-period wealth (l = −0.1, right graphs). The upper graphs depict
the investor’s optimal equity proportion (money invested into equity relative to
beginning-of-period-wealth), depending on her age and her initial equity proportion
when facing substantial capital gains in her equity (basis-price-ratio p∗ = 0.5). The
lower graphs depict her optimal equity exposure at age 20 depending on her initial
equity proportion and her basis-price-ratio.
is older than 90 years and is ￿locked in￿ with a high amount of money, i.e. she faces
a high initial equity proportion. However, even if the investor is not ￿locked in￿ she
increases her equity exposure. This is due to the reason that she can mainly base her
optimization problem on after-tax returns that come with a higher expected return
which increases the desirability of holding equity.
For young investors being ￿locked in￿, however, the rebalancing motive is a lot
more important than the forgiveness of capital gains at death, which is why they
realize some part of the capital gains and pay the capital gains tax to decrease their
equity exposure. Still, even young investors accept a higher equity exposure than
65they would choose not being ￿locked in￿ to avoid paying capital gains taxes. When
the initial equity proportion is low, the investor even slightly decreases her optimal
equity proportion as her initial equity proportion increases. This ￿nding is due
to the assumption that her basis-price-ratio is a weighted average of her purchase
prices. Hence, by decreasing her equity proportion she reduces her risk of getting
￿locked in￿ in future periods.
The upper right graph in Figure 2.2 di￿ers from the upper left graph because it
considers an investor who has an initial loss carryforward of 10% of her beginning-
of-period-wealth. When her optimal equity proportion is below her initial equity
proportion she uses the loss carryforward to realize capital gains, avoids the capital
gains tax-rate and lowers her equity exposure. If, however, her initial equity pro-
portion is only slightly above her optimal equity proportion, she accepts a slightly
higher equity proportion since she faces a lower risk of getting locked in because of
her initial loss carryforward.
The lower left graph in Figure 2.2 depicts the optimal equity proportion of an
investor at age 20 who does not have an initial loss carryforward ( l = 0), depending
on her initial equity proportion and her basis-price-ratio. If the investor’s basis-price-
ratio is below one, she faces unrealized capital gains. If her basis-price-ratio is above
one, she faces unrealized capital losses. According to our results in section 2.2, she
should realize these losses immediately, which leaves her with a loss carryforward.
This loss carryforward increases the desirability of equity, since it allows the investor
to earn some capital gains tax-free. Consequently, her equity exposure is higher when
initially facing unrealized capital losses than the equity exposure of an investor who
is neither facing unrealized losses nor capital gains, i.e. whose basis-price-ratio is
one.
If, however, the investor’s basis-price-ratio is smaller than one, indicating that
she faces an unrealized capital gain, she has to decide whether to realize that gain
or to postpone realizing it. Concerning this decision, there are two opposing ef-
fects. On the one hand, postponing the realization of the capital gain allows her
to earn compound returns on the tax-payments that have been postponed. On the
other hand, postponing the realization of the capital gains can result in unbalanced
portfolios. Especially if the risky asset has performed well in the past, its fraction
relative to the investor’s total wealth has been increasing which might result in an
66unbalanced portfolio. However, selling this asset to rebalance the portfolio would
result in capital gains tax payments. To avoid the capital gains tax payment, the
investor accepts a deviation from her optimal equity proportion, which is higher
when her basis-price-ratio is lower, i.e. when her unrealized capital gains per unit
of the risky asset is higher.
In case the investor is endowed with a low initial equity exposure, the investor’s
fraction of stocks after trading is decreasing in her initial equity exposure and in-
creasing in her basis-price-ratio p∗. Even though her total fraction of stocks after
trading is higher than her fraction of stocks before trading, it is not as high as if
the investor was not facing a capital gain (i.e. p∗ = 1). This is due to the fact
that next period’s basis-price-ratio is a weighted average of the beginning-of-period
basis-price-ratio and one. The lower the beginning-of-period basis-price-ratio and
the higher the initial equity exposure are, the lower next period’s basis-price-ratio
and thus the higher the risk of getting ￿locked in￿ with a signi￿cant amount in future
periods will be. To avoid increasing that risk too much, the investor’s optimal equity
exposure is lower than that of an investor who is not facing unrealized capital gains
or losses.
With increasing initial equity exposure, the investor attains an initial equity
exposure exceeding her optimal equity exposure. As long as her optimal equity
exposure does not deviate too far from the equity exposure, she has to hold to
avoid paying the capital gains tax. The rebalancing motive is outweighed by the
opportunity to earn compound returns on the unrealized capital gains. If the investor
is given an even higher initial equity exposure, the rebalancing motive outweighs the
tax-saving motive, and the investor’s wealth after trading is reduced by the capital
gains tax payment, which is why her fraction of stocks after trading relative to
beginning-of-period-wealth slightly decreases in her initial equity exposure. With
high capital gains tax payments, the investor decreases her beginning-of-period-
wealth after trading. As we de￿ned the optimal equity proportion to be the investor’s
stocks holdings relative to her beginning-of-period-wealth before trading, her optimal
equity exposure slightly decreases when realizing capital gains.
The lower right graph in Figure 2.2 di￿ers from the lower left graph by considering
an investor who is endowed with an initial loss carryforward of 10% of her beginning-
of-period-wealth. If her basis-price-ratio is above one, indicating that the investor
67faces an unrealized capital loss, she slightly increases her optimal equity exposure
due to the higher initial loss carryforward after trading.
If, in turn, the investor faces a basis-price-ratio below one, indicating that she
faces unrealized capital gains, her optimal equity exposure di￿ers signi￿cantly de-
pending on the di￿erent levels of the initial equity proportion. For low levels of her
initial equity proportion, she can increase her equity exposure to the desired level
without being confronted with any tax payments. As her initial equity proportion
increases, she uses her loss carryforward to rebalance her portfolio without facing
the capital gains tax. If, however, her unrealized capital gains exceed her loss car-
ryforward, she accepts about the same equity exposure as if she did not start with
an initial loss carryforward. 15
2.4.3 The Value of an Initial Loss Carryforward
In this section, we analyze the value of a loss carryforward by computing the equiv-
alent wealth increase an investor who has no loss carryforward would need to attain
the same level of expected utility as an investor who has an initial loss carryforward.
Since each dollar allows the investor to decrease tax-payments by not more than τ
dollars, a dollar of loss carryforward is never worth more than these τ dollars. How-
ever, if the investor faces a signi￿cant loss carryforward, her loss carryforward might
be worth less for two reasons. First, she might not use her entire loss carryforward,
implying that the potential value of the loss carryforward never turns into wealth
that can be consumed or bequeated. This type of risk is especially important for
older investors facing high mortality rates. Second, even if she uses her entire loss
carryforward, it might take several periods until her entire loss carryforward is con-
verted to wealth and she can earn pro￿ts from it. Since the loss carryforward does
not pay any interest, whereas ￿ in contrast ￿ tax rebates can be reinvested, one
dollar in a signi￿cant loss carryforward can be worth less than one dollar in a small
loss carryforward.
Figure 2.3 shows the equivalent wealth increase an investor who has no initial
loss carryforward needs to attain the same level of expected utility as an investor
15In fact, her optimal equity exposure is slightly above the level when she has no initial loss
carryforward, since the loss carryforward allows her to decrease her beginning-of-period-wealth
after trading less sharply than in the absence of a loss carryforward. However, the di￿erence is
very small and hardly visible in Figure 2.2.
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Figure 2.3: This Figure shows the equivalent wealth increase an investor who has no
initial loss carryforward needs to be compensated with to attain the same level of
expected utility as an investor who has an initial loss carryforward in a tax-system
that does not grant any tax rebates on capital losses ( m = 0). The left graph
shows the investor’s equivalent wealth increase when the investor’s basis price-ratio
is p∗ = 0.5 and her initial equity exposure is s = 1 depending on her age and her
initial loss carryforward. The right graph shows the equivalent wealth increase of
an investor at age 20 whose basis-price-ratio is p∗ = 0.5 as a function of her initial
equity proportion and her initial loss carryforward.
who has an initial loss carryforward. The left graph shows the equivalent wealth
increase an investor who has no initial loss carryforward needs to be compensated
with to attain the same level of expected utility as an investor who has an initial
loss carryforward, given that the investor faces unrealized capital gains ( p∗ = 0.5)
and her initial equity exposure is s = 1. The graph depicts the equivalent wealth
increase depending on the investor’s age and her initial loss carryforward. The
investor’s equivalent wealth increase is rising in the initial loss carryforward, since
each dollar of loss carryforward allows the investor to earn capital gains tax-free,
which is obviously an advantage. However, there is no linear relationship between
the level of the initial loss carryforward and the equivalent wealth increase. In fact,
the equivalent wealth increase is concave in the level of the initial loss carryforward.
This re￿ects the fact that a substantial loss carryforward faces a lower probability
of being entirely used than a low loss carryforward and that the loss carryforward
does not pay any interest, while the equivalent wealth increase can be invested.
The equivalent wealth increase is strictly decreasing as the investor ages. This
is because with increasing age of the investor, mortality rates increase such that the
probability that the loss carryforward remains unused and is worthless increases.
69Consequently, her equivalent wealth increase for the loss carryforward decreases as
the investor ages.
The right graph shows the equivalent wealth increase of an investor at age 20
who faces substantial unrealized capital gains in her equity ( p∗ = 0.5) in a tax-
system that does not grant any tax rebates for capital losses. The equivalent wealth
increase is depicted against the investor’s initial loss carryforward and her initial
equity proportion. Con￿rming the ￿ndings of the left graph, we ￿nd that the value of
the loss carryforward is a concave function of the level of the initial loss carryforward,
indicating that an additional dollar of loss carryforward provides the investor with
a lower utility when the investor’s initial loss carryforward is at a high level than
when it is at a low level.
Furthermore, the value of the loss carryforward is strictly increasing in the level
of the investor’s initial equity proportion. While for low levels of the initial eq-
uity proportion, the investor can increase her equity proportion to the desired level
without facing any tax-payments, for higher levels of the initial loss carryforward
the investor can use her loss carryforward to rebalance her portfolio without facing
the capital gains tax payments. Even when the investor’s initial equity proportion
is zero, indicating that the investor does not face any unrealized capital gains, the
initial loss carryforward is valuable for her due to the fact that she can carry it
forward and use it in forthcoming periods where she might face unrealized capital
gains.
2.4.4 Limited versus Unlimited Tax Rebates
Having analyzed optimal consumption, investment and equivalent wealth increases
for investors facing tax-systems with limited capital loss deduction, we now turn
to the impact of limits on tax rebates for the investor’s asset allocation decision.
Limits on tax rebates lessen the appeal of risky assets, since they confront the
investor with the same taxable treatment as in a tax-system with unlimited tax
rebates when the investor faces positive capital gains, but leaves the investor with
higher wealth decreases when she realizes capital losses. Even though the investor is
granted a loss carryforward that can be carried forward inde￿nitely, she is worse o￿
in a tax-system with limited capital loss deduction, as a tax rebate is more attractive
than a loss carryforward.
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Figure 2.4: This Figure shows the di￿erence between the investor’s optimal equity
exposure in a tax-system with unlimited tax rebates and a tax-system with no tax
rebates (di￿erence in equity exposure). The upper graphs depict the change in equity
exposure as a function of age and the initial loss carryforward, given a basis-price-
ratio of p∗ = 0.5 (upper left graph) and p∗ = 1.5 (upper right graph). The lower
graphs show the change in equity exposure as a function of the basis-price-ratio and
the initial equity exposure given a 20 year old investor (lower left graph) and a 90
year old investor (lower right graph).
In this section, we analyze the optimal asset allocation of investors that have no
initial loss carryforward in tax-systems with unlimited tax rebates in comparison to
tax-systems with limited tax rebates. 16 We show that due to limits on tax rebates,
the investor signi￿cantly decreases her equity exposure ￿ especially when having
neither substantial unrealized capital gains nor losses. For an investor in a tax-
system with unlimited capital loss deduction, our results con￿rm the ￿ndings of
Dammon et al. (2001).
Figure 2.4 shows the di￿erence between the optimal equity exposure (change in
16We do not compare asset allocation strategies in tax-systems with unlimited tax rebates to asset
allocation strategies in tax-systems with limited tax rebates for investors that have an initial
loss carryforward since in tax-systems with unlimited tax rebates, investors can never face a loss
carryforward since all their losses qualify for immediate tax rebates.
71equity exposure) for an investor trading in a tax-system with unlimited tax rebates
for capital losses and a tax-system with no tax rebates for capital losses that only
grants a loss carryforward. The upper graphs depict the change in equity exposure
as a function of age and the initial loss carryforward, given a basis-price-ratio of
p∗ = 0.5 (upper left graph) and p∗ = 1.5 (upper right graph). The lower graphs
show the change in equity exposure as a function of the basis-price-ratio and the
initial equity exposure given a 20 year old investor (lower left graph) and a 90 year
old investor (lower right graph).
The upper left graph of Figure 2.4 shows the change in equity exposure of an
investor who is endowed with a signi￿cant unrealized capital loss in her equity
(p∗ = 0.5). If such an investor is facing an initial equity exposure that is above
her desired level, she is ￿locked in￿. In both tax-systems, the opportunity to earn
compound returns is a strong incentive to postpone the realization of her capital
gains. Consequently, her desired level of equity is about the same in both tax-
systems. If, however, the investor has a small initial equity exposure below her
desired equity exposure, she increases her equity exposure in both tax-systems.
However, in the tax-system with unlimited tax rebates, the risk-return pro￿le of the
risky asset is more attractive which is why the increase in her equity exposure is of
a higher order of magnitude in the tax-system with unlimited tax rebates.
The upper right graph of Figure 2.4 shows the change in equity exposure of
an investor who is endowed with a signi￿cant unrealized capital loss in her equity
(p∗ = 1.5). As it is optimal to realize that loss immediately in both tax-systems,
the investor in the tax-system with unlimited tax rebates ends up with a higher
level of wealth, whereas the investor in the tax-system with no tax rebates ends up
with a loss carryforward she can use in forthcoming periods. For low levels of the
initial equity exposure, the tax-gift or the loss carryforward are quite small and the
investor in the tax-system with unlimited tax rebates increases her equity exposure
to a higher level than the investor in the tax-system with limited tax rebates. Again,
this ￿nding is due to the more attractive risk-return-pro￿le of the risky asset in the
former tax-system.17
17The sharp decrease in the change in equity exposure for an investor at age 99 is due to the
assumption that the investor’s maximum age is 100. Since next period’s capital gains are tax-
exempt when being bequeathed, the remaining loss carryforward does not provide the investor
with an advantage and provides a strong incentive not to sell equity with embedded unrealized
capital gains in both tax-systems.
72If the investor is given neither an unrealized capital gain nor loss ( p∗ = 1, not
shown here), the investor’s optimal equity proportion does not depend on her initial
equity exposure in neither the tax-system with limited nor with unlimited capital
loss deduction. This is due to the fact that for p∗ = 1, the investor can rearrange
her portfolio without facing capital gains tax-payments or tax rebates.
If the investor has a high initial equity exposure, she increases her equity expo-
sure in both the tax-system with unlimited and limited tax rebates. Even though the
initial loss carryforward granted in the tax-system with limited capital loss deduc-
tion increases the attractiveness of equity, the increase in wealth in the tax-system
with unlimited capital loss deduction outweighs this e￿ect and the change in equity
exposure increases as the initial equity exposure increases. The lower increase in the
tax-system with limited tax rebates is due to the reason that with increasing loss
carryforward, the probability of entirely using that loss carryforward and potentially
building up an even higher loss carryforward that has an even lower probability of
being used is increasing in the level of the loss carryforward. In contrast, one dol-
lar of tax rebate increases the investor’s beginning-of-period-wealth and thus the
increase in her equity exposure is increasing in her initial equity exposure.
The lower graphs in Figure 2.4 depict the change in equity exposure of an investor
at age 20 (lower left graph) and age 90 (lower right graph), respectively. If the
investor has neither an unrealized capital gain nor with an unrealized capital loss (i.e.
p∗ = 1), which is, for example, the case for an investor entering the stock market,
her equity exposure at age 20 in a tax-system without capital loss deduction is about
26.9%, which is below the 35.9% in a tax-system with unlimited tax rebates. This is
due to the fact that on the one hand in the tax-system with limited tax rebates, the
investor bears the entire risk when having net capital losses, as she does not get any
tax rebates on them. On the other hand, capital gains are treated the same way as
in a tax-system with unlimited tax rebates. Hence, equity is less attractive in the
tax-system with limited tax rebates which is why the investor holds a substantially
lower fraction of her wealth in equity.
If the investor is facing an unrealized capital loss (i.e. p∗ > 1), it is optimal
to realize that loss immediately. The investor has a loss carryforward, which is
higher as the net capital loss p∗ and her initial equity exposure increase. As this
loss carryforward allows for earning some future capital gains tax-free, the investor
73chooses a higher equity proportion after trading compared to the case of p∗ = 1.
While in the tax-system with unlimited tax rebates, the investor receives the loss
carryforward in cash as a tax rebate, in the tax-system with no tax rebates, it only
has value to the investor if it can be subtracted from forthcoming capital gains.
This is why in the tax-system with limited tax rebates, the increase in the fraction
of stocks is stronger than in the tax-system with unlimited tax rebates, but remains
at a certain level with increasing realized losses to avoid ending up with a portfolio
that is too heavily invested into equity.
If, however, the investor is facing an unrealized capital gain (i.e. p∗ < 1) and her
fraction of stocks before trading is low, her fraction of stocks after trading will be
about the same as without the capital gain and her basis-price-ratio after trading
will decline. Compared to the tax-system with unlimited tax rebates, the danger
of getting ￿locked in￿ with a higher amount of wealth seems to be neglectable. The
reason for this is that in the tax-system with limited tax rebates, each capital gain in
equity increases her future capital gains tax, while each loss in equity decreases her
future capital gains tax. This decrease in the future capital gains tax results in future
capital gains and capital losses being treated equally and thus has a higher value
for the investor than a loss carryforward, as the loss carryforward carries the risk of
potentially remaining unused. The numerical result suggests that the opportunity
of reducing the embedded capital gain outweighs the risk of getting locked in.
If the investor is facing an unrealized capital gain, and her fraction of stocks
before trading is substantial, the rebalancing motive outweighs the opportunity of
earning compound returns on the unrealized capital gains and the results in the
tax-system do not di￿er from those in the tax-system with unlimited tax rebates.
Comparing the lower left and the lower right graphs of Figure 2.4 shows that the
change in equity exposure decreases for an investor who does not have an unrealized
capital gain or loss (p∗ = 1). This is due to the fact that with increasing age
the investor runs a higher risk of generating a loss carryforward that she cannot
use in her remaining lifetime, which is why she reduces her equity exposure. If,
however, the investor faces unrealized capital losses she realizes these capital losses,
immediately and generates a loss carryforward. Since a 20 year old investor may
expect to have a higher remaining life expectancy than a 90 year old investor, the
90 year old investor tries to make use of the loss carryforward as early as possible,
74which is why she increases her equity exposure more strongly than the 20 year old
investor. However, in a tax-system with unlimited tax rebates there is an even
stronger increase in equity exposure due to the forgiveness of capital gains when
being bequeathed. Consequently, the di￿erence in equity exposure is higher for the
90 year old investor.
2.4.5 Comparative Static Analysis
Having analyzed the optimal tax-timing and asset allocation decision of an investor
in our base-case scenario, we now turn to a comparative static analysis and analyze
the impact of exogenous non-￿nancial income and the upper bound on capital losses
qualifying for tax rebates.
Ideally non-￿nancial income should be introduced into our model with its own
stochastic process. However, this would require increasing the number of state vari-
ables, and signi￿cantly complicating our numerical analysis. We therefore follow
recent literature (see e.g. Dammon et al. (2001, 2004)) and assume the investor’s
non-￿nancial income to be a constant proportion of her beginning-of-period wealth.
However, since present savings thereby do not only increase future wealth, but
also future non-￿nancial income, this assumption overstates the impact of present
savings. We consider an investor who has a non-￿nancial income of 15% of her
beginning-of-period-wealth before taxation during her working life until age 65, cor-
responding to a non-￿nancial income after taxes of 9.6%. When retired, we assume
the investor’s non-￿nancial income to decrease to 70% of her non-￿nancial income
during her working life.
In contrast to an investor who has no non-￿nancial income, the investor who
is endowed with non-￿nancial income of 15% of her beginning-of-period-wealth de-
creases her consumption over the life cycle (not shown here). This is due to the fact
that some part of her non-￿nancial income is used for consumption while some other
part is used to increase her savings and thereby her bequest potential. The younger
the investor is, the less important the bequest potential is, and thus the higher the
part of her non-￿nancial income is that she uses to increase her consumption.
Figure 2.5 shows the optimal asset location of an investor with non-￿nancial in-
come of 15% of her beginning-of-period-wealth. Compared to the optimal investment
strategy for an investor who has no non-￿nancial income (see Figure 2.2), the optimal
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Figure 2.5: This Figure shows the optimal equity exposure in a tax-system with
no tax rebates on capital losses (m = 0) for an investor who has no initial loss
carryforward (l = 0) and has non-￿nancial income of 15% of her beginning-of-
period-wealth before taxation during working-age, corresponding to an after-tax
income of 9.6%. When being retired, non-￿nancial income is cut down by 30%.
The left graph depicts her optimal equity exposure depending on her age and her
initial equity proportion when she is facing substantial capital gains in her equity
(p∗ = 0.5). The right graph depicts her optimal equity exposure at age 20 when she
has no initial loss carryforward (l = 0), depending on her initial equity proportion
and her basis-price-ratio.
equity proportion is signi￿cantly higher. This is due to the fact that non-￿nancial
income grants the investor a certain increase in her beginning-of-period-wealth and
is thus more similar to the return on the risk-free asset than the return on the risky
asset. Consequently, the investor wishes to hold a higher fraction of stocks than an
investor who is not endowed with non-￿nancial income.
The left graph depicts her optimal equity exposure over the life cycle, given
that she faces a basis-price-ratio of p∗ = 0.5 and has no initial loss carryforward
(l = 0). It shows that, in contrast to the base-case without non-￿nancial income,
the investor now accepts a higher deviation from her optimal equity exposure when
she is locked in. This is due to the fact that future non-￿nancial income allows her
to rebalance her portfolio without having to pay the capital gains tax. When the
investor approaches retirement age, she consequently accepts a lower deviation from
her optimal equity exposure, since her future non-￿nancial income decreases. As
her age increases, the accepted deviation increases again. This re￿ects the fact that
capital gains are forgiven when being bequeathed, which is a strong incentive not
to realize the capital gains.
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Figure 2.6: This Figure shows the optimal equity exposure in a tax-system with
tax rebates on capital losses not exceeding 1% of the investor’s beginning-of-period-
wealth (m = 0.01). The left graph shows the optimal equity proportion of an
investor who has substantial capital gains in her equity ( p∗ = 0.5) and an initial loss
carryforward of 10% of her beginning-of-period-wealth ( l = −0.1). The right graph
shows the optimal equity exposure of an investor at age 20 depending on her initial
equity exposure and her basis-price-ratio.
The right graph depicts the optimal equity exposure when the investor is 20
years old and has no initial loss carryforward ( l = 0). It shows that, compared to
the base-case scenario without non-￿nancial income, the investor’s equity exposure
is signi￿cantly higher. This is due to the fact that future non-￿nancial income
guarantees the investor a safe after-tax return of 9.6% of her beginning-of-period-
wealth. The impact of non-￿nancial wealth on her return is therefore similar to the
return of the risk-free asset. To end up with a well-diversi￿ed portfolio, her optimal
equity exposure is higher in a setting with non-￿nancial income than in a setting
without non-￿nancial income.
While so far, we have analyzed optimal tax-timing and asset allocation in a
tax-system that does not grant any tax rebates on capital losses, we now consider
the case of a tax-system that allows for small tax rebates not exceeding 1% of the
investor’s beginning-of-period-wealth (m = 0.01) in Figure 2.6. An investor who
has no initial loss carryforward and has substantial unrealized capital gains in her
equity is in a similar situation as an investor who trades in a tax-system with no
tax rebates (not shown here). This is due to the fact that the tax rebates only
provide her with an advantage if she has an initial loss carryforward or unrealized
capital losses. If her unrealized capital gains are substantial her advantage from
trading in a tax-system with tax rebates is negligible, which is why her optimal
77equity exposure does not deviate signi￿cantly from the optimal equity exposure of
an investor trading in a tax-system with no tax rebates on capital losses.
If, however, such an investor has an initial loss carryforward, the left graph in
Figure 2.6, which considers an investor with an initial loss carryforward of 10% of her
beginning-of-period-wealth, shows that the opportunity of getting tax rebates has an
impact on the optimal equity exposure. In contrast to the base-case-investor (upper
right graph of Figure 2.2) the investor does not use her entire loss carryforward
immediately to rebalance her portfolio. This is due to the fact that in the tax-
system that allows for tax rebates, she can not only subtract her loss carryforward
from realized capital gains, but can also use it to earn tax rebates. In contrast to
the tax-system with no tax rebates, she thus has the opportunity of both making
use of her loss carryforward and earning compound returns on the unrealized capital
gains. Consequently, her decrease in the optimal equity exposure is less severe than
in the tax-system that does not allow for tax rebates.
The right graph in Figure 2.6 depicts the optimal equity exposure of an investor
at age 20 with no initial loss carryforward ( l = 0) as a function of her initial equity
proportion and her basis-price-ratio. If the investor’s basis-price-ratio is above one,
indicating that the investor has an unrealized capital loss, her optimal equity expo-
sure increases less compared to an investor has no initial loss carryforward than in
a tax-system with no tax rebates (lower left graph in Figure 2.2). This is due to the
fact that without tax rebates, the investor can only make use of the loss carryfor-
ward when generating capital gains. In the tax-system with tax rebates, however,
the investor can also make use of the loss carryforward by realizing it in forthcoming
periods and earning the tax rebates granted for it. Consequently, she ends up with
a smaller remaining loss carryforward, which is why she does not increase her eq-
uity exposure as strongly as an investor in a tax-system without tax rebates, whose
remaining loss carryforward is at a higher level.
2.5 Conclusion
In his seminal 1983 paper, Constandinides shows that in a tax-system that permits
wash sales and provides unlimited tax rebates for incurred net capital losses, and in a
market without transaction costs, it is optimal to realize capital losses immediately,
78even though this trading strategy increases the investor’s purchase price. This paper
generalizes his ￿nding to tax-systems with limited tax rebates. It further shows,
not very surprisingly, that generally in such a tax-system, investors cannot attain
the same level of wealth as in a tax-system with unlimited tax rebates. Due to
the asymmetric taxable treatment of capital gains and losses in such a tax-system,
investors tend to hold substantially less equity than in tax-systems with unlimited
tax rebates.
If the investor is endowed with an initial loss carryforward, the optimal equity
exposure increases, since the loss carryforward allows the investor to earn capital
gains tax-free, which increases the desirability of stocks. The less that capital losses
qualify for tax rebates, the lower the equity exposure is. This ￿nding suggests that
investors in countries with more generous capital loss deduction should have a higher
equity exposure than investors in countries with lower or no capital loss deduction.
Whether this is in fact the case or whether the equity exposure is more driven
by national risk-attitude, di￿erent risk-return pro￿les of the assets for home-biased
investors in di￿erent national markets or other factors is an interesting question for
empirical research.
Inevitably, this paper neglects many important issues. Instead of considering the
impact of an absolute bound on capital loss deductions, it considers a bound relative
to current beginning-of-period-wealth and thus does not take the impact of the ab-
solute level of wealth on tax-timing into account. Furthermore, it ignores di￿erent
tax-rates on long-term and short-term capital gains and losses, transaction costs,
potential income shocks and more than one risky asset. When having the opportu-
nity of investing in more than one risky asset, the investor could potentially realize
losses in one risky asset to reduce diversi￿cation costs when selling another asset
with unrealized capital gains that makes up a substantial fraction of the investor’s
portfolio. Interesting avenues for further research are to include these factors into
the model, to compute tax-rates that allow investors to end up with the same level
of utility in a tax-system with limited tax rebates for given wealth and tax-rates
in a tax-system with unlimited tax rebates, and to analyze optimal tax-timing in a
tax-system where wash sale rules apply.
79Appendix:
Anmerkungen f￿r Deutschland
Im vorangehenden Artikel ist die Bedeutung einer asymmetrischen Besteuerung von
Kursgewinnen in einem Steuersystem untersucht worden, welches in wesentlichen
Grundz￿gen dem US-amerikanischen Steuersystem nachempfunden wurde. Im Rah-
men dieses Appendix soll kurz auf den Fall einer Anlegerin eingegangen werden,
die sich in einem Steuersystem bewegt, welches in den wesentlichen Grundz￿gen
dem deutschen Steuerrecht entspricht. Gegen￿ber dem US-amerikanischen Steuer-
system sieht sich die Anlegerin nach aktuell g￿ltiger Rechtslage dabei insbesondere
folgenden Unterschieden ausgesetzt:
• Der Spitzensteuersatz liegt h￿her als in den USA.
• Kursgewinne sind nach einer Mindesthaltedauer von einem Jahr steuerfrei.
Auf Grund der Steuerfreiheit von Kursgewinnen, die nicht als Spekulationsgewinne
gelten, kann die Anlegerin nach Ablauf der Mindesthaltedauer ihr Portfolio um-
schichten, ohne im Falle des Verkaufs von Wertpapieren mit Kursgewinnen, ihre
Kursgewinne versteuern zu m￿ssen. Dadurch besteht f￿r sie langfristige keine Ge-
fahr ￿locked in￿ zu werden. Somit sind f￿r deutsche Anlegerinnen im betrachteten
Modell Kursgewinne steuerfrei vereinnehmbar. Insbesondere gibt es f￿r sie mangels
steuerlicher Belastung ihrer Kursgewinne auch keine tax-timing Option. τg = 0 f￿hrt
also zu einem strukturell einfacherem als dem oben betrachteten Optimierungspro-
blem.
Durch die geplante Abgeltungssteuer, nach der Kursgewinne grunds￿tzlich steu-
erp￿ichtig werden sollen, k￿nnten tax-timing Strategien jedoch auch f￿r deutsche
Privatanlager schon bald Bestandteil e￿zienter Anlagestrategien werden.
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81Abstract
The literature on optimal asset location concludes almost unanimously that bonds
are the preferred asset to hold in tax-deferred accounts. We argue that in tax-
systems like the US where tax rebates on capital losses are limited, this is not
necessarily true. Depending on either positive or non-positive capital gains, bonds
remain the preferred asset to hold in a tax-deferred account. However, if the sign
of the capital gains is not known in advance, this result may not be true. This
surprising ￿nding is due to the fact that in contrast to tax-systems without limits
on tax rebates, the return on an asset in the tax-deferred account can no longer
be perfectly replicated in the taxable account since a replication risk is caused by
di￿ering replicating portfolios for positive and non-positive capital gains. While for
positive capital gains, the better performance of stocks might outweigh the higher
yield of bonds in tax-deferred account, for negative capital gains holding stocks in
the taxable account is more desirable due to the compensation for incurred losses
via potential tax rebates and a loss carryforward. A well diversi￿ed portfolio can
thus consist of stocks in both the taxable and the tax-deferred account. As one can
see, limits on tax rebates for capital losses can explain the asset location puzzle, i.e.
why private investors hold stocks in tax-deferred accounts.
JEL Classi￿cation Codes: G11, H24
Key Words: asset location, asset allocation, limited capital loss deduction, tax-
deferred accounts, loss carryforward, asset location puzzle
823.1 Introduction
The taxable treatment of private investors’ pro￿ts is a potentially important factor
in￿uencing household portfolio structure. While pro￿ts in taxable accounts are
subject to taxation, pro￿ts in tax-deferred accounts remain untaxed.
This paper explains optimal asset allocation (i.e. which assets to hold) and opti-
mal asset location (i.e. in which account to hold these assets) for investors that are
confronted with a tax-system in which tax rebates on capital losses are limited ￿
as under current US tax-law. It is most closely related to recent literature on opti-
mal asset location including Shoven and Sialm (1998, 2003), Dammon et al. (2004),
Poterba et al. (2004), Gomes et al. (2006), and Huang (2007). These papers con-
clude that in general, bonds should be preferred to stocks in tax-deferred accounts.
Garlappi and Huang (2006), in contrast, provide an example for short-selling con-
strained investors in which holding a mixed portfolio in the tax-deferred account
is optimal. Their result, however, is based on strong assumptions. Shoven (1999)
argues that based on historical returns holding stocks in tax-deferred accounts re-
sulted in higher wealth for a buy and hold investor. However, his approach fails to
control for risk properly.
This paper di￿ers from the existing literature by taking into account limitations
on tax rebates for capital losses. We show that in the presence of limited tax rebates,
it can be optimal to hold stocks in both taxable and tax-deferred accounts.
Conditioned on either a negative or a non-negative capital gain on the risky
stock tax-deferred bonds have higher replication costs in the taxable account and
should therefore be held in the tax-deferred account. However, stocks can become
the preferred asset to hold in the tax-deferred account, if the sign of the capital gain
is not known in advance. This is due to the fact that the portfolios replicating one
dollar of tax-deferred wealth in the taxable account are di￿erent for negative and
non-negative capital gains, making perfect replication no longer possible. While for
positive capital gains, the extra return resulting from the tax-exemption of pro￿ts
in the tax-deferred account might be higher for stocks than for bonds, stocks should
preferentially be held in the taxable account for negative capital gains to provide
the investor with the loss carryforward. Since the sign of a future capital gain is not
known in advance, it can be optimal to hold mixed portfolios in both accounts for
83diversi￿cation purposes. Another reason for holding stocks in tax-deferred accounts
is that limitations on tax rebates for capital losses worsen stocks’ risk-return-pro￿le
in the taxable account. The risk of generating a substantial loss carryforward which
could potentially remain unused in the investor’s remaining lifetime is especially
important for investors facing high mortality rates.
Limitations on tax rebates for capital losses can thus explain the asset location
puzzle (Amromin (2003)), i.e. why private investors hold substantial amounts of
stocks in their tax-deferred accounts.
In general, the taxation of pro￿ts has several impacts on private investors’ in-
vestment behavior. Firstly, due to shrinking returns, investors might increase their
present consumption and decrease their present investments. Secondly, if di￿erent
assets are taxed at di￿erent tax-rates, taxation has an impact on optimal asset al-
location. Historically, dividends and interest payments have been taxed at a higher
rate than long-term capital gains (Sialm (2006)). While the impact of di￿erent
tax-rates on asset allocation can still be analyzed implicitly by adjusting returns,
volatilities, and correlations accordingly, the tax-system confronts private investors
with additional tax-rules that deserve explicit modeling.
First, in the 1980s tax-deferred accounts like IRAs and 401(k)s with favorable
taxable treatment were introduced to stimulate private savings for retirement. In
particular, pro￿ts in such accounts are not subject to taxation. Furthermore, tax-
deferred accounts allow one to defer the taxation of income until withdrawal, which
is an advantage to private investors facing lower personal income tax-rates when re-
tired than when employed. However, early withdrawals from tax-deferred accounts
are subject to a 10% penalty tax. As a result of the penalty tax and limits on con-
tributions to tax-deferred accounts, taxable accounts are often used as a retirement
saving vehicle, as well. Due to the di￿erent taxable treatment of assets in taxable
and tax-deferred accounts, it is important to make an informed decision as to which
assets to locate in each account.
Second, capital losses exceeding the amount of $ 3,000 cannot be o￿set against
other income and thus do not qualify for tax rebates. This tax-rule has an unfavor-
able impact on the risk-return-pro￿le of volatile assets as it confronts the investor
with tax-payments in case of a capital gain, but limits tax rebates for capital losses. 1
1This rule assures that public ￿nances are not a￿ected too strongly when capital markets perform
84Instead, for losses that do not qualify for tax rebates, the investor receives a loss
carryforward that can be carried forward inde￿nitely and can be subtracted from
future capital gains to reduce future tax-burden or to generate a future capital loss
that quali￿es for a tax rebate.
Third, capital gains are not only taxed at a lower rate when being realized
long-term, they also come with a tax-timing option. That is, capital gains are not
taxable the moment they occur, but the moment they are realized. This option
provides the investor with an opportunity to defer the realization of capital gains
and to exploit the e￿ect of compound returns, resulting in a reduction of the e￿ective
capital gains tax-rate (Chay et al. (2006)). A tax-timing option thus increases the
equity exposure. However, tax-timing is associated with a risk of ending up with an
unbalanced portfolio. An asset that comes with substantial capital gains in some
period tends to increase its fraction in the investor’s portfolio. If the investor does
not sell some units of that asset, the investor’s portfolio may become too heavily
invested in it. Hence, for assets with an unrealized capital gain, postponing the
taxation of the unrealized gain and diversi￿cation can be opposing desires. If an asset
comes with an unrealized capital loss, and wash-sale rules do not apply, Marekwica
(2007) extends the classical result of Constantinides (1983) to tax-systems where
tax rebates on capital losses are limited. He shows that it is optimal to realize
that loss immediately even though that realization increases the investor’s tax-basis.
In addition, the investor’s compensation potentially comes as a loss carryforward,
which is less attractive than a tax rebate, since the loss carryforward does not pay
any interest and potentially remains unused.
In this paper, we focus on the impact of tax-deferred investing and limitations
on tax rebates for capital losses, and ignore the tax-timing option to concentrate on
the impact of limits on tax rebates for asset allocation and to keep our optimization
problem numerically tractable.
While optimal asset allocation is intensively discussed in the economic literature,
research on optimal asset location is a more recent ￿eld of research going back to Tep-
per and A￿eck (1974), Black (1980) and Tepper (1981). They analyze investment
strategies of companies running de￿ned-bene￿t pension plans and conclude that in
poorly. The revenue from capital gains taxation for public ￿nances are thus similar to the payo￿
of a call option on a fraction of the capital gains with forced realization for losses not exceeding
$ 3,000.
85the absence of tax-timing options, limits on capital loss deduction, and short-selling
restrictions, only bonds should be held in de￿ned-bene￿t pension plans. Auerbach
and King (1983) point out that this result can also be applied for private investors
with a tax-deferred account. Along this line, Shoven (1999) and Shoven and Sialm
(1998) introduce the asset location problem to household investment decisions.
Asset location strategies private investors follow in practice are analyzed in Bodie
and Crane (1997), Poterba and Samwick (2001) and Barber and Odean (2003).
According to these studies, private investors fail to exploit the opportunities tax-
deferred accounts o￿er them. Particularly for long-term investment horizons, contri-
bution rates have an important impact on total ￿nal wealth (Gomes et al. (2006)).
This is due to the tax-exemption of pro￿ts in tax-deferred accounts, which has a
tremendous impact on total ￿nal wealth for long-investment horizons due to the com-
pounding on the taxes saved. It would seem that if there were no early withdrawal
penalty, all individuals would contribute to tax-deferred accounts to the limit.
Amromin (2002) and Bergstresser and Poterba (2004) point out that many in-
vestors hold considerable amounts of equity in their tax-deferred accounts. Further-
more, according to the study of Benartzi and Thaler (2001), private investors’ equity
exposure in tax-deferred accounts and pension plans increases with the number of
equity funds the investors can choose from. In particular, many investors seem to
follow simple 1
n-diversi￿cation strategies.
If investors have limited taxable wealth and face high labor income risk, some
authors, among them Amromin (2003), Dammon et al. (2004) and Amromin (2005)
argue that bonds can be the preferred asset to hold in the tax-deferred account to
avoid the penalty tax on early withdrawals and to smooth consumption over the life
cycle. However, even with substantial income shocks, Dammon et al. (2004) show
that it usually still remains optimal to hold stocks in the taxable account.
While the impact of the opportunity to invest in a tax-deferred account 2 and
the impact of tax-timing on asset allocation 3 have been intensively discussed in the
literature, only limited guidance is available to investors faced with tax-systems
where tax rebates on capital losses are limited.
2See e.g. Shoven and Sialm (1998, 2003), Dammon et al. (2004), Poterba et al. (2004), Huang
(2007), Garlappi and Huang (2006), Gomes et al. (2006) and Zaman (2007).
3See e.g. Constantinides (1983, 1984) Dammon et al. (1989), Dammon and Spatt (1996), Dammon
et al. (2001, 2004), Chay et al. (2006) and Gallmeyer et al. (2006).
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free bonds are the preferred asset to hold in a tax-deferred account. We, however,
show that with limited capital loss deduction, it can be optimal to hold stocks in
tax-deferred accounts. We propose that limits on tax rebates for capital losses can
thus solve the asset location puzzle.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 derives the e￿ects
driving optimal asset location decisions when tax rebates on capital losses are lim-
ited. Section 3.3 introduces the model and presents our numerical results. Section
3.4 summarizes and gives some hints for further research.
3.2 E￿ects of Limits on Tax Rebates
We consider a market in which the investor has the opportunity to invest into a
risk-free bond paying a pre-tax return of r > 0 and a risky stock paying a constant
pre-tax dividend rate of d > 0, and a risky capital gains rate gt in period t. The
parameters τg ∈ (0,1) and τd ∈ (0,1) respectively denote the tax-rate on capital
gains and losses and on dividends and interest. αT,t denotes the fraction of stocks in
the taxable account relative to taxable wealth invested in period t. That is, αT,t is
the fraction of stocks in the taxable account relative to beginning-of-period-taxable
wealth adjusted for income, consumption, and contributions to or withdrawals from
the tax-deferred account. αR,t denotes the fraction of stocks relative to tax-deferred
retirement wealth invested in period t. In the absence of a limitation on capital
loss deduction, the investor’s period t gross-return RT,t on a risky asset in a taxable
account is given by
RT,t = 1 + (1 − τd)d + (1 − τg)gt. (3.1)
We, however, analyze a tax-system where capital losses exceeding a certain amount
M ≥ 0 do not qualify for tax rebates. 4 If Gt denotes the realized capital gain (or
loss) of an investor in period t and Lt−1 the loss carryforward that has been carried
over from period t−1 to t, the net capital gain (or loss) Tt in period t that is subject
to the capital gains tax is given by
Tt ≡ max(Gt + Lt−1;−M). (3.2)
4Under current US tax-law M is equal to $ 3,000.
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forward to the following periods. Thus, the loss carryforward Lt that can be carried
over from period t to period t + 1 is given by
Lt ≡ Gt − Tt + Lt−1. (3.3)
For simplicity, we assume capital losses to be limited by zero in this section, i.e.
there are no tax rebate payments at all and M = 0 (this assumption is relaxed in
section 3.3.5).5 If χgt>0 denotes the characteristic function which is 1 for gt > 0 and
0 for gt ≤ 0, the gross-return on the risky asset in the taxable account RT,t in period
t is given by
RT,t = 1 + (1 − τd)d +

1 − τgχ{gt>0}

gt =

 
 
1 + (1 − τd)d + (1 − τg)gt if gt > 0
1 + (1 − τd)d + gt if gt ≤ 0.
(3.4)
The limitation of capital loss deduction in the taxable account is an obvious dis-
advantage to the investor, as although there is no longer a tax rebate when facing
capital losses, the investor is still confronted with tax-payments when the capital
gain is positive. The gross-return on the risky asset in the tax-deferred account
RR,t at time t is not a￿ected by a limitation on capital loss deduction due to the
tax-exemption of pro￿ts and is given by
RR,t = 1 + d + gt. (3.5)
Huang (2007) uses a tax-arbitrage argument to show that the investor should only
hold bonds in the tax-deferred account when there is no limit on tax rebates for
capital loss deduction and the investor has the opportunity to go short in the taxable
account. Her tax-arbitrage argument considers the replication costs of one dollar of
bonds C
(R)
B,u and one dollar of stocks C
(R)
S,u in the tax-deferred account. Assuming that
the tax-rate on coupon payments is higher than on capital gains, that is, τd > τg,
and the interest rate on the risk-free asset is higher than the dividend rate on the
5Such a taxable treatment of capital losses is, for example, implemented in the German tax-code.
88stock, i.e. r > d, she shows that C
(R)
B,u and C
(R)
S,u are given by
C
(R)
B,u =
1 + r
1 + (1 − τd)r
(3.6)
C
(R)
S,u =
1
1 − τg
+
1
1 + (1 − τd)r
d(τd − τg) − τg
1 − τg
(3.7)
and that the replication cost in the taxable account for one dollar of tax-deferred
bonds is higher than for one dollar of tax-deferred stocks, i.e. C
(R)
B,u > C
(R)
S,u. One can
thus replicate one dollar of bonds in tax-deferred wealth by C
(R)
B,u dollars of taxable
wealth in bonds. One dollar of stocks in tax-deferred wealth can be replicated by 1
1−τg
dollars of stocks and 1
1+(1−τd)r

d(τd−τg)−τg
1−τg

dollars of bonds in the taxable account.
Therefore, bonds are the preferred asset to hold in the tax-deferred account.
Even in the absence of a short-selling opportunity, the recent literature except
for Garlappi and Huang (2006) concludes that it usually remains optimal to hold
bonds in the tax-deferred account.
If, however, capital loss deduction is limited, a stock in a tax-deferred account in
period t can no longer be perfectly replicated in a taxable account as the replicating
portfolio depends on whether the capital gain gt is positive or not. In this case,
stocks in the taxable and the tax-deferred account are only close but no longer
perfect substitutes in the sense that the return in the tax-deferred account can no
longer be perfectly replicated in the taxable account.
For gt ≤ 0, the replicating portfolio for one dollar of stocks in the tax-deferred
account is one dollar of stocks and
τdd
1+(1−τd)r dollars of bonds in the taxable account.
Its replication cost C
(R)
S,l is given by
C
(R)
S,l = 1 +
τdd
1 + (1 − τd)r
< C
(R)
B,l (3.8)
in which C
(R)
B,l = 1+r
1+(1−τd)r is the replication cost for one dollar of bonds in the tax-
deferred account. Since the risk-free asset does not come with any capital gains or
losses its replication cost is the same as in a tax-system with unlimited capital loss
deduction.
For gt > 0 the replicating portfolio thus is the same as in the case with unlimited
tax rebates for capital losses and thus consists of 1
1−τg stocks and 1
1+(1−τd)r

d(τd−τg)−τg
1−τg

dollars of bonds in the taxable account. As C
(R)
S,u < C
(R)
B,u = C
(R)
B,l , the replicating
89portfolio for both gt > 0 and gt ≤ 0 is more expensive for bonds than for stocks in
the tax-deferred account.
As one can see, conditioned on either gt ≤ 0 or gt > 0 bonds are more expensive
to replicate in the taxable account than stocks. This implies that given gt ≤ 0
or gt > 0 bonds have their preferred location in the tax-deferred account if the
replication cost of tax-deferred wealth in the taxable account is state independent
at each point in time (Huang (2007)). However, this does not imply that bonds are
the preferred asset to hold in the tax-deferred account. This is due to the fact that
the replicating portfolios for gt ≤ 0 and gt > 0 are di￿erent. If the investor chooses
the replicating portfolio for gt ≤ 0, but gt turns out to be positive, the return of the
replicating portfolio is given by
1 + d + gt (1 − τg) < 1 + d + gt. (3.9)
In this case, the return of the replicating portfolio is lower than in the tax-deferred
account, due to the taxation of capital gains in the taxable account. If, on the other
hand, the investor chooses the replicating portfolio for gt > 0, but gt turns out to
be negative, the return of the replicating portfolio is given by
1 + d +
gt
1 − τg
< 1 + d + gt. (3.10)
Again, the return of the replicating portfolio is below the return of one unit of stocks
in the tax-deferred account. Hence, in addition to the uncertainty about the return
of the risky asset, replication itself is another source of risk. In contrast to the
setting in Huang (2007) with limits on tax rebates there is no longer a dominating
asset location strategy. In the presence of limits on tax rebates for capital losses,
it can be optimal to hold stocks in both taxable and tax-deferred accounts for two
reasons.
First, whereas so far, the focus of our analysis has been on the impact of asset
location decisions for cash ￿ows, the asset location decision also has an impact on
a future loss carryforward. An investment strategy that does not invest heavily in
stocks in the taxable account in some given period potentially generates a small loss
carryforward that has a high probability of being entirely used in future periods In
contrast, an investment strategy that does invest heavily in stocks in the taxable
90account potentially generates a huge loss carryforward that has a lower probability
of being entirely used in future periods. It can be optimal to invest in stocks in both
the taxable and the tax-deferred account to have the opportunity of generating a
small loss carryforward, while avoiding generating a high loss carryforward with a
lower probability of being entirely used.
Second, for negative returns, stocks are better held in the taxable account to have
the opportunity of being compensated for capital losses with a loss carryforward.
For substantial positive returns, however, stocks are better held in the tax-deferred
account to bene￿t from the tax exemption of capital gains in the tax-deferred ac-
count. Thus, holding stocks in both taxable and tax-deferred accounts can be part
of a diversi￿cation strategy and limits on tax rebates for capital losses can explain
the asset location puzzle.
Due to the di￿erent taxable treatment in tax-deferred and taxable accounts,
shifting assets between these two accounts changes their risk-return pro￿les. While
shifting bonds from a taxable to a tax-deferred account increases their return by
τdr, shifting stocks from the taxable to the tax-deferred account increases their
return by τdd + τggt in a tax-system with unlimited capital loss deduction and by
τdd + τgχ{gt>0}gt in a tax-system with limits on tax rebates. Thus, stocks are less
attractive in the taxable account in the tax-system without tax rebates on capital
losses. This is because the taxable treatment for positive returns remains the same,
while for negative returns the investor is not compensated for losses in cash, but
instead with a loss carryforward that ￿ in contrast to tax rebates ￿ does not pay
any interest and bears a risk of never being converted into cash. The second source
of risk is especially important for aged investors with higher mortality rates.
In a tax-system with unlimited tax rebates on capital losses, the tax-deferred
account provides an investor with the opportunity of either earning a safe τdr extra
dollars per dollar of bonds in the tax-deferred account or τdd+τggt extra dollars for
each dollar of stocks in the tax-deferred account in period t. In particular, as τggt
is negative for gt < 0, the tax-exemption of pro￿ts in the tax-deferred account can
be a disadvantage to the investor since there are no tax rebates on capital losses in
tax-deferred accounts. In a tax-system without tax rebates on capital losses, the
tax-deferred account provides an investor who has no initial loss carryforward with
the opportunity of either earning a safe τdr extra dollars and a loss carryforward of
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Asset E￿ect of shift on Unlimited tax rebates No tax rebates
Bonds Return τdr τdr
Extra loss carryforward - -
Stocks Return τdd + τggt τdd + τggtχ{gt≥0}
Extra loss carryforward - τggtχ{gt<0}
Table 3.1: This table shows the ￿ects of shifting asset from a taxable to a tax-
deferred account in tax-systems with limited and unlimited tax rebates on capital
losses.
τggt dollars, if gt < 0, per dollar of bonds shifted to the tax-deferred account or a
safe τdd extra dollars and an extra τggt extra dollars if gt > 0, per dollar of stocks
shifted to the tax-deferred account.
While in the tax-system with unlimited capital loss deduction, shifting stocks
from the taxable to the tax-deferred account increases the order of magnitude of
a capital loss, this does not hold in a tax-system without capital loss deduction.
Thus, shifting stocks from the taxable to the tax-deferred account does not increase
the downside risk, but increases the upside potential. However, for negative capital
gains, stocks have their preferred location in the taxable account due to the loss
carryforward granted for incurred losses and the preferential taxable treatment of
bonds in the tax-deferred account.
Table 3.1 summarizes the e￿ects of shifting assets from the taxable to the tax-
deferred account in tax-systems without tax rebates on capital losses and unlimited
tax rebates.
If, however, the investor is endowed with an initial loss carryforward, potential
capital gains in the taxable account not exceeding that loss carryforward can be
earned tax-free by making use of the loss carryforward. In that case, shifting stocks
to the tax-deferred account only allows the investor to earn τdd extra dollars, whereas
shifting bonds to the tax-deferred account allows her to earn τdr > τdd extra dollars
per dollar invested in the tax-deferred account. Thus, for investors that are endowed
with an initial loss carryforward of substantial size, holding bonds in the tax-deferred
account increases their total wealth more than holding stocks in the tax-deferred
account.
However, due to penalties on early withdrawal, the opportunity to earn pro￿ts
tax-free and maximum contribution limits in tax-deferred accounts, taxable and
92tax-deferred wealth are imperfect substitutes. Besides the impact on total wealth,
the distribution on future taxable and tax-deferred wealth can have an impact on
the optimal investment decision as well.
Furthermore, an investment decision a￿ects the next period’s distribution of the
loss carryforward. Since a loss carryforward does not pay any interest, a given
increase in a loss carryforward has a higher value for an investor who is endowed
with a low initial loss carryforward than for an investor who is endowed with a high
initial loss carryforward.6 While the investor who is endowed with an initial loss
carryforward performs better in case of a positive capital gain, the investor without
an initial loss carryforward generates a higher advantage from the loss carryforward.
Due to the higher value of a potential increase in the loss carryforward, for an
investor who has no loss carryforward it can even be rational to hold a higher equity
proportion in the taxable account than for an investor with a small loss carryforward.
In addition, the advantage of an initial loss carryforward depends on the distri-
bution of the investor’s total wealth. Investors that hold a high fraction of their
total wealth in a tax-deferred account should c.p. assign a lower value to an initial
loss carryforward than investors holding a substantial fraction of total wealth in a
taxable account.
While so far it has been assumed that the tax-system does not allow for tax
rebates (M = 0), we now turn to the case that the tax-system does allow for tax
rebates (M > 0). In this case, it can be optimal to carry losses forward and receive
tax rebates from the loss carryforward in future periods. For not decreasing the loss
carryforward, and thereby tax rebate payments, it can be optimal to hold stocks
in the tax-deferred account. If, however, an investor only has a small or no loss
carryforward, it can be optimal to hold mixed portfolios in both the taxable and the
tax-deferred account.
3.3 Numerical Evidence
Having analyzed the e￿ects of limits on tax rebates for optimal asset location de-
cisions from a theoretical perspective, we now focus on the optimal asset location
and asset allocation over the life cycle in a numerical setting. We consider an econ-
6This issue is analyzed in more detail in section 3.3.3.
93omy consisting of investors living for at most T years that can only trade at time
t = 0,1,...,T. F(t) denotes the probability that the investor is still alive through
period t (t ≤ T). Investors in that economy derive utility from the consumption of a
single good and have CRRA-utility with parameter of risk-aversion γ ∈ [0,∞), i.e.
U(Ct) =

 
 
C
1−γ
t
1−γ for γ 6= 1
ln(Ct) for γ = 1.
(3.11)
The parameter γ represents the investor’s willingness to substitute consumption
among di￿erent states in time. It also represents the elasticity of consumption, which
is given by 1
γ. Given an initial endowment, the investor optimizes the discounted
expected utility of lifetime consumption and bequest, subject to the intertemporal
budget constraint. Following Dammon et al. (2001), we assume that at the time
of death, the investor’s remaining wealth is used to purchase an H-period annuity
payable to the investor’s bene￿ciary and that the H-period annuity provides the
bene￿ciary with nominal consumption of AHWt (1 + i)
k−t at date k (t + 1 ≤ k ≤
t + H), in which AH ≡
r∗(1+r∗)H
(1+r∗)H−1 is the H-period annuity factor, Wt is the sum of
the investor’s taxable and after-tax tax-deferred wealth, and r∗ ≡
(1−τd)r−i
1+i is the
after-tax real bond return. For simplicity, the bene￿ciary is assumed to have the
same preferences as the investor. On this assumption, H can be interpreted as a
measure for the strength of the investor’s bequest motive. High values of H denote a
strong bequest motive and low values denote a weak bequest motive. The parameter
β represents the investor’s utility discount factor and i is a constant annual in￿ation
rate. If Ct denotes the investor’s consumption, Zt the contribution to (or withdrawal
from) the tax-deferred account that is limited by some upper bound Bt, i.e. Zt ≤ Bt,
τp is the penalty tax-rate applicable to early withdrawals from tax-deferred accounts,
At is the investor’s age in period t, J is the investor’s mandatory retirement age,
and Nt is the investor’s non-￿nancial income in period t, the investor’s optimization
94problem over the life cycle can be expressed as
max
Ct,αT,t,αR,t,Zt
E
"
T X
t=0
β
t
"
F(t)U

Ct
(1 + i)
t

+ [F(t − 1) − F(t)]
t+H X
k=t+1
β
k−tU

WtAH
(1 + i)
t
##
(3.12)
subject to
Wt = WT,t + (1 − τd)WR,t t = 1,...,T (3.13)
WT,t = Nt (1 − τd) + QT,t−1

αT,t−1 (1 + (1 − τd)d + gt−1)
+ (1 − αT,t−1)(1 + (1 − τd)r)

− τgTt−1 t = 1,...,T (3.14)
QT,t = WT,t − Ct − Zt
 
1 − τd − τpχ{Zt<0}∩{At<J}

t = 0,...,T − 1 (3.15)
WR,t = QR,t−1

αR,t−1 (1 + d + gt−1) + (1 − αR,t−1)(1 + r)

t = 1,...,T
(3.16)
QR,t = WR,t + Zt t = 0,...,T − 1 (3.17)
QT,t,QR,t,Ct ≥ 0; αT,t,αR,t ∈ [0,1]; Zt ≤ Bt t = 0,...,T − 1 (3.18)
given the investor’s initial taxable wealth WT,0, the initial tax-deferred wealth WR,0
and the initial loss carryforward L−1. F(−1) is set equal to one to indicate that
the investor is alive at the end of period 0. U(.) denotes the utility function of the
investor and the bene￿ciary.
According to Equation (3.12), the investor’s current expected utility is a weighted
sum of utility from consumption and utility from bequest. Equation (3.13) de￿nes
the investor’s beginning-of-period-wealth Wt at time t to be the sum of taxable
wealth WT,t and WR,t that part of tax-deferred retirement wealth that does not fall
to the treasury at withdrawal.
Equation (3.14) describes the evolution of wealth in the taxable account. WT,t
is the investor’s taxable wealth in period t before consumption and investment deci-
sions. QT,t−1 is the investor’s taxable wealth invested in period t−1 after consump-
tion, contributions or withdrawals, and the tax-payments or tax-rebates resulting
from the contribution or withdrawal. Equation (3.15) is the investor’s budget con-
straint. It shows how the investor’s reinvestable wealth in the taxable account
depends on consumption as well as the contribution or withdrawal from the tax-
deferred account.
95Equations (3.16) and (3.17) de￿ne the evolution of wealth in the tax-deferred
account. Equation (3.16) shows the evolution of wealth WR,t in the tax-deferred
account. QR,t−1 is the investor’s tax-deferred wealth invested from period t − 1 to
period t. Equation (3.17) de￿nes QR,t. If the investor dies before retirement age,
we assume that the penalty tax on early withdrawal does not apply, which, among
other reasons, can be the case if the bene￿ciary is the investor’s spouse.
By letting Xt denote the vector of the investor’s state variables, Vt(.) the in-
vestor’s value function at time t, and f(t) the probability of surviving from period
t to t + 1, and taking into account that
k+H X
k=t+1
β
k−t =
β (1 − β)
H
1 − β
(3.19)
as shown in Dammon et al. (2001), the optimization problem can also be stated as
Vt(Xt) = max
Ct,αT,t,αR,t,Zt
"
f(t)U

Ct
(1+i)t

+ f(t)βEt [Vt+1 (Xt+1)]
+(1 − f(t))
β(1−βH)
1−β U

AHWt
(1+i)t
#
(3.20)
for t = 0,...,T −1 subject to Equations (3.2), (3.3) and (3.13) to (3.18) with vector
of state variables
Xt = [WT,t,WR,t,Lt−1] (3.21)
and terminal condition VT(XT) = U

AHWT
(1+i)T

. For the numerical analysis, we assume
that M is a constant multiple of Wt, i.e. m ≡ M
Wt is a constant. Following Dammon
et al. (2004), we assume that non-￿nancial income Nt is a constant multiple of Wt,
i.e. n ≡ Nt
Wt (t ∈ NJ ≡ {t ∈ N|t ≤ J}) is a constant during the accumulation phase
and a multiple of n that is given by the replacement rate λ during retirement. We
further assume that bt ≡ Bt
Wt is an exogenously given constant during the investor’s
working age.
When the investor is retired, we do not allow any further contributions and
require the investor to withdraw at least a fraction of 1
E[L(At)] of the remaining
tax-deferred wealth when the investor is aged 70.5 and older where L(At) is the
remaining life-expectancy of an investor at age At. The optimization problem can
then be simpli￿ed by normalizing both the objective function and the constraints
96by Wt. We let wR,t ≡ (1 − τd)
WR,t
Wt denote the fraction of total beginning-of-period-
wealth in the tax-deferred account. qT,t ≡
QT,t
Wt is the investor’s taxable wealth
after transactions relative to beginning-of-period-wealth and qR,t ≡ (1 − τd)
QR,t
Wt is
the investor’s retirement wealth after transactions relative to beginning-of-period-
wealth. The investor’s initial loss carryforward beginning-of-period-wealth ratio is
lt ≡
Lt−1
Wt . zt ≡ Zt
Wt is the investor’s contribution-wealth-ratio, and ct ≡ Ct
Wt is the
investor’s consumption-wealth-ratio. Finally,
δt ≡
Gt
QT,t
= αT,tgt (3.22)
is the investor’s capital gain per dollar invested in the taxable account from period
t to t+1. The investor’s taxable capital gains wealth ratio tt ≡ Tt
Wt is then given by
tt = max(δtqT,t + lt−1,−m) (3.23)
in which qT,t = 1−wR,t−ct−zt
 
1 − τd − τpχ{zt<0}∩{At<J}

de￿nes the ratio between
QT,t and Wt. If
µT,t = αT,t

1 + (1 − τd)d + gt

+ (1 − αT,t)

1 + (1 − τd)r

(3.24)
and
µR,t = αR,t

1 + d + gt

+ (1 − αR,t)

1 + r

(3.25)
denote the investor’s return per dollar invested in the taxable account and the tax-
deferred account before capital gains tax payments, respectively, the evolution of
the investor’s total wealth is given by
Wt+1
Wt
=
qT,tµT,t − τgtt + qR,tµR,t
1 − nt+1 (1 − τd)
. (3.26)
For the evolution of the investor’s tax-deferred retirement wealth, it holds that
wR,t+1 = qR,tµR,t
Wt
Wt+1
, (3.27)
97and the evolution of the investor’s loss carryforward is given by
lt ≡
Lt
Wt+1
=
Lt
Wt
Wt
Wt+1
= (δtqT,t − tt + lt−1)
Wt
Wt+1
. (3.28)
By de￿ning vt(xt) ≡
Vt(Xt)
￿
Wt
(1+i)t
￿1−γ to be the normalized value function, and ρt ≡
Wt+1
Wt(1+i)
to be the real growth rate of total wealth in period t, the assumption of CRRA-utility
assures that the investor’s objective function can be rewritten as
vt(xt) = max
ct,αT,t,αR,t,zt
"
f(t)U(ct) + f(t)βE

vt+1 (xt+1)ρ
1−γ
t

+(1 − f(t))
β
 
1 − βH
1 − β
U (AH)
#
(3.29)
with vector of state-variables
xt = [wR,t,lt−1]. (3.30)
The investor’s optimization problem can then be rewritten as
max
ct,αT,t,αR,t,zt
"
f(t)U(ct) + f(t)βE

vt+1 (xt+1)ρ
1−γ
t

+ (1 − f(t))
β
 
1 − βH
1 − β
U (AH)
#
(3.31)
subject to
qT,t,qR,t,ct ≥ 0; αT,t,αR,t ∈ [0,1]; zt ≤ bt (3.32)
and Equations (3.22) through (3.28).
For the numerical analysis, it is assumed that annual in￿ation is i = 3.5%,
mandatory retirement age is J = 66, in that the investor retires when she turns
66. It is further assumed that exogenous income nt is 0.15 during the accumulation
phase and 0.105 during retirement, corresponding to a replacement ratio of λ = 0.7.7
The risk-free rate is set to r = 6%, the return on equity is lognormally distributed,
independent in time, and comes with an expected capital gain of µ = 7% (t ∈ NT), a
standard deviation of σ = 20.7% (which corresponds to a standard deviation of the
7Ideally, non-￿nancial income should be introduced into our model with its own stochastic process.
However, this would require increasing the number of state variables and signi￿cantly complicate
our numerical analysis. We therefore follow recent literature (see e.g. Dammon et al. (2001, 2004))
and assume the investor’s non-￿nancial income to be a constant proportion of her beginning-of-
period wealth. However, since present savings do not only increase future wealth, but also future
non-￿nancial income, this assumption overstates the impact of present savings.
98real return of about 20%), and a constant dividend rate of d = 2% in each period.
The correct choice of the risk-premium for equity has been subject to numerous
theoretical and empirical research (see Siegel (2005) for a survey). While the his-
torical risk-premium has been about 6% in the US since 1872 (Mehra and Prescott
(1985)), economists doubt whether this will be true in future periods. We follow the
current consensus which is about 3% to 4% (see e.g. Dammon et al. (2001, 2004),
Cocco et al. (2005) or Gomes and Michaelides (2005)). The tax-rate on interest,
dividends and income is assumed to be τd = 36%. The tax-rate on realized capital
gains is assumed to be τg = 20%.8 This choice of parameters follows Gallmeyer
et al. (2006) and is quite similar to that of Dammon et al. (2004). For this parame-
ter choice, the asset location problem is the problem of whether the investor prefers
a safe extra return of τdr = 0.0216 and a loss carryforward of τggt for gt < 0 per
dollar of bonds in the tax-deferred account in period t, or a safe extra return of
τdd = 0.0072 and an extra return of τggt where gt ≥ 0 for each dollar of stocks held
in the tax-deferred account in period t. We consider an investor who makes decisions
annually starting at age 20 (t = 0). The maximum age the investor can attain is set
to 100 years (T = 80). It is assumed that the relative risk-aversion of the investor is
γ = 3 and the annual subjective utility discount factor is β = 0.96. The data for the
survival probabilities of our investor were set equal to the survival probabilities for
female investors according to the 2001 Commissioners Standard Ordinary Mortality
Table.
During the accumulation phase until retirement age J, the maximum contri-
bution is set to bt = 5% (t ∈ NJ−1). When the investor is retired, we do not
allow any further contributions and require an investor at age At with remaining
life-expectancy of L(At) to withdraw at least a fraction of 1
E[L(At)] of the remaining
tax-deferred wealth when the investor is aged 70.5 and older. Initially, H is set
to H = 10 in the bequest function, indicating that the investor wished to provide
the bene￿ciary with an income stream for the next 10 years. This set of parameter
values is referred to as the base case scenario. Table 3.2 summarizes these base-case
parameters.
Our optimization problem can be solved numerically using backward induc-
8Since the tax-rate on long-term capital gains is equal to the tax-rate on dividend income, we
thereby implicitly assume that the capital gains qualify for long-term treatment. The case with
τg = τd = 0.36 is analyzed in section 3.3.5.
99Base-case Parameter Values
Description Parameter Value
Risk-aversion γ 3
Length of investment horizon T 80
Number of years annuity bene￿ciary H 10
Mandatory retirement age J 66
Utility discount factor β 0.96
Dividend rate d 2%
Expected return stock µ 7%
Standard deviation stock σ 20.7%
Interest payment of bond r 6%
In￿ation rate i 3.5%
Non-￿nancial income n 15%
Tax-rate on dividends, interest and income τd 36%
Tax-rate on capital gains τg 20%
Table 3.2: This table reports the parameter values used in the base-case.
tion. The state-space for the vector of endogenous state-variables xt = [wR,t,lt−1]
is spanned over a 51 × 51 grid with equally distributed grid points on [0,1] and
[−0.5,0], respectively, for each period t. For values of [wR,t,lt−1] within the grid,
cubic spline interpolation is performed. The integral of the expectation in Equation
(3.31) is computed using Gaussian quadrature.
In the following, we present our numerical results for the optimal consumption-
investment problem in the presence of taxes, limits on tax rebates for capital losses
and short-sale restrictions. The model is ￿rst solved for the base-case parameters.
To demonstrate the e￿ect of limits on tax rebates for capital losses and tax-deferred
investment opportunities, the model is also solved for a setting with unlimited tax
rebates for capital losses and a setting without a tax-deferred account. These two
settings serve as benchmarks for our forthcoming analysis. The optimal consumption
policy is considered in section 3.3.1, and the optimal investment policy is analyzed
in section 3.3.2. In section 3.3.3, we compute the value of an initial loss carry-
forward. Section 3.3.4 examines the e￿ect of optimal asset location on expected
utility by comparing the optimal investment strategy with the strategy of preferring
bonds in tax-deferred accounts. Section 3.3.5 examines the sensitivity of the optimal
investment and liquidation policies to various model parameters.
1003.3.1 Optimal Consumption Policy
We begin the discussion of our numerical results by presenting the investor’s optimal
consumption policy over the life cycle depending on age, the fraction of wealth in
the tax-deferred account and an initial loss carryforward the investor is potentially
endowed with. As benchmark cases, we consider an investor in a tax-system with
unlimited capital loss deduction and an investor who does not have the opportunity
of locating funds in a tax-deferred account.
The relation between the optimal consumption-wealth ratio and age depends
heavily on the investor’s bequest motive. As the investor ages, her mortality rate in-
creases and the impact of the bequest motive on her consumption decision increases.
Investors with strong bequest motives will decrease their consumption-wealth ra-
tio; while in contrast, investors with low levels of bequest motive will increase their
consumption-wealth ratio. The bequest motive used in the base-case is not so strong
that the investor decreases her consumption throughout her entire life nor is it so
weak that she increases her consumption throughout her entire life. Due to tax-
e￿ects and a replacement ratio below one, the investor decreases her consumption
until retirement age and increases it again afterwards.
However, the optimal consumption-wealth ratio does not only depend on age,
but also on the investor’s initial loss carryforward and the distribution of her wealth
to the taxable and the tax-deferred account. The higher the loss carryforward, the
more advantageous the risk-return pro￿le of equity in the taxable account, and thus
the higher the increase of potential future consumption for each dollar that is not
consumed today. The higher the investor’s fraction of wealth in the tax-deferred
account, the higher the investor’s expected return on her total wealth. Thus, to
generate the same expected wealth in the forthcoming period, an investor who has
a high fraction of tax-deferred wealth can consume more than an investor who has
a small fraction of tax-deferred wealth.
Figure 3.1 depicts the optimal consumption-wealth ratios of an investor in our
base-case setting who is endowed with either no initial loss carryforward (l = 0,
left graph), or an initial loss carryforward of 10% of her beginning-of-period wealth
(l = −0.1, right graph).
The investor’s optimal consumption depends on both age and the fraction of
101Optimal consumption over the life cycle in the base-case
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Figure 3.1: Optimal consumption-wealth-ratio (optimal consumption) for a female in-
vestor in the base-case scenario who has an initial loss carryforward of zero (l = 0) or
10% of her initial wealth (l = −0.1) as a function of her age and her initial fraction of
tax-deferred wealth.
tax-deferred wealth. The optimal consumption is strictly increasing in tax-deferred
wealth except for very high levels of tax-deferred wealth where the investor has to
withdraw from her tax-deferred account to ￿nance consumption. This is due to
the fact that tax-deferred wealth provides the investor with higher returns than
taxable wealth due to the tax-exemption of pro￿ts. Due to the tax-exemption of
pro￿ts in tax-deferred accounts, one dollar of tax-deferred wealth is worth more
than one dollar of taxable wealth if the investor can avoid the penalty-tax on early
withdrawal (Dammon et al. (2004), Poterba (2004)). Hence, with a higher level of
tax-deferred wealth, the investor can attain the same level of next-period-wealth
by investing a lower amount of wealth today. Furthermore, the investor can both
increase her present consumption by consuming some part of the di￿erence between
the amount of wealth needed in the absence of a tax-deferred investment opportunity
and the amount needed in the presence of tax-deferred investment opportunities,
and investing the remainder. Young investors, however, face penalties on early
withdrawals from tax-deferred accounts.
Prior to the retirement age of 66, the investor’s consumption gradually decreases.
This re￿ects the fact that at retirement age, the investor’s non-￿nancial income
sharply decreases. To keep up a certain level of consumption, the investor builds
up capital she can use to compensate for the decrease in non-￿nancial income when
she reaches retirement age.
Over the life cycle, the investor faces two structural changes in the taxable treat-
102ment of her wealth. First, having attained retirement age, the investor is not allowed
to make any further contributions to the tax-deferred account, but is allowed to
withdraw from it. For an investor with very high levels of tax-deferred wealth, the
opportunity to withdraw funds from the tax-deferred account is an advantage since it
allows her to consume without being confronted with the tax-penalty on early with-
drawal. Hence, having attained retirement age consumption increases signi￿cantly. 9
An investors with lower levels of tax-deferred wealth, however, does not consider the
opportunity of withdrawing funds from the tax-deferred account a tremendous ad-
vantage, since she is endowed with su￿cient amounts of taxable wealth. The upper
bound on contributions of zero prevents such investors from shifting taxable wealth
to tax-deferred wealth for earning higher returns. The investor thus can no longer
increase returns by shifting the location of assets, which reduces the intertemporal
rate of consumption, and makes current consumption more attractive due to the
decreasing premium on consumption deferral. Consequently, the consumption level
increases having attained retirement age.
Second, at age 70.5 the investor is subject to the minimum withdrawal rules
which force her to withdraw at least a fraction, equal to one divided by her remaining
life expectancy, from her tax-deferred account. Due to this forced withdrawal, the
investor’s return is decreasing since assets in the tax-deferred account are not subject
to taxation of pro￿ts while assets in the taxable account are. Hence, the appeal
of current consumption increases as the premium for a deferral of consumption
decreases. This is why starting at age 70.5, the slope of the investor’s consumption
increases with time even stronger than before.
Compared to the benchmark case with no tax-deferred account (not shown here),
the investor’s optimal consumption is signi￿cantly higher, since the tax-deferred
investment opportunity allows the investor to generate substantially higher returns
than investments in the taxable account. Compared to the benchmark case with
unlimited capital loss deduction, the investor’s optimal consumption does not change
signi￿cantly.
Figure 3.1 further shows that the level of an initial loss carryforward does not
have a signi￿cant impact on optimal consumption. However, an initial loss car-
9Due to the assumption of non-￿nancial income increasing taxable wealth, the base-case investor
can never end up in such a state. In section 3.3.5 we consider an investor who does not have
non-￿nancial income.
103ryforward does have a tremendous impact on the optimal investment policy. In
particular, it has a strong impact on optimal asset location.
3.3.2 Optimal Investment Policy
Having discussed the optimal consumption policy in the previous section, we now
turn to the optimal investment policy in the presence of tax-deferred investment
opportunities and limitations on capital loss deductions.
In the absence of tax-deferred investment opportunities (not shown here), there
is no longer an asset location problem. In that case, di￿erences in the investor’s
equity exposure only depend on the remaining investment horizon and the level of
the initial loss carryforward. Not very surprisingly, the investor’s equity exposure
tends to increase with an increasing initial loss carryforward. This is due to the
fact that in the presence of a loss carryforward, the risk-return-pro￿le of the asset
becomes more advantageous to the investor. Furthermore, for low levels of initial
loss carryforward, the investor’s equity exposure decreases when the investor ages.
This is due to the fact that because by investing into equity, the investor faces a
high probability of generating a loss carryforward that potentially cannot be used
anymore.
Without limits on capital loss deduction, the tax-arbitrage argument of Huang
(2007) suggests that the investor should hold her entire tax-deferred wealth in bonds.
Our numerical analysis supports this ￿nding. Due to the unlimited tax rebates
on capital losses, the risk-return-pro￿le of stocks in the taxable account is quite
attractive, which is why the preferred asset to hold in the tax-deferred account are
bonds ￿ a result which is in line with the ￿ndings of the existing literature on optimal
asset location.
Figure 3.2 depicts the optimal proportion of stocks relative to taxable and tax-
deferred wealth after consumption, contributions, and withdrawals, in both the
taxable and the tax-deferred retirement wealth for an investor in our base-case
setting who is either endowed with no initial loss carryforward ( l = 0, upper
graphs), endowed with an initial loss carryforward of 4% of beginning-of-period
wealth (l = −0.04, middle graphs), or endowed with an initial loss carryforward of
10% of her beginning-of-period wealth (l = −0.1, lower graphs) as a function of age
and the fraction of beginning-of-period-wealth in the tax-deferred account.
104Optimal fraction of stocks in taxable and tax-deferred wealth in the
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Figure 3.2: Optimal stock holding relative to taxable and tax-deferred wealth after con-
sumption, contributions, and withdrawals for a female investor in the base-case scenario
in taxable account (TA, left graphs), and tax-deferred account (TDA, right graphs) who
is endowed with an initial loss carryforward of zero (l = 0, upper graphs), 4% of her initial
wealth (l = −0.04, middle graphs) or 10% of her initial wealth (l = −0.1, lower graphs) as
a function of age and initial fraction of tax-deferred wealth.
105The upper left graph shows the optimal equity proportion in the taxable account
for an investor who is not endowed with an initial loss carryforward. The upper right
graph shows the optimal fraction of stocks in the tax-deferred account. When the
investor is young, more stocks are held in the taxable account as the certain tax-gift
in the tax-deferred account of τdr extra dollars and the loss carryforward of τggt in
period t is very attractive when she is young and can expect to make use of the loss
carryforward at a signi￿cant probability. In contrast, if the investor is old, stocks
are preferentially held in the tax-deferred account. This is due to the fact that for an
old investor, the probability of using the entire loss carryforward in future periods
is much lower than for a young investor. That is, a safe extra return of τdd plus an
extra return of τggt if gt > 0 in period t tends to be more attractive for a young
investor than a safe τdr extra dollars and a loss carryforward of τggt dollars if gt < 0.
However, to hold a well diversi￿ed portfolio, it can be rational to hold stocks in both
the taxable and the tax-deferred account. 10
During the accumulation phase, the investor takes advantage of that diversi￿-
cation strategy and holds stocks both in her tax-deferred and her taxable account.
Having attained retirement age, she preferentially locates bonds in the tax-deferred
account. This preference is caused by two tax-e￿ects.
First, having passed age 70.5, the investor is subject to the minimum withdrawal
rules such that an increase in the return on tax-deferred wealth does not only increase
tax-deferred wealth, but also increases the minimum withdrawal in forthcoming
periods, which in turn decreases the appeal of tax-deferred investing. However, the
results of section 3.3.5 in the absence of minimum withdrawal rules suggest that such
rules cannot explain the entire decrease in the equity exposure of retired investors.
Second, having passed retirement age, the investor is no longer allowed to con-
tribute to the tax-deferred account. Since the investor’s equity exposure in the
taxable account is above the equity exposure in the tax-deferred account, and tax-
able wealth can no longer be decreased by contributing to the tax-deferred account,
the optimal equity exposure in the tax-deferred account is decreasing. Accordingly,
10The optimal equity proportion of one in the taxable account for high levels of tax-deferred wealth
is a side-e￿ect of the modeling. Whereas tax-deferred wealth is measured as beginning-of-period
tax-deferred wealth, the optimal equity proportion in the TA is given as a fraction of the investor’s
taxable wealth after consumption, contributions to and withdrawals from the taxable account.
This modeling allows us to reduce the number of decision variables. Since the investor’s optimal
consumption is about 10%, she has no taxable wealth left that can be reinvested and thus any
equity proportion in the taxable account is optimal.
106the minimum distribution rules increase the investor’s taxable wealth, which in turn
causes her to decrease her taxable equity exposure when she passes age 70.5.
When investors are very old, these e￿ects are outweighed by the high probability
of generating a loss carryforward that cannot be used anymore due to the high
mortality. Consequently, the loss carryforward has a low value for the investor, which
causes her to increase her stock holdings in the tax-deferred account and decrease
her equity exposure in the taxable account when approaching her maximum age of
100.
The middle left graph of Figure 3.2 shows the optimal equity exposure in the
taxable account of an investor who is endowed with an initial loss carryforward of
4% of her initial total wealth. Compared to the case without a loss carryforward,
there are two important di￿erences.
First, the investor’s equity exposure in the tax-deferred account at high age
decreases while her equity exposure in the taxable account increases in comparison
to the case with no initial loss carryforward. If the investor is endowed with an
initial loss carryforward, her equity exposure in the taxable account is signi￿cantly
above her equity exposure in the absence of an in initial loss carryforward. This is
due to the fact that the loss carryforward changes the risk-return-pro￿le of equity in
the taxable account in an attractive manner. The increase in the investor’s equity
exposure is such that her loss carryforward su￿ces to cover potential capital gains at
a satisfactory probability. Consequently, the investor decreases her equity exposure
in the tax-deferred account to avoid getting too heavily invested into equity.
Second, in the presence of a small loss carryforward, a retired investor holds
stocks in the tax-deferred account for lower levels of tax-deferred wealth than in the
absence of a small loss carryforward. This is because when endowed with a sub-
stantial loss carryforward, the investor holds 100% of stocks in the taxable account
for a lower level of initial tax-deferred wealth and thus can only increase her equity
exposure by holding additional stocks. To avoid getting too underweight in equity,
the investor holds some equity in the tax-deferred account as well. Again, bonds are
the preferred asset in the tax-deferred account during retirement.
With increasing length of the investment horizon, i.e. for younger investors, a
higher loss carryforward becomes more attractive, as the investor may expect to
live longer and thus the probability of making use of the loss carryforward increases.
107That is, with decreasing age, the investor increases her equity exposure in the taxable
account and decreases her equity exposure in the tax-deferred account.
The lower left graph of Figure 3.2 shows the optimal equity exposure in the
taxable account of an investor who is endowed with a substantial initial loss car-
ryforward of 10% of her total wealth ( l = −0.1). The lower right graph shows her
optimal equity exposure in the tax-deferred account. While for a small loss carry-
forward, the investor holds equity in both the taxable and the tax-deferred account
at high age, with substantial initial loss carryforward, equity is strictly preferred in
the taxable account over the entire life cycle.
3.3.3 Valuing an Initial Loss Carryforward
In section 3.2 we argued that an initial loss carryforward increases the investor’s
utility since it allows her to earn some capital gains in the taxable account not
exceeding that loss carryforward tax-free. In this section, we quantify the value of
an initial loss carryforward. We do this by computing the increase in both taxable
and tax-deferred an investor who is not endowed with an initial loss carryforward
needs to be compensated with to attain the same level of utility as an investor who
is endowed with some given initial loss carryforward.
Figure 3.3 shows the increase in both taxable wealth and tax-deferred wealth
(equivalent wealth increase) an investor who is not endowed with an initial loss
carryforward needs to be compensated with to attain the same level of utility as
an investor who is endowed with an initial loss carryforward. The left graph shows
the equivalent wealth increase for an investor at age 20 as a function of her tax-
deferred wealth and the level of her initial loss carryforward. The right graph shows
her equivalent wealth increase over the life cycle given a level of her tax-deferred
wealth of 20%. Since one dollar of loss carryforward allows saving τg dollars of
tax-payments, one dollar of loss carryforward cannot be worth more than τg dollars.
However, since in contrast to present wealth, the loss carryforward does not pay any
interest, it can be, and is, worth less as Figure 3.3 shows.
The left graph shows that if the investor is not endowed with an initial loss
carryforward, her equivalent wealth increase is strictly increasing in the value of the
initial loss carryforward, since a higher loss carryforward allows her to improve her
after-tax return in the taxable account, leaving her with a higher after-tax wealth.
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Figure 3.3: This Figure shows the increase in both taxable wealth and tax-deferred wealth
(equivalent wealth increase) in the base-case scenario with which an investor who is not
endowed with an initial loss carryforward needs to be compensated to attain the same
level of utility as an investor who is endowed with an initial loss carryforward. The left
graph shows the equivalent wealth increase for an investor at age 20 as a function of her
tax-deferred wealth and the level of her initial loss carryforward. The right graph shows
her equivalent wealth increase over the life cycle given a level of her tax-deferred wealth of
20%.
Furthermore, the equivalent wealth increase is strictly decreasing in the investor’s
tax-deferred wealth. This ￿nding is also quite intuitive as a loss carryforward only
provides the investor with an advantage in our base-case setting if she can subtract
it from future positive capital gains in her taxable account. The higher the level
of her tax-deferred wealth, the lower the level of her taxable wealth, and thus the
lower the level of potential capital gains in the taxable account relative to total
wealth. Consequently, her equivalent wealth increase is strictly decreasing in her
tax-deferred wealth.
The right graph of Figure 3.3 shows that the wealth increase of an investor being
endowed with a level of tax-deferred wealth of 20% is strictly decreasing with age
after the investor has attained retirement age. This is due to the fact that the prob-
ability of not making use of the loss carryforward is increasing as she ages. Opposing
the age-e￿ect, the minimum distribution rules increase the investor’s taxable wealth,
which in turn increase the attractiveness of an initial loss carryforward. Figure 3.3
shows that the age-e￿ect outweighs this opposing e￿ect.
Prior to retirement age, the equivalent wealth increase remains at about the same
level for a given initial loss carryforward. Approaching retirement age the investor’s
equivalent wealth increase goes up slightly with age, since at retirement age, the
109investor is no longer allowed to shift funds from her taxable to her tax-deferred
account. Thus, her taxable wealth remains at a higher level than for an investor
who can shift money to the tax-deferred account, which is why a loss carryforward
has a higher value for her.
Both the left and the right graph in Figure 3.3 show that the equivalent wealth
increase is concave in the level of the initial loss carryforward. With increasing initial
loss carryforward, an additional loss carryforward results in a decreasing impact
on equivalent wealth increase. This is due to the reason that, ￿rst, a higher loss
carryforward has a lower probability of entirely being used over the investor’s life
cycle and, second, the loss carryforward does not pay any interest. Even for high
levels of the initial loss carryforward, the level of the equivalent wealth increase
remains quite low. An investor at age 20 who is endowed with an initial level of tax-
deferred wealth and an initial level of her loss carryforward has the same expected
utility as an investor who is endowed with no loss carryforward, but an initial wealth
level that is about 2.5% above that of the ￿rst investor.
3.3.4 Welfare Analysis
In the absence of limits on tax rebates for capital losses, recent literature on optimal
asset location suggests that locating bonds preferentially in tax-deferred accounts
is an optimal asset location strategy. The previous sections examined the e￿ect of
limits on tax rebates for capital losses on optimal investment and liquidation policies.
In this section, we investigate the welfare costs of preferentially locating bonds in
the tax-deferred account and stocks in the taxable account. That is, we assume
the investor to hold stocks in her tax-deferred account only if her entire taxable
wealth is invested into stocks. We solve numerically for the optimal consumption,
contribution, and investment strategies in taxable and tax-deferred accounts using
the base-case parameters. The resulting value functions are compared to the value
function from the base-case model with optimal asset location over the entire state
space. For each point in the state space, the percentage increase is computed in both
taxable and tax-deferred wealth that would be needed to bring the value function for
the heuristic asset location strategy of preferring bonds in the tax-deferred account
up to the level of the value function following the optimal asset location strategy
(utility costs).
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Figure 3.4: Welfare costs measured as wealth increase in both taxable and tax-deferred
wealth (utility costs) needed to compensate an investor following the suboptimal asset
location strategy as compared to the optimal policy in the base-case scenario. The Figure
shows the results for an investor who is initially endowed with no loss carryforward ( l = 0,
left graph), or an initial loss carryforward of 10% of her total wealth (l = −0.1, right
graph).
Figure 3.4 shows that the utility costs of following a ￿pecking-order￿ rule which
locates as many bonds as possible in the tax-deferred account results in a higher
initial wealth needed to bring the investor up to the same level of utility as an
investor following an optimal asset location strategy. The left graph in Figure 3.4
shows the investor’s utility costs when the investor is endowed with no initial loss
carryforward (l = 0). The right graph shows the utility costs when the investor is
endowed with an initial loss carryforward of 10% of her initial wealth ( l = −0.1).
When the investor is not endowed with an initial loss carryforward, her utility costs
are positive if ever her optimal investment strategy di￿ers from the strategy of
preferring bonds in the tax-deferred account. This is the case when she is very old
and faces high mortality rates, and during her accumulation phase, when she holds
mixed portfolios in both the taxable and the tax-deferred account to diversify the
di￿erent types of risks of stocks in the taxable and the tax-deferred account. The
maximum level of the utility costs is about 1
10% for a 99 year old investor with an
initial fraction of tax-deferred wealth of 50% which is a very modest utility gain.
The low level of the utility costs is due to the fact that much of the investor’s
utility is derived from present consumption and the investor has non-￿nancial in-
come such that her future level of wealth is only partly driven by her investment
decisions. In addition, especially for older investors, those states in which the in-
111vestor prefers stocks in her tax-deferred account are only attained at a quite low
probability explaining why the investor’s utility costs at the beginning of retirement
are close to zero.
If the investor is endowed with an initial loss carryforward (right graph), her util-
ity costs when preferring bonds in the tax-deferred account and stocks in the taxable
account decrease even further. This is because the loss carryforward improves the
risk-return pro￿le of stocks in the taxable account, which makes the ￿pecking-order￿
asset location strategy approach the optimal investment strategy. Consequently, the
utility costs of following that ￿pecking-order￿ rule decrease.
3.3.5 Comparative Static Analysis
In this section, we provide some comparative static results by: varying the maximum
percentage of beginning-of-period-wealth that quali￿es for tax rebates, allowing for
non-￿nancial income, increasing the tax-rate on capital gains τg to the tax-rate on
dividends and interest τd, increasing the volatility of equity, considering the mortality
table of a male investor, and ignoring minimum withdrawal rules.
If the percentage m of the investor’s initial wealth qualifying for tax rebates is
greater than zero, the risk-return pro￿le of stocks in the taxable account becomes
more attractive, since a potential loss carryforward cannot only be subtracted from
future capital gains, but also be claimed a loss carryforward in a forthcoming period
qualifying for tax rebates if the investor has no capital gains in that period. If
the investor is not endowed with an initial loss carryforward ( l = 0), and 2% of
the investor’s beginning-of-period-wealth quali￿es for tax rebates ( m = 0.02), she
strictly prefers stocks in her taxable account except when she is very old, due to
the high mortality rates at the end of her life that leave her with a high probability
of not making use of a potential loss carryforward. If only 1% of the investor’s
beginning-of-period-wealth quali￿es for tax rebates ( m = 0.01), the investor starts
shifting stocks from the taxable to the tax-deferred account at age 95, and prefers
stocks to bonds in the taxable account when younger than 95.
If the investor does not receive any non-￿nancial income and has to ￿nance her
entire consumption from her investments, her consumption is much lower when she
is young and strictly increases to the level of an investor endowed with exogenous
112income.11 Her optimal investment strategy remains similar to that of an investor
who is endowed with non-￿nancial income.
Increasing the volatility of stocks from σ = 20.7% to σ = 31.05%, corresponding
to a volatility of real stock returns of about 30%, causes the investor to sharply
decrease her equity exposure. Furthermore, with σ = 31.05%, the investor prefers
stocks in her tax-deferred account when not being endowed with an initial loss
carryforward. Again, this is due to the fact that the higher volatility provides the
investor with a higher increase in wealth when holding stocks in the tax-deferred
account and a higher loss carryforward when holding stocks in the taxable account
compared to the base-case. Using the same argument as in the case with a higher
tax-rate on capital gains, the investor prefers stocks in the tax-deferred account.
In the base-case scenario, we have considered the mortality table of a female
investor. If, instead, one considers the mortality table of a male investor, our results
do not change signi￿cantly (not shown here). While the optimal consumption policy
remains about the same as for a female investor, the optimal asset location at the end
of the life cycle slightly di￿ers. Since men are subject to higher mortality rates, male
investors start shifting stocks from their taxable to their tax-deferred accounts at a
lower age than female investors. While female investors start this shifting around
age 88, male investors already start shifting stocks around age 81.
The two most important changes in the taxable treatment of the investor’s wealth
occur, ￿rstly, when attaining retirement age, when the investor is no longer allowed
to contribute to her tax-deferred account but the penalty-tax on early withdrawal no
longer applies, and secondly at age 70.5, when minimum distribution rules apply. In
a tax-system where early withdrawals from the tax-deferred account are not subject
to a penalty-tax, i.e. τp = 0, the investor with high level of tax-deferred wealth
decreases her consumption less than in the base-case with a penalty-tax on early
withdrawal of τp = 10%. However, she still decreases her consumption. This is due to
the fact that to ￿nance her consumption, she has to withdraw from her tax-deferred
account, which pays a tax-free return, whereas for low levels of tax-deferred wealth,
she can consume from her taxable wealth, which only pays an after-tax return.
If minimum distribution rules do not apply and the investor is never forced to
11In fact, her optimization problem is the same as for an investor with non-￿nancial income in the
very last period.
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Figure 3.5: Optimal stock holding relative to taxable and tax-deferred wealth after con-
sumption, contributions, and withdrawals for a female investor in taxable account (TA,
left graph) and tax-deferred account (TDA, right graph) who is endowed with an initial
loss carryforward of zero (l = 0), when minimum distribution rules do not apply.
withdraw funds from her tax-deferred account for legal reasons, Figure 3.5 shows
that the optimal fraction of stocks in the taxable account is signi￿cantly below the
level of an investor in a tax-system where minimum distribution rules apply for an
investor endowed with some tax-deferred wealth. 12 This is due to the fact that the
investor only withdraws funds from her tax-deferred account for consumption, since
investments in the tax-deferred account result in higher returns than investments in
the taxable account. Consequently, the investor’s taxable wealth is primarily used
for consumption and thus a low volatility in it is a desirable feature. This is why the
equity exposure in the taxable account is quite low compared to the case with a tax-
system where minimum distribution rules apply. For not getting too underinvested
into equity, the investor increases her equity exposure in the tax-deferred account.
Increasing the investor’s bequest motive by increasing H from 10 to 20 causes
the investor to decrease her consumption over the entire life cycle, but does not
change her investment strategy in either the taxable or the tax-deferred account
signi￿cantly.
In our analysis, we have so far assumed that capital gains are taxable when they
occur. Many tax-systems around the world do not tax capital gains until they are
realized, which provides the investor with a tax-timing opportunity. As tax-timing
can only be performed in the taxable account, a tax-timing option increases the
12As in the base-case setting, the high fraction of stocks in the taxable account for high levels of
tax-deferred wealth is a side-e￿ect.
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Figure 3.6: Optimal stock holding relative to taxable and tax-deferred wealth after con-
sumption, contributions, and withdrawals for a female investor in taxable account (TA,
left graph) and tax-deferred account (TDA, right graph) who is endowed with an initial
loss carryforward of zero (l = 0), when the tax-rate on capital gains corresponds to the
e￿ective capital gains rate of Chay et al. (2006) of τg = 14%.
attractiveness of holding stocks in the taxable account. Zhou (2007) argues that
optimal asset location should depend on the frequency of capital gains realizations
since this frequency a￿ects the tax burden on stocks. The study of Chay et al.
(2006) shows that due to the tax-timing option, the e￿ective capital gains rate τg,e
that the investor faces is lower than the capital gains tax-rate τg. According to their
study, the e￿ective capital gains tax-rate of an investor with capital gains tax-rate
τg = 20% is τg,e = 14%.
Figure 3.6 shows the optimal asset location and asset allocation of an investor
who is confronted with a capital gains tax-rate of τg = 14%, the e￿ective capital
gains tax-rate of Chay et al. (2006). An investor who faces such a low capital gains
tax-rate strictly prefers bonds in her retirement account, due to the high tax-burden
on these assets. These ￿ndings suggest that in the presence of a tax-timing option,
the asset location puzzle cannot entirely be explained by asymmetric treatment
of capital gains and losses in taxable and tax-deferred accounts and other factors
like the desire for liquidity might haven an important impact as well. However, to
describe the advantages of the tax-timing option in one single value, Chay et al.
(2006) require some simplifying assumptions. In particular, they assume that the
optimal liquidation price is independent of the purchase price, which ignores the
fact that with unrealized capital gains, investors tend to hold a higher fraction of
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Figure 3.7: Optimal stock holding relative to taxable and tax-deferred wealth after con-
sumption, contributions, and withdrawals for a female investor in taxable account (TA,
left graph) and tax-deferred account (TDA, right graph) who is endowed with an initial
loss carryforward of zero (l = 0), when capital gains are considered short-term gains and
τg = 36%.
that asset than without to avoid the capital gains tax payment. This assumption
thus casts doubt on whether the tax-timing opportunity causes investors to prefer
bonds in their tax-deferred accounts.
In the base-case, it has been assumed that the tax-rate on capital gains τg is
τg = 20%, which is below the dividends tax-rate that we set as τd = 36%. The
tax-rate on capital gains is only lower than the tax-rate on dividends if capital gains
are realized long-term. In case capital gains are realized short-term, the tax-rate on
capital gains is equal to that of dividends and τg = τd. Considering all capital gains
short-term gains, τg increases to τg = 36%. This increase in the tax-rate on capital
gains has a tremendous impact on optimal asset location for an investor who is not
endowed with an initial loss carryforward, as shown in Figure 3.7.
Figure 3.7 shows that when capital gains are realized short-term, an investor
who is not endowed with an initial loss carryforward prefers holding stocks in the
tax-deferred account to holding stocks in the taxable account. This result is due
to changes in the investor’s risk-return pro￿le caused by the increase of the capital
gains rate. By increasing τg from 20% to 36%, the asset location decision depends
on whether the investor prefers a safe extra return of τdr = 0.0216 and a loss
carryforward of τgg for gt ≤ 0 per dollar of bonds in the tax-deferred account in
period t, or a safe extra return of τdd = 0.0072 and an extra return of τggt in case
116that gt > 0 for each dollar of stocks held in the tax-deferred account. The increase
of τg thus increases the potential increase in wealth in the tax-deferred account for
positive capital gains, while in the taxable account it only provides the investor with
a higher loss carryforward in case of negative capital gains. Since the opportunity to
earn extra money by locating stocks in the tax-deferred account is more attractive
than the opportunity to increase the loss carryforward by holding stocks in the
taxable account, the investor prefers stocks in the tax-deferred account when her
capital gains are realized short-term.
When the investor attains retirement age and is not endowed with signi￿cant
tax-deferred wealth, she increases her equity exposure in the taxable account sig-
ni￿cantly. Having passed that signi￿cant increase in equity, however, her equity
exposure decreases with age. The strong increase in her equity exposure is due to
the fact that having passed retirement age; she no longer has the opportunity to
contribute to a tax-deferred account. On the one hand, this causes her to increase
her consumption (not shown here), as the premium for consumption deferral is de-
creasing. On the other hand, she can no longer increase her return by shifting funds
from the taxable to the tax-deferred account. To avoid decreasing her return too
sharply, she increases her equity exposure. Having increased her fraction of stocks
in the taxable account at retirement age, she then decreases this fraction again in
time. This decrease is due to the fact that her mortality increases, which in turn in-
creases her probability of potentially generating a loss carryforward that she cannot
use anymore.
3.4 Conclusion
This paper has analyzed optimal asset location and asset allocation decisions in
the presence of tax-deferred investment opportunities and limits on tax rebates for
capital losses. It has shown that in contrast to the ￿ndings in recent economic
literature, it is no longer always optimal to follow a ￿pecking-order￿ rule in such
tax-systems. Even though utility gains from following an optimal asset location
strategy are quite small, it is usually not optimal to hold as many bonds as possible
in the tax-deferred account. There are two important reasons for this result.
First, limitations on tax rebates for capital losses worsen stocks’ risk-return pro-
117￿le in the taxable account by compensating the investor with a loss carryforward
instead of a tax rebate. Especially for aged investors facing high mortality rates,
a loss carryforward is potentially worthless if the investor does not survive long
enough to o￿set it with positive capital gains or receive tax rebates on it. Further-
more, in contrast to compensation by tax refunds, a loss carryforward does not pay
any interest.
Second, while for positive capital gains holding stocks in the tax-deferred account
can result in a higher increase in total wealth, for negative capital gains holding
stocks in the taxable account results in the same return on the stock, but leaves
the investor with the tax-free return of bonds and a loss carryforward that provides
her with a tax-advantage in forthcoming periods. Thus, investors might want to
hold stocks in both taxable and tax-deferred accounts to diversify this risk. Hence,
limits on tax rebates for capital losses can explain the so-called asset location puzzle,
i.e. why private investors hold substantial amounts of their tax-deferred wealth in
stocks.
The equivalent increase in both taxable and tax-deferred wealth needed to bring
the expected lifetime utility of an investor who is not endowed with an initial loss
carryforward to the same level of an investor who is endowed with an initial loss
carryforward is convex in the level of the investor’s utility. The higher the level of
the initial loss carryforward, the lower the increase in both taxable and tax-deferred
wealth needed to bring the investor without an initial loss carryforward up to the
same level as the investor who is endowed with an initial loss carryforward. This is
due to the fact that a loss carryforward does not pay any interest and faces the risk
of never being used at all. The higher the level of the initial loss carryforward is,
the more important these two types of disadvantages are.
Inevitably this paper has ignored several important factors. In particular, it
made a simplifying assumption on the taxation of capital gains, namely that capital
gains are taxable when they occur. Many tax-systems around the world do not tax
capital gains until they are realized which provides the investor with a tax-timing
opportunity. Computations with e￿ective capital gains tax-rates according to Chay
et al. (2006) suggest that the optimal asset location decision might change when
the investor has a tax-timing opportunity. However, their e￿ective tax-rates rely on
some simplifying assumptions that are not met in this paper.
118An interesting avenue for further research is to extend our model with an endoge-
nous tax-timing opportunity. Furthermore, due to the forgiveness of capital gains
when being bequeathed, aged investors facing higher mortality rates might consider
pre-tax capital gains more important than after-tax capital gains and might thus
prefer stocks to bonds in their taxable accounts. It would be interesting to know
how our results on optimal asset location change in a tax-system that allows for tax-
timing. However, this problem is quite challenging from a numerical perspective.
We leave this problem for further research.
119Appendix:
Anmerkungen f￿r Deutschland
W￿hrend im vorangehenden Aufsatz eine Erkl￿rung f￿r das Asset Location Puzzle
im Rahmen eines Steuersystems gegeben wurde, welches dem US-amerikanischen
nachempfunden wurde, wird im Rahmen dieses Appendix auf die Situation einer
Anlegerin eingegangen, die sich mit dem deutschen Steuersystem konfrontiert sieht.
Neben ˜nderungen in der H￿he der Steuers￿tze auf Dividenden und Kursgewinne
sieht das deutsche Steuerrecht vor, dass Entnahmen aus Altersvorsorgekonten in der
Regel in Form von Leibrenten erfolgen m￿ssen. Im Rahmen so genannter R￿rup-
Vertr￿ge hat die Entnahme in Form einer lebenslangen Leibrente zu erfolgen, im
Rahmen so genannter Riester-Vertr￿ge muss die Entnahme sp￿testens ab einem
Alter von 85 in Form einer lebenslangen Leibrente erfolgen.
Dem Vorteil einer Leibrente, das Langlebigkeitsrisiko auszuschalten, stehen die
Nachteile der mangelnden Vererbbarkeit und der In￿exibilit￿t gegen￿ber. So kann
die Anlegerin etwa bei einem kurzfristig hohen ￿nanziellen Bedarf (z.B. in Folge einer
Krankheit, deren Kosten nicht oder nur teilweise von ihrer Krankenkasse getragen
werden) nicht auf das in die Leibrente investierte Verm￿gen zur￿ck greifen. Dies liegt
daran, dass Leibrenten praktisch nicht wieder ver￿u￿erbar sind, was im Wesentlichen
an der asymmetrischen Informationsstruktur liegt, der sich ein m￿glicher Verk￿ufer
und ein m￿glicher K￿ufer gegen￿ber sehen.
Bedingt auf das eigene ￿berleben darf eine Anlegerin, die eine Leibrente kauft,
eine h￿here Rendite erwarten als im Rahmen eines Auszahlplans, welche aus dem
Ableben anderer Inhaberinnen desselben Typs von Leibrente resultiert. Diesen E￿ekt
bezeichnet man auch als mortality credit.
Ein wesentlicher Unterschied zwischen Deutschland und den USA besteht darin,
dass die Mittel in Altersvorsorgekonten restriktiveren Entnahmeregelungen unter-
liegen und insbesondere keine Vererbung mehr m￿glich ist.
Der faire Preis Px einer variablen Leibrente, die im Alter von x Jahren von einer
Anlegerin gekauft wird, die h￿hstens bis zum Alter 100 lebt und ab dem Alter x+1
j￿hrlich eine gleichbleibende St￿ckzahl n des Fonds, in den investiert wird, auszahlt,
120ist gegeben durch
Px =
100−x X
t=1
x+tpxn, (3.33)
worin x+tpx die Wahrscheinlichkeit bezeichnet, dass die Anlegerin vom Alter x bis
zum Alter x + t ￿berlebt. Legt man f￿r diese Wahrscheinlichkeiten die Daten der
Sterbetafel des Statistischen Bundesamts 2002/2004 f￿r deutsche Frauen im Alter
von 66 Jahren zu Grunde, so ergibt sich
P66 = 18,4 n. (3.34)
F￿r eine j￿hrliche Zahlung von einer Einheit des Werts eines Fonds bis zu ihrem
Lebensende muss die Anlegerin also im Alter von 66 Jahren den Preis von 18,4
Einheiten dieses Fonds bezahlen.
Nachfolgend wird in Anlehnung an das vorstehende Kapitel und die deutschen
Gesetzesregelungen untersucht, welchen Ein￿uss eine erzwungene Umwandlung des
gesamten Altersvorsorgeverm￿gens bei Erreichen des 66sten Lebensjahres in eine va-
riable Leibrente hat, die ausschlie￿lich in das risikolose Wertpapier investiert. 13 Auf
Grund der erzwungenen Umwandlung des Altersvorsorgeverm￿gens in eine Leibren-
te stehen dem Vorteil der Steuerfreiheit der Ertr￿ge in diesem Konto sowie dem mit
der Leibrente verbundenen mortality credit die Nachteile der un￿exiblen Entnah-
mem￿glichkeiten sowie der mangelnden Vererbbarkeit gegen￿ber.
Um die Bedeutung der Zwangsumwandlung in eine Leibrente f￿r die optimale An-
lagestrategie einer deutschen Anlegerin abzusch￿tzen, wurde eine dem Vorgehen des
voranstehenden Artikels entsprechende Berechnung mit deutschen Parametern f￿r
Steuers￿tze, Sterblichkeiten, etc. mit Zwangsumwandlung des angesparten Alters-
vorsorgeverm￿gens in eine Leibrente durchgef￿hrt. Die Ergebnisse der Berechnung
lassen sich kompakt wie folgt zusammenfassen:
13Die hier vorgenommene Modellierung unterscheidet sich von der steuerlichen Behandlung deut-
scher Anlegerinnen dadurch, dass statt einer konstanten oder steigenden Leibrente eine variable
Leibrente zu Grunde gelegt wird. Eine solche Leibrente w￿re nicht Riester-kompatibel, wenn sie
risikobehaftete Anlageformen enth￿lt, da sie dann auf Grund von m￿glichen Wertschwankun-
gen des Fonds keine gleichbleibenden oder steigenden Auszahlungen garantiert. Es wird deshalb
davon ausgegangen, dass der Leibrentenanbieter ausschlie￿lich in das risikolose Wertpapier in-
vestiert. Ferner erlaubt eine Riester-Rente eine Implementierung eines Entnahmeplans bis 85 mit
anschlie￿ender Leibrente. Hier wird vereinfachend angenommen, dass die Anlegerin von dieser
M￿glichkeit keinen Gebrauch macht und stattdessen eine Leibrente bereits mit Ablauf des 65sten
Lebensjahres erwirbt. Die beiden wesentlichen Unterschiede zwischen einer Leibrente und einem
Entnahmeplan ￿ der mortality credit und die Unvererbbarkeit ￿ lassen sich auch im Rahmen
einer variablen Leibrente untersuchen.
121• Wie f￿r eine US-Amerikanische Anlegerin ist es auch f￿r eine deutsche Anlege-
rin ab einem Anteil des Altersvorsorgeverm￿gens von etwa 30% am Gesamtver-
m￿gen optimal, in jungen Jahren gemischte Portfolios in beiden Kontentypen
zu halten.
• Im Alter nimmt der optimale Anteil von Aktien im Altersvorsorgekonto stetig
mit dem Anteil des Gesamtverm￿gens im Altersvorsorgekonto zu. Dies liegt
daran, dass im Altersvorsorgekonto auf Grund der Zwangsumwandlung in eine
Leibrente nach Konstruktion der Leibrente keine Aktien gehalten werden k￿n-
nen. Um die Aktienquote bezogen auf das Gesamtverm￿gen nicht zu stark zu
senken, erh￿ht die Anlegerin deshalb mit steigendem Altersvorsorgeverm￿gen
ihren Aktienanteil im konventionellen Konto.
• Die M￿glichkeit in ein Altersvorsorgekonto zu investieren, bleibt trotz Zwangs-
umwandlung in eine Leibrente ohne Vererbungsm￿glichkeit sehr attraktiv, was
man daran erkennt, dass Anlegerinnen mit nicht mehr als 50% ihres Verm￿gens
im Altersvorsorgekontos den maximal zul￿ssigen Beitrag in ihr Altersvorsor-
gekonto leisten.
Zusammenfassend kann festgehalten werden, dass die Kernergebnisse des Aufsatzes
￿Are Bonds Desirable in Tax-Deferred Accounts?￿ auf eine Anlegerin, die sich ge-
setzlichen Rahmenbedingungen gegen￿ber sieht, die in groben Z￿gen den deutschen
Regelungen nachempfunden wurden, ￿bertragbar sind.
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